In 1946 when the Muslim League declared “Direct Action Day” and some of the most horrendous and large scale Hindu-Muslim violence erupted throughout India, one of the worst hit areas was the Noakhali district of Bengal. Mahatma Gandhi walked barefoot through village after village in this district, in an angry and hostile atmosphere, trying to persuade people to take a pledge not to kill others. Some strewed thorns and filth in his path and one man even physically attacked him. Gandhi was then 77, but undaunted kept on with his march for peace. Even in this darkest and seemingly most hopeless moment of his life, he was single-mindedly action-oriented. He was heard constantly murmuring to himself.

“Kya karoon? Kya karoon?” “What must I do? What must I do?” A biographer noted: “At that moment, he was magnificent.”

Tibetans all over the world are asking that question in the wake of the “fire protests” of the eight young monks and, today, of the nun, Tenzing Wangmo (age 20) in Ngaba. Demonstrations, stand-ins, vigils, marches, hunger-strikes, petitions and signature drives have been organized in Minnesota, New York, Dharamshala, Taiwan, London, New Delhi, Geneva, Paris, and other cities.

In Tibet itself the acts of self-immolation have not taken place in isolation. and protests have been reported in the surrounding region and the calls for wider protests are growing. Four days ago two Tibetans were shot by Chinese troops during a protest outside a police station in another part of Sichuan province. Woser la has been blogging incessantly and so have other Tibetan writers and bloggers in Tibet and China, Check out High Peaks Pure Earth for an English translation of a poem “Mourning” by the blogger Sengdor which appeared on October 11th.

But little notice has been paid by the world to the “fire-protests” in Tibet, there has only been some passing references on CNN, and a couple of brief reports in the BBC. Of course the world media has never been noticeably outspoken or brave when it comes to reporting on Tibet and China, but that is a given. I think that something else is using up all the available media oxygen at the moment. The “Occupy Wall Street” protests have spread to over sixty cities worldwide and show every sign of getting bigger and noisier by the week. I am completely supportive of this protest, and since the issue is one that affects everyone (whether you support the protestors or not) it is going to dominate the headlines for weeks to come. That’s why in my previous posting I suggested that our biggest demonstration of support to the people in Tibet should be five months from now on 10th March 2012. But I absolutely support the demands of feistier spirits that we have to do something right now

So what can we do?

A Tibet activist in Switzerland has come up with a brilliant idea. The beauty of the scheme is it’s unbelievable simplicity:

• It needs no more than two people to execute.
• It takes little time, about ten to twenty minutes at the most.
• It is completely legal and not unsafe in any way.
• It requires no resources other than a piece of chalk and a digital (cellphone) camera.
• Each action, like an individual brick in a building, has a definite and structurally important place in the overall success of the project.

And that’s it. I am not kidding.

Go to www.chalktibet.org If you go to the site and click on the “How does it work…?” Tab you’ll get the instructions. This action can be done on the fringes of an organized demonstration, at periodic moments during a march, or at any opportune time and place (preferably a place with a lot of foot traffic, where people will gather and look on). This action began in Switzerland and is now being taken global. Join in! And pass on the web address to all your friends, support groups or other interested parties!

Here are the instructions (from the site):

________________________

How does it work…?

The recent self-immolation protests that took place in occupied Tibet call us to action! We can’t remain silent, yet what can we do to effectively generate broad awareness of the tragic situation in Tibet that is driving Tibetans to such desperate measures? Well, here is one simple, yet thought-provoking action that can be undertaken very easily, at no cost and with little time:
Using a simple piece of chalk, let’s outline the Tibetan dead in our streets.
The objective of this action is to generate the buzz which will cause it to go viral, along the lines of guerrilla marketing. This means that your particular action in this campaign needs to be shared among your friends and, via a dedicated website, among larger online communities.

How to proceed

This powerful action requires very little: two persons, one piece of chalk and a camera. Here’s how to do it:

1. Choose a busy spot or a place with symbolic significance in your own town or city.
2. One person lies flat on the ground, as if he or she were a dead body (this should draw much attention by itself).
3. The other person draws a chalk outline of the body.
4. Tape a piece of paper with a message inside the chalk outline or write the message directly on the ground with chalk. A typical message might read “Once again this morning [or yesterday, or last week] a Tibetan committed self-immolation in Tibet in protest against China’s brutal occupation”.
5. Take a photo of the scene.
6. Post the photo on www.chalktibet.org and on your favorite social networks, requesting your friends to do the same in their own towns and cities.

_________________________

A few suggestions of mine (JN) for color, identification and variety. Just one idea per photo. Keep it simple. Think up some new ones.

• Stick a small paper Tibetan flag inside the outline. Maybe at the head?
• Put the (framed) photographs of the the nine in the outline.
• Place some flowers, wreaths and khatags inside the chalk lines
• Spread some ash or make scorch marks within the outline.
• Have a monk meditating within the chalkline.
• Try for a little background in the shot: bystanders and something to suggest the place. But don’t sweat it. The outline comes first.

I believe these and other actions and projects will draw the attention of people the world over to the sacrifice of the young nun and monks and their demands for freedom and the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet. I believe that all the many marches, protests and future demonstrations will contribute to igniting a Rangzen revolution throughout Tibet. I believe that in the not too distant future the Chinese Empire will “wither away” as all evil empires have invariably done so, and I believe I will have an opportunity to make a small contribution to the creation of an independent democratic Tibet.

Gandhi told me so. “Men often become what they believe themselves to be. If I believe I cannot do something, it makes me incapable of doing it. But when I believe I can, then I acquire the ability to do it even if I didn’t have it in the beginning.” Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi.

(RANGZEN MERO* PARWA)

In mid-December last year, Mohamed Bouazizi, a humble Tunisian street-vendor of fruits and vegetables, set himself on fire to protest the confiscation of his produce and the daily harassment and humiliation inflicted on him by police and local officials. His act set of demonstrations and riots throughout Tunisia which intensified following Bouazizi’s death on January 4, leading the authoritarian regime and its leader to flee the country after 23 years of repressive and corrupt rule.

This and the events that followed, called the “Jasmine Revolution” or the “Arab Spring”, resulted in a peaceful revolution in Egypt, an armed uprising in Libya (resulting in the fall of its dictator), civil uprisings in Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen, and protests in Israel, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Oman and elsewhere, that have yet to run their courses.

Just this year, in Tibet, starting twelve days after the death of Mohamed Bouazizi, we have had eight self-immolations – so far. And there are unsettling rumors of more to come. The latest happened after I had actually finished writing this post and late last night was doing some rewrites before forwarding it to other blog-sites and web-journals. This gave me the opportunity to put in the necessary addition – but the immediacy of it was unsettling. On October 15, 11.50 local time, a former monk of Kirti monastery Norbu Damdul set himself on fire in the central town of Ngaba. “Engulfed in flames, Norbu Damdul raised slogans demanding ‘Complete Independence for Tibet’ and ‘Return of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Tibet’”.

Two self-immolations took place a week ago, on October 7th “At around 11.30 am Tibet time today, Choephel age 19 and Khayang 18, monks of Kirti monastery, set themselves ablaze in the central town of Ngaba district”. “Eyewitnesses have told sources in exile that as they were engulfed in flames they called for Tibetans to unite and rise up against the Chinese regime and raised slogans for Tibet’s freedom and the return of the Dalai Lama from exile.”

Three days before that, on October 3 at around 2 pm local time, a very young novice monk “Kesang Wangchuk walked out onto the main street of Ngaba town holding a photo of the Dalai Lama and shouting slogans protesting Chinese rule over Tibet. He then set himself ablaze.”

Last month, on September 26, two teenage monks of Kirti Monastery, Lobsang Kalsang, and Lobsang Kunchok, both around 18 years of age “set themselves on fire in an anti-China protest in the central town of Ngaba. Their whereabouts and condition are not yet known.”

The month before, on August 18, in A Tibetan monk, 29-year old Tsewang Norbu, a monk from Nyitso monastery in Tawu, died after setting fire to himself and calling for “freedom of worship, freedom and independence for Tibet, and the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet”.

At the beginning of this year on March 16, afternoon, Phuntsog, a 16-year-old monk at Kirti monastery set himself on fire.

Readers should be reminded that two years earlier in February 27, 2009, A Kirti monk called Tapey was shot by police when he set himself on fire on. The police immediately took him away. He is said to have survived but his whereabouts are unknown.

All reports and comments in the exile Tibetan world have stressed the “tragic”, “terrible” “heartbreaking” and “desperate” aspects of these actions. Calls for international condemnation and UN intervention have been made by various political and activist organizations as well as foreign support groups. A number of demonstrations, vigils and hunger-strikes have taken place. Some concerns have been expressed that more self-immolations could happen and that a way to prevent or at least discourage such actions should be sought.

All these statements and acts of concern and support have been tremendous, and in fact such responses are crucial to make the world take notice of what is happening in Tibet. They only become somewhat misguided, even unconsciously condescending, if supporters fail to overcome their first natural reaction of dismay and horror, and are unable to view the sacrifices of the monks in the way that those young men wanted them to be seen: as calls to action for the cause of a free and independent Tibet. It is also counterproductive if the actions of these young men are misinterpreted as merely a call for human rights, religious freedom or even “autonomy” within the PRC as has been most bizarrely reported in the British paper, The Independent.

There can be no doubt that the men acted not out of despair, not because they could not go on living any longer, and not because they thought it was all over for the Tibetan freedom struggle. The reports on the immolations have been sketchy but what is clear is that they are all clear acts of political protest against Chinese rule in Tibet, with slogans calling for “Tibetan freedom and independence” (bhod rawang-rangzen) for Tibet and the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet. The last demand must also be understood in its proper historical and political context, since the Dalai Lama has always been regarded, first and foremost, as the sovereign ruler of independent Tibet, not only by those who acknowledge him as their spiritual leader, but by Tibetans from other Buddhist sects, by Bonpos, Tibetan Muslims and Christians who have their own distinct spiritual leaders.

It is more than likely that the young men were inspired, as were nearly everyone in the Tibetan world then, by the sacrifice of Thupten Ngodup, former paratrooper and one of the liberators of Bangladesh, who set himself on fire in April 1998. He did it stone cold. He was fit and healthy, of cheerful disposition, with no money problems, and living in a free country, in a small meditation hut surrounded by flowers. But he did it for bhod rawang-rangzen, for Tibetan freedom and independence.

The eight young men must also have heard or read of Mohammed Buazizi, especially after Chinese bloggers and activists, at the beginning of this year, spread the news of the Arab Spring throughout the PRC and began calling on the Chinese people to start their own Jasmine Revolution. Fifteen foreign journalists were arrested on 6th March, in “the biggest showdown between Chinese authorities and foreign media in more than two decades.” This call for revolution spread to about thirteen cities (as well as Hong Kong and Taiwan) and definitely alarmed China’s leaders. The Atlantic quoted Hilary Clinton: “They’re worried, and they are trying to stop history, which is a fool’s errand. They cannot do it. But they’re going to hold it off as long as possible.” The New York Times reported that Beijing police had banned the sale of jasmine flowers at various flower markets, causing wholesale prices to collapse. Subsequently thirty-five prominent human rights activists were arrested, the highest-profile arrest being that of the courageous and protean artist Ai Weiwei.

The self-immolations of the eight young monks were revolutionary acts of ultimate sacrifice to rouse the Tibetan people to action, in much the way as Mohammed Buazizi’s self-immolation, woke up the oppressed people of the Middle East from many many decades of fear, apathy, cynicism and weariness – and goaded them to overthrow their dictators, supreme leaders and presidents-for-life.

A New Leadership

These revolutionary acts taking place in Tibet this year, and from 2008 onwards, seem to indicate that the direction of the Tibetan struggle is now definitely coming from inside Tibet. I mean the “direction” of the freedom struggle, not the leadership of the refugee community for which there is now a non-governmental administration to replace the earlier Tibetan government in exile – probably the longest running-exile government of the Cold War period, in a manner of speaking, while it existed.

Exile governments in the Cold War era have had a fairly dismal record of returning to liberate the countries they had earlier been forced to flee, even when most of these governments were recognized and supported by such great powers as USA and Britain. Poland maintained an exile government in London during World War II and later the Soviet occupation, but it was only the long civil resistance movement of Solidarność (Solidarity), the independent trade-union movement within Poland that freed the country from the Soviet yoke in 1990.

The Czechs also had an exile government in London during the war, which returned to Czechoslovakia in 1945, but the country was effectively absorbed into the Soviet block, especially after ‘68 when Russian tanks rolled into Prague. Czechoslovakia only became free in December 1989, entirely through the efforts and sacrifice of the Czech people in Czechoslovakia through the “Velvet Revolution” (sametová revoluce).

Even under Soviet occupation the Baltic States managed to retain a few independent diplomatic representatives in Europe. Lithuania had consulates in Chicago and Rome, while the Latvian Diplomatic Service maintained representation for independent Latvia in their offices in New York and London. Only Estonia had an exile government in Sweden from 1953 to 1992 (and a consulate in New York). But freedom came to the Baltic states entirely through indigenous campaigns of civil resistance in the late 1980s, one being “The Singing Revolution.” A documentary film (now on DVD) with that title was released in 2007 and is required viewing for all Tibetan activists. The most spectacular (literally) and best-known of these campaigns was the “Baltic Chain” (or the Chain of Freedom) a peaceful political demonstration that occurred on August 23, 1989. Approximately two million people joined hands to form a human chain spanning over 600 kilometers across the three Baltic states. Such symbolic yet powerful actions not only brought about the freedom of these ancient nations but directly contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

What is striking about all these successful revolutions is that exile governments in no way brought about, or even seem to have contributed to, the civil uprisings that eventually liberated these countries. Freedom came to the people of these occupied nations through their own effort, courage and sacrifice. Of course, these struggles benefited from the major geopolitical shifts that occurred throughout the world in the eighties and nineties.

I’m dredging up these accounts of freedom struggles and exile governments, since our own Tibetan government-in-exile pulled the plug on itself this summer. Many acquaintances of mine, former officials and Rangzen activists were deeply shocked and troubled by the Dalai Lama’s decision to end the exile government and substitute it with a kind of NGO. There was even concern and alarm that the Tibetan issue, the cause of Tibetan freedom itself, might have been fatally harmed, because of the crisis in Dharamshala.

Of course in the first decade or so of our exile the exile government was truly indispensable, not just for the freedom struggle or the preservation of Tibetan culture, but for us to just hang on to a bare-bones identity. In spite of the internal wrangling, that I have written about before, there can be no doubt that the exile government did an amazing job in the first couple of decades after March 1959. I started working full-time for the exile government in 1968, though I worked as a volunteer teacher a few years earlier, during my school winter vacations. I was really surprised and impressed by the organization of the exile government and the dedication of its officials. I hope one day to put together as full an account of how the first Tibetan refugees overcame so many formidable obstacles to set up the exile government, and – why (over time) this government gave up its core mission, and became an organization whose sole apparent purpose appears to be to perpetuate itself, in regressively more ignominious and farcical ways.

In the last piece I wrote in this blog, Ending to Begin, I argued for the Dalai Lama retaining a symbolic role as head of state of the Tibetan nation, and condemned the downgrading of the exile government to the role of an NGO. I did not clearly see then that not only had the political life-span of the exile government run its natural course, but that the perhaps the resignation of the Dalai Lama and the ending of the government-in-exile was a timely event.

If we cast our minds back to the revolutionary events of 2008, the year when Lhasa was in flames, I am sure we can recall the thousands of Tibetans throughout the plateau rushing out of their monasteries, homes and tents, riding their horses down the mountainsides, all waving the national flag and all calling for Tibetan freedom and independence. We also surely remember the five major exile organization that united to create the People’s Uprising Movement and launched the peace march to Tibet. Exile Tibetans (and friends) the world-over staged enormous adrenalin charged protests and “creative action campaigns” supporting the Tibet uprisings and opposing the Beijing Olympics and the Torch Relay.

What we may have subliminally blocked out of our memory is the Dalai Lama’s statement that he would resign because Tibetans in Lhasa had rioted. We might have also forgotten the Dalai Lama ordering the five organizations to halt their march to Tibet, and prime-minister Samdong Rimpoche creating “Solidarity Committees” so as to take over the protest organizations to emasculate them and stop demonstrators from burning Chinese flags or shouting such slogans as “Free Tibet” or “China Out of Tibet.” A few years earlier Samdong Rinpoche had forbidden Tibetans from demonstrating against Chinese leaders visiting the USA. Could all the events of 2008 have led to something bigger? I clearly remember they were extraordinary in their sweep and energy. There was a definite feel of new beginnings and radical possibilities. But we will never know now, will we? Dharamshala, exercising the usual spiritual and emotional blackmail, gradually let the air out of everyone’s hopes and high-spirits, and concluded that year with an orgy of collective hypocrisy and sycophancy that was also called the November Special Meeting.

My biggest fear, my secret nightmare, is also rooted in my one lifelong dream. My dream is that in the not too distant future during an economic downturn in China, concurrently with some major internal conflict (even a revolution), rangzen uprisings will break out all over Tibet (and possibly Turkestan or Mongolia) and a real opportunity to seize Tibetan independence will finally come our way. This scenario is not as fanciful as it appears. It has happened before, in its entirety, in 1912.

But then my nightmare takes over. In the not too distant future, when the revolution happens, the Tibetan leadership, “persuaded” by its sponsors in the West who want to keep the Chinese economy afloat so their investment portfolios don’t take a hit, declare that Tibet is a part of the PRC and that Tibetans have no other aspiration except to be loyal citizens of the PRC. Pretty much what they are saying right now. A desperate China might even throw Dharamshala a bone and allow another delegation (the 23rd ?) to visit Beijing or even allow the Dalai Lama a visit to Mt. Wutaishan (riwo-tsenga). But it would kill the revolution stone-dead.

This time around the Dalai Lama has not made any direct statement about the self-immolations, and the exile-administration has not called for it to be stopped. I am grateful for this reprieve, but I’m not holding my breath. Yet perhaps, finally, the leadership of the struggle has truly passed on to those willing to die for it.

The Way Forward

The way forward for those of us in exile who believe in Rangzen is to connect with our brothers and sisters in Tibet, and find a way to contribute to the coming revolution. And we have a definite role to play, the same way that many young Arabs who had lived or had studied in the USA or Europe joined the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and provided the communication, medical, media and other skills that enabled the success of the Arab Spring.

We cannot go into all that now. It will have to be deliberated thoroughly in a forum of those committed to rangzen. I am confident this will happen soon. That said, there is some outstanding business that must be taken care of right now, here in this post. Our first task is to send a message to the people in Tibet. They have definitely heard of the resignation of the Dalai Lama and the closure of the exile government. Many must be confused and some have no doubt concluded that exiles have given up the cause. So we must send them a message, very clearly and very loudly, that whatever the mixed messages from Dharamshala, the rangzen struggle goes on, world over, and that it has become profoundly inspired and energized by the courage, commitment and sacrifice of so many inside Tibet. A most fitting moment and occasion to send this message would be the 10th March commemoration in 2012. This coming March will be particularly significant as it marks exactly 100 years when we rose up against the Chinese empire and created a free and independent Tibet.

On October 1911 revolution broke out in China. Chinese troops in Tibet went on a looting spree and terrorized the population of Lhasa city. The great historian Shakabpa tell us that the 13th Dalai Lama, in exile in Darjeeling, sent two of his officials Jampa Tendar and Trimon Norbu Wangyal, to Lhasa to take charge of the resistance. On the 26th of March 2012 they declared war on the Chinese and Manchu troops stationed there and fierce fighting broke out throughout the city. After nearly a year of hard and brutal fighting, the Chinese surrendered and were deported to China, via India. The 13th Dalai Lama entered a free Tibet the next year.

This coming March 10th, 2012, all Tibetans and friends should gather together in super demonstration/commemoration/festival events, like we have never had before. These gatherings should be so enormous, expressive, innovative, and attention-getting, that the world, but far more importantly, our brothers and sisters in Tibet will hear our collective refrain (ramgyo) to the message of revolution, freedom and independence they have sent us from over the high mountains and grasslands of Tibet. The message they have sent us all these years through their songs, poems, writings, demonstrations and flag-raisings; and also through their tears, their pain, their devastated lives and fiery sacrifices. The fires that were lit in Delhi, Kirti and Kanze have died down now, but to paraphrase His Holiness “…the flame of truth will never be fully extinguished”, and it is for us to guard and nurture these precious burning embers of truth, freedom and independence till the moment comes, and soon, when we can re-ignite them brightly in the hearts of all our people throughout the entire Tibetan plateau.

* * *

*Tibetan historians use the expression “nurturing the embers of the dharma” (tempae mero solwa) to describe the lonely but heroic struggle of a few dedicated scholars and teachers who kept the Buddha dharma alive in Tibet after the breakup of the Tibetan Empire, and eventually brought about the second or “later transmission” (tempa chidhar) of Buddhism to Tibet.

One of the highest, most commendable achievements of the Tibetan people during the last 52 years in exile has been our ability, despite extreme challenges and pressures over the years to safeguard and retain the name of Tibetan Government-in-Exile and the symbol of Tibetan independence.

Recently during the Second Tibetan National General Meeting, a significant majority of the subcommittees voted against changing the Tibetan name of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile and a unanimous decision was reached during the final outcome of the meeting, which supported this motion of maintaining the original name.  However, during the three-day special session of the 14th Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile, the members went against the overwhelming voice and decision of the people and replaced the name of Tibetan Government-in-Exile in the Tibetan Charter by “Institution/Organisation of the Tibetan People”.

At the time, due to the critical nature of the situation, the Tibetan Youth Congress had issued a rejoinder and submitted appeal letters specifically requesting that the parliament should not make hasty decisions and that it should postpone this discussion for the 15th Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile to resolve.  It also made explicit that such significant changes require extended time, contribution and deliberations from international legal experts and scholars and seek their opinions and guidelines.  The Tibetan Youth Congress remains highly apprehensive that within such a short period of time such fundamental and critical changes were made, and even more so viewing the proceedings of the parliament-in-exile which was conducted haphazardly.

Regardless of all these changes, it is an undeniable fact that the Tibetan nation belongs to the Tibetan people.  We should not be discouraged and should be capable of drawing a line between our enemy and our friends and remain unified to achieve our principal goal.  Despite the fact that it is sorely disappointed, TYC considers that the most important thing is to keep alive and sustain, the unity and hope of the Tibetan people. It will therefore respect and continue to recognize and retain the name of Tibetan Government-in-Exile.  It would also like to clearly emphasize that without violating the principles and processes of democracy, it would shoulder the responsibilities and duties and offer collective efforts to ensure Tibetan unity.  TYC would like to urge the Tibetan people all over the world to have the confidence and pride in our government and stand united.

Moreover, the true aspiration of the Tibetan people, and to safeguard the truthful cause of Tibet and to restore independence of Tibet, it is extremely important that we preserve our centuries-old historical legacy of the existence of the Tibetan government, the title and its symbol. Therefore, TYC with the firm conviction and pride of being able to restore Tibetan independence will hold in our safekeeping; a copy of the Tibetan national anthem, the Tibetan national flag, the former national emblem of the Tibetan government and an older version of the Tibetan Charter (prior to the amendments made during the extended session of the 14th Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile) and the Constitution of Tibet.  It would like to convey to our Tibetan brothers and sisters in Tibet, Tibetans in the Diaspora, the Tibet support groups and government of the People’s Republic of China that when Tibet becomes independent, these symbolic items will be returned and handed over to its rightful owner- the Tibetan nation and its people and so shall be inscribed in the chronicles of the world.

Dated: 7 June 2011

Note: Translated from Tibetan, which should be considered final and authoritative.

དེ་རིང་བོད་ཀྱི་དྲ་བརྙན་བརྒྱུད་ནས་ བཀའ་བློན་ཁྲི་པ་མཆོག་གིས་ “བོད་གཞུང་”དང་འབྲེལ་བའི་གསལ་བཤད་གནང་བ་དེར་ཉན་པ་ཡིན། ཁོང་གིས་ ཐེངས་འདིའི་བཅའ་ཁྲིམས་བསྐྱར་བཅོས་ཀྱི་རིམ་པ་དེ་གཙོ་བོར་༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་གི་སྐུ་དབང་ཕྱིར་བསྡུ་ལ་དམིགས་ཡོད་ཅེས་གསུངས་ནས། “བོད་གཞུང་”དེ་ “བོད་མིའི་སྒྲིག་འཛུགས་”ཞེས་བསྒྱུར་བ་ནི་ཞོར་འཕྲོས་སུ་སོང་བ་ཡིན་པ་ལྟ་བུ་ཞིག་གསུངས་སོང་། དེ་ཡང་། བོད་མི་དམངས་ལ་འདོད་པ་མེད་ན་སྐབས་བཅོ་ལྔ་པའི་སྤྱི་འཐུས་ཀྱིས་བསྐྱར་བཅོས་བྱེད་ཆོག་གི་རེད་ཅེས་གསུངས་སོང་།

ལྷག་པར་དུ། ཐེངས་འདིའི་འགྱུར་བ་དེ། ཐ་སྙད་ཙམ་ཞིག་གི་འགྱུར་བ་ཡིན་པ་མ་གཏོགས་དོན་གྱི་ཆ་ནས་དམངས་གཙོའི་ཀ་བ་གསུམ་འཛོམས་ཀྱི་གཞུང་ཞིག་མུ་མཐུད་ནས་གནས་ཡོད་པ་དང་། མུ་མཐུད་པའི་གཞུང་དེ་ཡང་ ལོ་ངོ་ ༣༠༠ ལྷག་ལ་རྒྱུན་མ་ཆད་པའི་གཞུང་དེ་ཡིན་ཞེས་གསུངས་སོང་།
ད་ “བོད་གཞུང་”ཞེས་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་འདི་བསྒྱུར་དགོས་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་དེ་ཐད། མ་རེད་སྐོར་གཅིག་གསུངས་པའི་ཁྲོད།
༡. ༧རྒྱལ་བ་རིན་པོ་ཆེས་བཀའ་གནང་ནས་བསྒྱུར་བ་མ་རེད།
༢. རྒྱ་ནག་གི་གནོན་ཤུགས་འོག་ནས་བསྒྱུར་བ་མ་རེད།
༣. རྒྱ་གར་གྱི་གནོན་ཤུགས་འོག་ནས་བསྒྱུར་བ་མ་རེད།
༤. བོད་མིའི་གནོན་ཤུགས་འོག་ནས་བསྒྱུར་བ་མ་རེད།
ད་བསྒྱུར་དགོས་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཐད།
༡. སིམ་ལ་ན་ཁ་མཆུ་ཞིག་འགྲོ་བཞིན་པ་རེད། ༼ཁ་མཆུ་གང་འདྲ་ཡིན་ངས་མ་ཤེས།༽
༢. རྒྱ་གར་ལྷོ་ཕྱོགས་ན་ཉིན་རེ་བཞིན་ཚགས་པར་སོགས་ལ་གནས་ཚུལ་ཐོན་བཞིན་ཡོད། ༼དོལ་རྒྱལ་དང་འབྲེལ་བའི་གནས་ཚུལ་དག་ཡིན་ནམ་ཡང་ན་གཞན་ཞིག་ཡིན།༽
༣. འཇར་མཱན་གྱི་ཚོགས་པ་ friedrich naumann foundation ཟེར་བས་བོད་ཀྱི་གྲོས་ཚོགས་དང་སྲིད་བྱུས་ཉམས་ཞིབ་ཁང་ལ་རོགས་དངུལ་ ཉུང་དུ་ཕྱིན་པ། ༼འདི་ཡང་ བོད་གཞུང་ཞེས་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་སྤྱད་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་ཡིན་ནམ། དེ་འདྲ་ཞིག་ངས་གོ་བྱུང་།༽
༤. མ་འོངས་པ་ལ་མིང་ཙམ་ལ་བསྙད་ནས་ དཀའ་ངལ་འབྱུང་སྲིད་པ། ༼འདི་ནི་ད་ལྟ་མེད་པའི་དཀའ་ངལ་ཞིག་རེད།༽
༥. བོད་ཀྱི་བདེན་མཐའ་མ་གསལ་བར་དུ་རྒྱ་གར་དུ་བོད་མིའི་སྒྲིག་འཛུགས་གནས་དགོས་པ།
བཅས་གསུངས་སོང་།

ད་དགོངས་ཚུལ་ཞིག་གསུངས་དང་། བསྒྱུར་དགོས་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་དང་བསྒྱུར་མི་དགོས་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་གཉིས་བསྡུར་ན། བསྒྱུར་དགོས་དོན་ཁྱོན་ནས་མེད་པ་འདྲ་ཞིག་མི་འདུག་གམ། དགོས་དོན་མེད་པ་ཞིག་བསྒྱུར་བ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས། “བོད་དོན་ལ་”མི་ཚེ་བཏང་བའི་མི་ཞིག་ངུ་གི་འདུག “ང་ནི་སྐྱིད་པོ་ཁྱོན་ནས་མི་འདུག”ཟེར་མཁན་གྱི་བོད་མི་ཧ་ཅང་མང་པོ་འདུག “ད་རྡ་རམ་ས་ལ་རེ་བ་རྒྱག་རྒྱུ་ལྷག་ཡོད་མ་རེད། དེ་ལས་བོད་ནང་གི་བོད་པ་དང་གཞོན་སྐྱེས་ཚོ་རུབ་རུབ་བྱས་ཏེ་ལས་འགུལ་ཞིག་རྩོམ་དགོས་འདུག”ཅེས་གསུངས་མཁན་འདུག
འདི་ནི་དགའ་མི་དགའི་རྩོད་པ་ཞིག་མ་རེད་ལ། ཐ་སྙད་ཅིག་འགྲིག་མི་འགྲིག་གི་རྩོད་པ་ཡང་མ་རེད། འདི་ནི་གཞུང་ཞེས་མི་མང་གིས་རེ་བ་བཅོལ་ས་ཞིག་ སྒྲིག་འཛུགས་སུ་གྱུར་པའི་གནད་དོན་དེ་རེད། གཞུང་དེ་ཡང་བཀའ་བློན་ཁྲི་པ་མཆོག་གིས་གསུངས་པ་ཇི་བཞིན། ལོ་ངོ་སུམ་བརྒྱ་ལྷག་གི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་ཡོད་པའི་གཞུང་ཞིག་རེད། ད་ང་ཚོར་ “བོད་གཞུང་”ཟེར་བའི་ཐ་སྙད་འདི་སྦྱོར་ས་ཞིག་ས་སྟེང་འདི་ནས་མེད་སོང་བ་རེད།

ངས་ རང་གི་སྐྱེས་ཡིག་དང་གཉེན་སྒྲིག་གི་ཡི་གེ་ལ་བལྟས་པ་ཡིན། ལས་ཤོག་གཡོན་ཐད་ན། དབྱིན་ཡིག་ཏུ། Department of Home Affairs, Central Tibetan Secretariat of His Holiness the Dalai Lama ཞེས་འཁོད་འདུག དེའི་གཡས་ངོས་ཀྱི་ཐོད་དུ་ “བོད་གཞུང་དགའ་ལྡན་ཕོ་བྲང་ཕྱོགས་ལས་རྣམ་རྒྱལ་”ཞེས་འཁོད་པའི་གངས་སེང་གི་ལས་ཐམ་དེ་འདུག དེའི་གཤམ་ན་ཡང་བསྐྱར་གངས་སེང་གི་ཐེལ་དང་ བདེ་དོན་ལས་ཁུངས་ཀྱི་མཚན་རྟགས་བཀོད་འདུག ཡིག་ཆ་འདི་འདྲ་ད་ཡང་བསྐྱར་ཡོང་རྒྱུ་ཡོད་དམ།
ངས་ ད་བར་དུ་ སྐྱེས་ཡིག་དང་གཉེན་སྒྲིག་གི་ཡི་གེ་དགོས་ ཞེས་བརྗོད་མཁན་ཡོངས་རྫོགས་ལ་ཡི་གེ་འདི་སྤྲད་པ་ཡིན། དྲི་བ་གཅིག་ཀྱང་མེད་པར་ངོས་ལེན་བྱེད་རྐྱང་བྱས་སོང་། ངའི་སྐྱེས་ཡིག་གིས་སྐྱེས་ཡིག་གི་གོ་ཆོད་པ་རེད། ངའི་གཞུང་དེ་གཞུང་འབྲེལ་གྱིས་ངོས་ལེན་བྱེད་མཁན་མེད་པ་བདེན་མོད། ངས་རང་གི་གཞུང་གིས་གནང་བའི་ཡིག་ཆ་འཁྱེར་ནས་ ང་འཛམ་གླིང་དུ་བོད་མི་ཞིག་ཡིན་པའི་ར་སྤྲོད་བྱེད་ཐུབ་ལ། ངའི་གཉེན་སྒྲིག་གི་དཔང་རྟགས་ཀྱང་དེས་ཐུབ།

ད་དུང་“བོད་གཞུང་དགའ་ལྡན་ཕོ་བྲང་ཕྱོགས་ལས་རྣམ་རྒྱལ་”ཞེས་པའི་གཞུང་འདི་ ཉེ་ཆར་ཡིག་ཐོག་ནས་ཡལ་བར་གྱུར་པའི་ཉིན་མ་དེ་བར་དུ་ “བོད་གཞུང་དགའ་ལྡན་ཕོ་བྲང་ཕྱོགས་ལས་རྣམ་རྒྱལ་”ཞེས་པའི་གཞུང་འདི་གསོན་པོ་ཡིན། གཞུང་འདི་ལ་ཚེ་སྲོག་ཡོད། ད་ནི་གཞུང་འདི་ མ་ཤི་གོང་ནས་བསད་པ་དེ་ལ་འགྱོད་པ་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་ལས་གཞན་ལྷག་མེད་པ་འདྲ།

འགྱོད་པ་སྐྱེས་མཁན་གྱི་བོད་མི་ག་ཚོད་ཡོད་དམ། ངས་ངོ་ཚོར་བའི་མི་གྲགས་ཅན་གཉིས་ལས་གཅིག་ནི་ངུ་གི་འདུག གཞན་དེ་ནི་ཧ་ཅང་སེམས་ཕམ་གྱི་འོག་ན་འདུག གཞུང་འདི་ “དབུ་མའི་ལམ་གྱི་སྲིད་བྱུས་”མགོ་བཙུགས་པ་ནས་རིམ་གྱིས་སྒོ་བརྒྱབ་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནམ་ཞེས་རྩོམ་ཡིག་འགའ་ལ་འཁོད་འདུག ལོས་ཡིན། བོད་རྒྱ་ནག་གི་ཆ་ཤས་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་ཁས་བླངས་པའི་ཉི་མ་དེ་ནས་ “བོད་གཞུང་”ཞེས་པའི་མིང་ཚིག་དང་འབྲུ་དོན་གཉིས་ཀ་དུས་གཅིག་ཏུ་སྤངས་པ་རེད། དེ་ལ་དཔག་པའི་རྩོམ་ཡིག་ཀྱང་མང་པོ་ཞིག་བྱུང་བ་རེད། འོན་ཀྱང་། “མཐའ་མའི་ཐག་གཅོད་དེ་བོད་མི་མང་གིས་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རེད།”ཅེས་གསུངས་ནས་རེ་བ་རྒྱག་ས་ཞིག་ཡོད་བསྡད་པ་རེད། རེ་བ་དེ་དང་ཆབས་གཅིག་ཏུ། ཀ་བ་གསུམ་ལྡན་གྱི་བཙན་བྱོལ་ནང་གི་མང་གཙོའི་གཞུང་དེ་ལ་ འོས་འདེམས་ཀྱི་ཐོག་ནས་ཚ་ཚ་འུར་འུར་བྱས་པ་རེད། བཀའ་བློན་ཁྲི་གསར་ཞིག་འདམས་ནས་ དེའི་དྲོད་མ་ཡལ་གོང་དེར་ “བོད་གཞུང་”ཞེས་པའི་མིང་ཚིག་འདི་གཤིན་ཡུལ་དུ་བསྐྱལ་བ་རེད། ད་ནི། སྒྲིག་འཛུགས་ཤིག་གི་བཀའ་བློན་ཁྲི་པ་ཞེས་པ་འདིས། “གཞུང་”ཞེས་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་ཙམ་ཡང་མེད་པའི་སྒྲིག་འཛུགས་ཤིག་གི་འགོ་གཙོ་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་པ་རེད།

ཧ་ཅང་བློ་ཕམ་པ་ཞིག་ལ། བཙན་བྱོལ་གྱི་བོད་མི་ཚོས་ རང་གི་ལས་འགུལ་གྱི་ཁ་ཕྱོགས་དེ་བོད་ནང་དུ་བསྐོར་མ་ནུས་པ་དེ་རེད། འགྲོ་སོང་སོགས་ཡོད་ཚད་བཙན་བྱོལ་ནང་གི་སྒྲིག་འཛུགས་ཤིག་དང་བཙན་བྱོལ་ནང་གི་ལྟ་རྟོག་ཐོག་ཤོར་པ་རེད། ད་ནུས་པ་ཡོད་ཚད་སྤུངས་ནས་ཉར་བའི་གཞུང་དེ་ཡང་ “གཞུང་”གི་ཐ་སྙད་མེད་པ་ཞིག་ཏུ་གྱུར་པ་རེད།

རང་བཙན་དང་བོད་གཞུང་དགའ་ལྡན་ཕོ་བྲང་ཕྱོགས་ལས་རྣམ་རྒྱལ་ནི་ ཨང་གྲངས་ ༡༠༠ ཁ་ཚང་ངེར་ཡོད་པ་དེ་རེད། དབུ་མའི་ལམ་ནི་གོང་གི་དེ་གཉིས་ནས་ ཨང་གྲངས་ ༥༠ འཐེན་པའི་ཐོབ་གྲངས་རེད། ད་ བོད་མིའི་སྒྲིག་འཛུགས་ནི་ དེ་ནས་ཀྱང་ཨང་གྲངས་ ༥༠ འཐེན་ཤུལ་གྱི་ ༠ དེ་རེད། ང་ཚོ་ནི་ ༠ ལ་ཡིད་ཆེས་བྱེད་མཁན་གྱི་བོད་ཀྱི་འབངས་མི་རེད།

རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་གིས་བོད་བཙན་འཛུལ་བྱས་ཤིང་། བོད་ཀྱི་ཁྲིམས་མཐུན་སྲིད་གཞུང་དེ་བཙན་བྱོལ་དུ་གྱར་ནས་ད་ལྟ་རྒྱ་གར་དུ་གནས་ཡོད་ཅེས་དམ་བཅའ་ཞིག་ཡིད་ལ་འཁྱེར་ནས་བཙོན་ཁང་འགྲིམས་མཁན་ཚོར་དགོངས་པ་ཞིག་བཞེས་དང་། བོད་གཞུང་དགའ་ལྡན་ཕོ་བྲང་གི་སྲི་ཞུ་བསྒྲུབས་ཆེད་སྐུ་སྲོག་ཤོར་བའི་དཔའ་བོ་དང་དཔའ་མོ་ཚོར་དགོངས་པ་ཞིག་བཞེས་དང་།

ང་ཚོ་ལ་འཇོན་ཐང་ཡོད་ན། བོད་གཞུང་ནི་ཐ་སྙད་ཅིག་མ་རེད། བོད་གཞུང་ནི་ཐ་སྙད་ཅིག་གི་རྩོད་པའང་མ་རེད། འདི་ང་ཚོའི་གཞུང་རེད། འདི་ང་ཚོའི་མེས་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་གཞུང་རེད་ལ། འདི་ང་ཚོའི་མི་རབས་རྗེས་མ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་གཞུང་རེད། འདི་བོད་མི་ས་ཡ་དྲུག་གི་ངོ་བོ་མཚོན་པའི་གཞུང་རེད། འདི་ཐ་སྙད་ཅིག་མ་རེད།

Illustration: Juan Osborne

I had not yet fully digested the scope of the Dalai Lama’s retirement when I was struck by a curious remarks made by Lobsang Sangay on BBC’s HARDtalk and NDTV’s Your Call. According to the newly elected Kalon Tripa, his surprising conversion to the Middle Way Approach was nothing but the result of maturity. This baffled me even more to find out that this argument had to be supported solely by a quote from Winston Churchill: “When you are young, if you are not liberal you don’t have heart, and when you are old, if you are not conservative you don’t have head.”

Looking at the current crisis faced by the Tibetan nation, I find this quote absolutely bizarre. It implies that the present dismantlement of the nation and of its governmental institutions is the logical culmination of a mature thought, and not the direct result of a disastrous and unsuccessful policy of reconciliation with Communist China launched twenty-five years earlier by the Dalai Lama. It also signals further attacks and belittlement of the issue of Tibetan independence and the marginalization of those Tibetans who still believe that Tibet’s independence can be restored.

This quote didn’t pop-up by chance, and is obviously a part of Lobsang Sangay’s “policy” speech. He repeated it word for word in both HARDtalk and Your Call, subtly adding: “So I’m right in the middle. So I have both head and heart, and I subscribe to the Middle Way policy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama as it stands today, and I support that because it’s a pragmatic approach.”

Pragmatic, conservative and intelligent. This is what Lobsang Sangay’s stance on Middle Way boils down to, if we are to accept this quote. By extension, it also implies that those thousands who believe in, fought and died for independence are good hearted but brainless citizens.

But there’s another big problem with the quote. And an embarrassing one. This quote is not from Winston Churchill as Lobsang Sangay claims. To the contrary. As explained by The Churchill Centre and by Paul Addison of Edinburgh University: “Surely Churchill can’t have used the words attributed to him. He’d been a Conservative at 15 and a Liberal at 35!” According to Wikiquote, “this quote was in fact first uttered by mid-nineteenth century historian and statesman François Guizot when he observed, ‘Not to be a republican at 20 is proof of want of heart; to be one at 30 is proof of want of head’, and has been attributed variously to George Bernard Shaw, Benjamin Disraeli, Otto von Bismarck and others.”

Not only do I find regrettable that Lobsang Sangay had nothing else than a quote for clarifying his clumsy and embarrassing conversion to the Middle Way Approach — the source of which he didn’t even take the time to double-check —, I find a pity that he had to choose one that uses denigration as a justification. For it not only denigrates Rangzen advocates, it also denigrates the youth as well, whom, if I am correct, makes the largest part of his electorate.

It is also highly disturbing that Lobsang Sangay had to refer so often to prestigious leaders to make his point on TV and during his campaign, especially when he tries to appropriate their charisma. Would it be that Lobsang Sangay has very few arguments and thoughts of his own? Most of the leaders he refers to, be it Winston Churchill, Gandhi, Nelson Mandela or Martin Luther King, are people who fought actively for freedom with conviction and who, unlike Lobsang Sangay, never gave up on their original goals and never gave in to the might of the enemy. Referring to their struggle’s outcome to promote the surrender policy of the Middle Way is nothing but intellectual dishonesty.

Using the same method as the new Kalon Tripa, and in the hope of correcting the image given by Lobsang Sangay of this great wartime leader, let me quote two speeches of Winston Churchill, rightly attributed this time:

Never Surrender

We shall not flag or fail. We shall go on to the end. We shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air. We shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be. We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing-grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills. We shall never surrender!

—House of Commons, 4 June 1940, following the evacuation of British and French armies from Dunkirk as the German tide swept through France.

Never Give In

This is the lesson: never give in, never give in, never, never, never, never—in nothing, great or small, large or petty—never give in except to convictions of honour and good sense. Never yield to force; never yield to the apparently overwhelming might of the enemy.

—Harrow School, 29 October 1941.

* * *

I must admit that criticizing a Tibetan prime minister before he even started his job is unfair. But one must also admit that it actually depends of the gravity of the offense and whether the criticism might be beneficial for the Premier’s tenure. Moreover, taking into account the political uncertainty brought by the recent constitutional changes and by the decision of the Dalai Lama not only to devolve his political power but also to put a definitive term to the Tibetan government, the need for scrutiny is higher than ever.

Lobsang Sangay, anyhow, deserves a chance. Even if I didn’t support his candidature, I believe that he will need the support of all of us to carry successfully his task of Premier and to make the best out of this mess. After all, we all strive to end Chinese tyranny in Tibet. This support is, however, reciprocal. The new prime minister cannot expect to rally all Tibetans and friends to his command simply on the basis that he secured 55 percent of the votes cast by exile Tibetans. If Lobsang Sangay seriously wishes unity, then he will have to make an extra effort to accommodate different opinions, in particular when it comes to the restoration of Tibet’s independence. Contempt is definitely not the best recipe.

The outgoing prime minister, Samdhong Rinpoche, has sparked a great deal of controversy and bitterness by launching a wide-scale crusade against supporters of independence. I hope Lobsang Sangay won’t fall in the same trap. On the contrary, I hope he will publicly keep a declaration of independence as an option if Beijing persists in not showing any interest at negotiating within the first year of his tenure.

The sort of political sentence pronounced on the Tibetan people resembles the terrible “death by a thousand cuts”. This was a form of execution practiced in China until the early twentieth century, in which the condemned person was killed by using a knife to methodically remove portions of the body over an extended period of time. The punishment is said to work on three levels: as a form of public humiliation, as a slow and lingering death, and as a punishment after death.

In referring to this form of capital punishment I am not talking about the harsh treatment meted out by Communist China to those living in occupied Tibet.

No, today what I’m concerned by is not China. It is the recent retirement of the Dalai Lama and the fatal amendments consequently made to the Tibetan Constitution and ratified last Saturday by the Tibetan Parliament. What is happening is actually a tragedy for the Tibetan people, and by any means the end of Tibet as a nation. A slow death, where portions of its sovereignty have been methodically cut off over time.

The first shock came on 21 November 2010. The Dalai Lama, much to the general surprise, announced during an interview on CNN-IBN that he would completely retire from politics “within six months”. Three-and-half months later, on 10 March 2011, he announced that his retirement was definitely decided and that it was to be ratified by the present Parliament. Although a great deal of emotions was expressed after these announcements, I was not among those who feared that Tibet’s struggle would not survive without the charismatic leader. I was, however, seriously alarmed that such decision would deprive Tibet of its head of state, with no replacement, no public consultation and, I must add, in a rather undemocratic manner.

Jamyang Norbu first raised this question of head of state and the subsequent legitimacy of the Tibetan Government on 28 March in his article “Resolving the Dalai Lama Resignation Crisis“. He called attention to a fact that most journalists, bloggers and commentators had until then failed to grasp in their respective judgments of the Dalai Lama’s announcement. Jamyang Norbu’s piece definitely inspired and influenced the debates that took place since then on this issue. Unfortunately, we know now that despite every advices and appeals the Dalai Lama “categorically” rejected the role of a symbolic head of state.

The second shock came along with the announcement of his retirement: in an address on the opening day of the Parliament session, on 14 March, the Dalai Lama declared “ineffective” two important documents passed by the Parliament in 1963 and 1992, calling explicitly for the restoration of Tibet’s independence. Here again, the issue was overlooked by most commentators and did not seem to steer much debate. It is surprisingly Robert Barnett of Columbia University, a controversial expert on Tibet, that underlined first this important issue in a Foreign Policy‘s article, followed recently by Wangpo Tethong who wrote:

“It is disturbing that His Holiness has now made a very strong linkage between his political retirement and the revocation of these two documents that have provided to the Tibetans a visionary guidance for their struggle for freedom. Why is it not possible to adjust these documents and edit only those parts that are related to the future role of the Dalai Lamas?”

The third shock — and indeed the final blow — came when the Dalai Lama gave further details on his decision. During a public speech at the Tsuglagkhang on 19 March,  he clearly insisted that there were no such things as a “government in exile” or a Tibetan “prime minister”, and that in English one should use “administration” instead of “government”. This was nothing new, of course, but his remarks just made a shiver run down my spine… If the Dalai Lama was to insist on that point at such a particular time, it could only mean that he had programmed the termination of the Tibetan nation and was envisaging Tibet’s future solely through the narrow lens of his Middle Way Approach. The recent change in the government’s name, very unfortunately, proved me correct.

Obviously, if we take the Middle Way Approach to its logical — and suicidal — conclusion, a head of state is no longer relevant under PRC’s administration. It would be thus logic to abolish this function as a further concession to the Chinese regime. But in this case, it would also require doing away with the prime minister and the cabinet; in Communist China, provinces are ruled by governors, not by ministers. Why then such a masquerade? Why not to call a spade a spade?

The most alarming in all these events is the time factor. Indeed, there is much to wonder as to why everything had to be so hastily settled, with no public consideration of any kind excepted for submissively acquiescing to the Dalai Lama’s decisions and “suggested” amendments. Among others, one could seriously question the Dalai Lama’s insistence for an “immediate” amendment to the Charter as he called in a letter issued to the Parliament on 27 May, when most of the concerned people had agreed to give it more consideration and time.

All this haste is even more difficult to understand if we consider that four months before his original announcement on CNN-IBN, the Dalai Lama had not yet planned a date for his retirement. In July 2010, asked in an interview on NDTV if he had set a time frame for this retirement, the Dalai Lama answered “No.”  In fact, even during the November interview, the Dalai Lama was hesitant about the date, and it’s interesting to see how he answered Karan Thapar’s questions:

Click here to view the embedded video.

Karan Thapar: Do you have a date when you want to retire?

Dalai Lama: No. Firstly I have to discuss with our exile Parliament. I want to inform them [of] my intention, although I briefly mentioned [them] already.

Karan Thapar: So only after you discuss you will decide a date?

Dalai Lama: That’s right.

Karan Thapar: But it is not something that is going to happen soon?

Dalai Lama: Oh, I think… [hesitating] I think within… within a few, within next…, I think six months… I think. I think it will be.

Karan Thapar: Within six months you will retire? [Thapar baffled]

Dalai Lama: Oh yeah. No, I have to discuss.

Karan Thapar: And then when do you think the retirement will happen?

Dalai Lama: I don’t know. Perhaps…, I think…, next…, a few months. I think, maybe, OK.

The sudden timing imposed by the Dalai Lama as well as the real scope of his decision seem to have surprised even someone as close to him as the Special Envoy Lodi Gyari. In an interview on Kunleng, a few days after His Holiness’ original November announcement, Gyari was personally confident that the Dalai Lama would retire from his role of head of government, but not as head of state. Three months later, after the Dalai Lama had given more precision on his retirement, he however acknowledged that the Dalai Lama has devolved both his roles.

In regards to such a curious and unwise timing, one should definitely question the legitimacy of the constitutional amendments ratified last Saturday, particularly in regards to the government’s new name. If we are to understand the conclusion of the recent Special Meeting held in Dharamshala, the Parliament did not pay any consideration to the fact that the 418 delegates were “unanimous on not changing the name of the Tibetan government.”  This gives much thought about the democratic process of this whole affair.

Finally, looking back in 1992, one should not forget that the Dalai Lama had written a quite different scenario for the day he would resign from his leadership. In his “Guidelines for Future Tibet’s Polity and Basic Features of Its Constitution” (one of the two documents he declared “ineffective”, originally written for an eventual return in Tibet), he had carefully mentioned the need of an elected president to be Tibet’s head of state. Why then such a sudden change? Why the Dalai Lama didn’t even propose an alternative to his retirement, such as a presidential election as originally planned?

It is sad to admit it, but the only logical conclusion I see to the Dalai Lama’s refusal to be Tibet’s symbolic head of state seems to have nothing to do with the duties required by this function — he will definitely continues to travel and meet foreign dignitaries —, nor with the democratic emancipation of his people — he would have proposed them a choice —, but with his refusal to enshrine a Tibetan state in any form. I sincerely hope to be proven wrong, but if not, 29 May should be marked in Tibetan calendars as the Capitulation Day.

I’m going to assume that most people reading this post know who Barry Sautman is (and no, he’s not the one in the picture; that’s King George I and to see what he’s doing in this post you’ll have to scroll down further). And on that assumption I’ll also take it for granted that the fact that one of his recent articles, “Tibet’s Putative Statehood and International Law” (Chinese Journal of International Law, registration required) and a longer piece that preceded it, “All that Glitters is Not Gold conclude that Tibet has been a part of China for centuries will come as a terrible shock to… no one.

Sautman has looked at aspects of the Tibet issue from all sorts of angles: Were Tibet’s demographics battered by a large loss of life in the first decades of PRC rule and subsequent decades of Chinese migration? Should people be concerned about the health of the Tibetan language in the PRC?—etc., etc. And the answers? Well, he has set out to demonstrate on any number of occasions just how misplaced or (drum roll, please) malevolent are the sympathies and attitudes of those who might find that at times Tibet’s history as a part of the PRC has been devastatingly and particularly brutal. Reading what he writes on Tibet often leaves the reader feeling as if he or she has just encountered a cop at the scene of something horrible, a cop keen on keeping everyone’s attention focused elsewhere with a “move along,” and a “nothing to see here.”

Actually, readers of this blog may have already noticed that going though Sautman’s pensées becomes something of a game, since there’s so much to comb through and he throws up a veritable “Where’s Waldo?” barrage of extraneous and dubious references and verbal detours to camouflage actual facts (yes, those quaint things). For someone interested in Tibet’s history, particularly Tibet’s historical relationship with China, these new pieces exemplify all of this; and yet they hold out the possibility of hours of entertainment as one sifts through specious evidence, some eccentric ideas about history, and various tricks of a trade usually associated with someone standing on a sidewalk with a folding table, three shells and a pea.

The task of unpacking these particular works is made somewhat more entertaining thanks to Sautman’s provision of a companion powerpoint presentation for “All That Glitters is Not Gold.” All of these items together make for much fun, allowing the reader to observe Sautman working ever so hard to expose the errors of anyone who might think that Tibet had an existence as something other than a part of China during the last seven centuries.

So, we have much to play with here, but where to begin?—and what to choose? Well, first off I have to confess that I have a day job and I periodically need to attend to it. I will beg the indulgence of readers and limit my remarks to just a few of the things related to the larger subject of Tibet’s historical relationship with China, but any other RA bloggers who may be so inclined should feel free to jump in and chew over the latest entries in Sautman’s oeuvre. There’s plenty for everyone. Please note that most of the references to Sautman below are to “All that Glitters is Nor Gold;” References to “Tibet’s Putative Statehood and International Law” are specifically noted as such.

With that, let’s start off with Sautman’s conception of the Mongols and their empire. From Sautman we learn that unbeknownst to most of the scholarly world outside China, the Mongols were Chinese subjects before they conquered China (“…long before they became rulers of multi-ethnic China, the Mongols and Manchu already were Chinese imperial subjects;” this, Sautman asserts, rebuts in part the position of a certain “pro-Tibet independence historian… Elliot Sperling”). Setting aside a long established consensus, best embodied in the title of the book China Among Equals, published decades ago, Sautman is silent as to how this domination was substantively administered, leaving one to conclude that he is simply resurrecting the antique view of the grant of titles, the establishment of “tribute” relations, etc., as markers of the subjection of peoples outside China to Chinese rule and authority. But methinks Sautman is being a bit too cautious. Why not cast coyness aside and go totally retro, back even before the days of J.K. Fairbank and company: why not designate these peripheral peoples as barbarians, inexorably drawn into submission to the higher civilization of the Central Kingdom? If Sautman wants to write as if more than a half-century of historiography on Inner Asia never happened, well why go for euphemisms? Why not give us some arcane awe-struck, tribute-paying Asiatics?

The point, of course, is that Sautman wants us to view the Mongols of the Mongol imperial period as Chinese in order to confute any attempts to see Tibet under Mongol rule as something other than a part of China. He is quite specific about this, asserting that Tibet was a part of China because the Mongols (and the Manchus) were Chinese. Hence the quaint notion that the Mongols were already China’s subjects before they… conquered China. But then they couldn’t have conquered China, could they? At best they’d have to be portrayed as “rising in revolt,” since they were, after all, already under China. (Personal note: I remember well the visit of Wang Zhonghan to Indiana University during my student years. A prominent scholar of Mongol history, he was adamant in insisting that we must never use the term “Mongol Conquest” in discussions of Chinese history: “How can you conquer your own country?” was his logic. He did not, sad to report, win anyone over and left the venerable Prof. Hangin Gombojab more than a little incensed.)

Anyway, let’s look at the basics of Sautman’s proposition. If the Mongols were truly subjects of the… Wait: what dynasty is he talking about again? Song? Liao? Perhaps the Xixia? Actually, he doesn’t say. Well… perhaps he thinks it best not to get bogged down in details; he wouldn’t want to waste precious mental energy on minutiae, one supposes. Let’s just assume it’s some undifferentiated “China.” That approach allows him (and us!) to forego dealing with the raw materials of history: the records of actual structures—offices, bureaus, geographical units, etc.—through which real Chinese authority was administered to subjects. Indeed, the relevant dynastic histories have always included sections on the administrative geography of the state, the surest way to understand what was ruled as “China.” Alas, the Mongols seem to have been overlooked in these… until now, with Sautman riding to the rescue of the old barbarians-in-thrall-to-the-Central-Kingdom model. Actually Sautman’s historical writing, such as it is, displays a marvelous creativity in avoiding references to primary sources when approaching topics for which they’re really quite essential.

But more on that later…

For now, let’s just note that having established the Mongols as Chinese subjects he proceeds to treat the Mongols who ruled China as Chinese. Their state was Chinese, they were Chinese and—wouldn’t you just know it—their Tibetan subjects were Chinese subjects. The idea that what Qubilai and his heirs ruled need not all have been China seems to have no part in Sautman’s understanding of the era of the Mongol Conquest. But that division is clearly the basis for the successor Ming Dynasty’s exclusion of Tibet from the administrative geography contained in the official dynastic history of the Mongol Yuan. It is also what underlies the first Ming emperor’s missive to the Tibetans, a missive sent to other lands outside China as well, proclaiming the unification of the state and the ouster of the foreign, illegitimate Hu 胡; i.e., the Mongol rulers—this while Ming forces campaigning to extirpate Mongol rule halted at the frontier of Tibetan territory. If Tibet had become a part of China under the Yuan, one would naturally think the Ming would have understood this and made a claim to Tibet. This never happened and Sautman, one assumes for that reason, passes over the question in silence. He is likely ignorant of the unambiguous language in the Ming emperor’s missive about the non-Chinese identity of the Mongols and the assertion that their rule over China was essentially a perversion of the normal order of things,: 向者胡人竊據華夏百有餘年, 冠履倒置, 凡百有心孰不興憤. But Sautman has decided that all under Mongol rule was Chinese and is thus incapable of entertaining the possibility that the Mongols themselves might not have been Chinese.

And so Sautman asserts that the continuity from Yuan to Ming is rooted in recognition of the Mongols as Chinese, which in turn is shown by the fact that “after the Yuan dynasty ended in 1368, Han elites continued to identify with it and not the new Han-led Ming Dynasty.” This is a convenient way to put it. “Han elites…” Really? How many? And why should anyone extrapolate from Sautman’s vague sample a general sense of identification with the Mongols as fellow Chinese on the part of the larger body of “Han elites”? And what, indeed, occasioned this “identification?” The circumstances of bureaucrats and officials caught in the upheaval of dynastic overthrow have dynamics that are by no means reducible to Sautman’s retroactive vision of some sort of harmonious pro-diversity inclusiveness. Indeed, the choice of which side to take in such a situation is fraught with considerations that usually place survival first and foremost. Then too, there are calculations about the possibility of prospering under new rulers, given what one might have done—and to whom—under a collapsing regime. It’s a wee bit more complicated than the casual reader would guess from Sautman’s at best lazy, at worst deceptive, phrasing. So, again, what does he mean by “Han elites continued to identify with [the Yuan]?” The “Han elites?” Most “Han elites?” Some “Han elites?” Maybe ten “Han elites?” Two-and-half “Han elites?” And while the “Han elites” were celebrating their Chinese brotherhood with the Mongols, who was helping out with the poor, elite-starved (and, one assumes, under-staffed) Ming state? Unless the running of the Ming bureaucracy had been outsourced to a call center in Mumbai, there must have been at least some “Han elites” helping out at court… aside from the poor, multi-culturally-challenged emperor, that is. No matter; the existence of any who declined to serve the Ming for whatever reasons is enough for Sautman to co-opt them into his project of identifying the Mongols as Chinese.

All this picks up steam in earnest when Sautman arrives at the Qing, where the complex issue of Manchu identity is suitably dressed up and put on display to show that the Manchus like the Mongols were Chinese, their empire was Chinese, and their subjects were China’s subjects—indeed all whom they ruled were multi-ethnic subsets of Chinese. End of story. And to that end he trots out a variety of secondary sources—by no means all of them authored by people actually familiar with the Manchus as Manchus—to show how the Manchus ruled as Chinese emperors. That they did. But the idea that they served within China as legitimate emperors of China, and yet ruled as emperors of a larger entity greater than China, is elided. In other words, this “empire” is marked by an exceptionalism among empires that makes of its conquering rulers not foreigners but Chinese, and their empire all China. But to be a legitimate ruler of China is not synonymous with being Chinese, and Sautman plays fast and loose with this idea. His take on the earlier tradition of the Mongols demonstrates this well enough: the legitimacy of the Mongols as rulers of China is evinced in the inclusion of their dynasty, the Yuan, as a legitimate Chinese dynasty. The Ming, after all, had the official history of that dynasty drawn up. But the attitude of the successor Ming to the Mongols as Chinese is clear in Ming Taizu’s own words on the subject, though Sautman is either incapable of perceiving it or purposely ignores it. Instead, coming to the Manchus, he adopts another tack:

Because China was multi-ethnic and its Manchu emperors were multi-cultural, to speak of them as “Chinese emperors” requires acceptance that the term “Chinese,” used now for peoples of many ethnicities in China, should not retroactively be restricted to Han Chinese.

But the retroactivity (certainly as regards both Manchus and Mongols) in defining China is Sautman’s doing. He is projecting the current construction of China as a “unitary multi-national” state onto the body of what was an empire. And thus he projects the current PRC orthodoxy of what “Chinese” means onto a past imperial structure that knew very well ethno-national boundaries and stratification. Before the People’s Republic began rigidly fixing certain areas of the lexicon the Chinese language was still Zhongwen, something for which Hanwen was simply a synonym. But Zangwen and Mengwen were assuredly not Chinese. Not to Chinese and certainly not to Tibetans or Mongols. In spite of Sautman’s insistence on the centuries-old inclusiveness of the term “Chinese” the artificial nature of the ethno-national construction of the Tibetans as “Chinese” people is tellingly obvious from the reminiscences of a Chinese participant in the talks leading to the signing of the 17-point agreement in 1951.* As there was no word in Tibetan denoting China in the newly constructed PRC sense of the term, the Chinese side created a new term, “Krung-go,” for use in Tibetan. The implication, if one understands that China claims Tibetans have been a part of China for centuries, is that they didn’t know the name of their own country! Does Sautman believe this? Does he really think Tibetans were that, ahem, stupid? Well, go through these pieces and you realize that such things are feasible on Planet Sautman. He evinces no interest in or knowledge of the view from below; from those peoples and lands incorporated into the imperium; it is only the view from China that informs these articles. And even there his confusion of subjection to the emperors who ruled over China with actually being part of China is paralleled by his confusion of the ability of the Manchus to rule China—“The Qing’s Yongzheng Emperor … refuted the Ming loyalist idea that… cultural differences and the territorial Manchuria/Central States (Zhongguo) distinction made the Qing unsuited to rule China”—with their actually being Chinese.

This harping on the Manchus as Chinese forces him to face the fact that there was a clear, perceptible negative sentiment against the Manchus as foreigners in the Qing era; but he does this with simple dismissiveness: “Both 17th and late 19th/early 20th century Han chauvinists, who sought to mobilize ethnic bias against a dynasty they saw as headed by alien “barbarians,” pushed the idea that Manchu rulers were not Chinese emperors because they were not Han.” Again, an interesting use of terminology: “Han chauvinists.”  This characterization tells us nothing about the function or force of this perception, simply that it was bad… and therefore we should ignore it. (Move along folks, nothing to see here…)

In further support of his retro celebration of happy, functional multicultural diversity he also attempts to enlist various scholars, among them Mark Elliott. He relies on Elliott when he states that “ ‘the Qing rulers appear to have all but abandoned their Altaic heritage’ in favor of Han culture;” but then continues quoting him:

Many Manchus spoke and wrote Chinese better than they spoke and wrote Manchu, and their devotion to the pursuit of the arts of the refined (and not so refined) Chinese gentleman exceeded that of the Chinese themselves. Because many Qing imperial institutions were modeled directly on Ming precedents and because Manchu acculturation was widespread by the nineteenth century, it is hard to deny the importance of Chinese influence on the Manchus and Manchu rule.

And then Sautman’s following paragraph begins: “the Qing and its Manchu Bannermen families became so Chinese that…” Read all of this carefully: after expending a lot of energy on portraying the Manchus as Chinese, Sautman follows Elliott and uses Manchu and Chinese as two distinct categories, reverting (unknowingly, I would assume) to common (and common-sense) usage: juxtaposing Manchu against Chinese (here correctly synonymous with Han), rather than following the PRC orthodoxy in his earlier comments which have the Manchus as Chinese, and which juxtapose Manchu against Han (both of whom are subgroups of Chinese). If one passes over the phrasing quickly, one misses Sautman’s uncritical use of Elliott’s reference (surely an oversight on his part!) to the Chinese language, a reference made in such a way as to equate it exclusively with “Hanwen.” Ditto “the Chinese themselves”! While this is how “Chinese” is normally understood, one can only smile at the sight of commonly understood meaning forcing its way out from under the rigid politicized language use engendered in 20^th-century China right there in the middle of Sautman’s tedious testament to a common Chinese identity for one and all under the Qing, be they Manchus, Tibetans or Mongols. This is not to deny Manchu Sinicization; but this Sinicization certainly didn’t extend to areas such as Tibet, where a Manchu Empire staffed by Manchu amban remained in place. And empire it was. Zhao Erfeng, trying to suppress Tibetan risings in Khams on the eve of the Qing collapse, urged the government to stimulate settlement and development there by emulating the imperial models provided by the British, French, Japanese and Americans in Asia and Africa: 查各国之开辟遐荒，如英之于澳洲，法之于马达加斯加，美之于菲律宾，日之于虾夷, 皆先设招待所，以利导之，而后趋之者如市.

But let’s return to Sautman’s use of Mark Elliott’s work. And let’s note too that it’s Elliott with two “t”s (the Elliot with one “t” is me). Perhaps his reading of the name corresponds to his reading of Elliott’s The Manchu Way. Sautman relies on Elliott to paint a picture of the Manchus embracing the common Chineseness that they share with their subjects; and while he dismisses ethno-national discord with a wave of the “Han chauvinism” card, he really seems not to have read and considered  Elliott’s The Manchu Way in its entirety. For while Elliott does refer to imperial Manchu expressions of familial ties to their Chinese subjects—and remember, the expression of such sentiments was part of a strategy—he also makes it quite clear that this sort of rhetoric was by no means believed, even by an emperor uttering it: “imperial protests not withstanding, Manchu-Han equality was largely a myth. Manchu and Han, that is, were not ‘one family’.”

It ought to go without saying that in examining questions of identity within an empire one cannot simply rely on the definition asserted by the majority or, in the case of Sautman, the definition that the modern Chinese successor state has projected back on the history of the various peoples comprising the empire’s population. Modern scholarship would demand that the view from the subject peoples—the view from below—be accorded its due weight in the matter. That the modern Chinese state asserts that the terms “China” and “Chinese” are applicable to Tibet and the Tibetans over the course of Tibet’s pre-1911 history is in many ways irrelevant if that sentiment was not shared by Tibetans themselves during the period in question. Or should we, following Sautman, consider Tibetans who saw themselves as subject to the Manchu emperor and not as part of China to have constituted an auxiliary battalion of Han Chauvinists? Let’s go back to the frankly moronic notion that Tibetans had no name for their own country. Imagine: the Tibetan language could conceptualize something such as “interdependent arising” (rten-cing ’brel-bar ’byung-ba) but was at a loss for the name of the very country within which Tibetans dwelled! The fact is, Tibetans did see themselves as subjects of the Qing emperor. But they did not see themselves as a part of China and the Tibetan language had no word for a country that defined them as such. In common Tibetan discourse the terms “Tibet” and “”China” have excluded each other from their fields of meaning. Thus, Gung Mgon-po skyab’s well known 18^th-century account of Buddhism in China, the Rgya-nag chos-’byung is now accorded the Chinese title Hanqu Fojiao yuanliuji, making it a history of Buddhism “in the Han region.” Within the PRC the traditional Tibetan word for China has long since been torn from its original meaning and officially yoked to the Chinese word “Han.”

Sautman is oblivious to all of this because he does not (and seems to feel no need to) go beyond the views from China. That the Tibetans and Mongols asserted in their 1913 treaty that they had emerged from under rule by the Manchu State and were thus no longer linked with China (Rgya-nag) is significant in terms of terminology (རང་རེ་བོད་སོག་གཉིས་  མཉྗུའི་རྒྱལ་ཁབ་ཀྱི་མངའ་འོག་ནས་ཐོན་  རྒྱ་ནག་པོ་དང་བྲལ་ཏེ་  བོད་སོག་སོ་སོ་རྒྱལ་ཁབ་རང་བཙན་པ་བགྱིས). But Sautman has no need of Tibetan sources in writing about Tibet’s historical status.

Actually, he really has no use for Tibetan—or Chinese—primary sources at all, which is maybe not so surprising, given what we’ve so far seen here. Looking through “All that Glitters is Not Gold,” one can’t help but feel that Sautman’s willingness to write with supposed authority on a subject as complex as Tibet’s historical status without recourse to primary sources is of a piece with his writings in general: the intention is not to clarify with any sense of objectivity, but rather to make a polemical case. That would seem to be the only way to understand such a strangely sourced work. Indeed the refusal to look at sources that reflect the way the Mongol and Manchu empires were experienced in their own times—not simply from the imperial base within China but also, quite importantly, from the outlying dominions—combined with a highly selective use of uniquely secondary sources (with the possible exception of various U.N. or other printed or online government documents), is telling.

Sautman has assembled a mass of such sources: “All that Glitters is Not Gold” clocks in at 415 footnotes in 58 single spaced pages. And just to make sure the polemical efforts are not wasted, he here and there not-so-subtly steers readers towards his preferred view of some of those he cites or to whom he refers, using labels such as “pro-independence” (by his lights, perhaps; many who might be labeled as such are simply in favor of Tibetans deciding for themselves what they want—but one supposes “pro-self determination” doesn’t give off the right irredentist zing) or, “conservatives.” The latter, Sautman makes sure to inform his readers, share an affinity with exile elites. And not just your run-of-the-mill lukewarm affinity: “Exile elites are in turn enthusiastic about their affinity with conservatives.” As with “Han Chauvinists,” this is another one of Sautman’s clumsy ways of saying “bad.” Of course he can’t resist bringing G.W. Bush on stage as someone the exiles tout as a real supporter and friend. It’s worth noting, however, that Tibetan exile representatives have held all recent U.S. presidents (up to and including the present one) to be friends who understand the Tibet issue. And speaking of friends, why not add here the Dalai Lama’s extolling of Deng Xiaoping as his old friend during the 1990s? Oh, sorry… wrong polemical effect…

But since we’re playing with Sautman’s use of “scare” labels, might we not see in his refusal to look at the Manchu Empire from the local—ahem, subaltern?—perspective and his dogged hostility to the idea of Tibetan self-determination, an attitude that is a wee bit… “conservative”? Indeed, the George W. Bush administration consistently supported the territorial integrity of the PRC as currently constituted, a position with which Sautman would seem to have a strong… “affinity.”

Just as Sautman uses labels to insinuate a bias or element of unreliability, he lets the lack of any similar labeling infer greater scholarly reliability to opinions he accepts, even when some of those emanate from writers with questionable views on some of the basics. Thus, his cited source for the assertion that under the Qing all territory held by the Qing was China and the official policy was “Han and non-Han are one family” is an article by Yang Jianxin, “中国”一词和中国疆域形成再探讨, which discusses the term “China” and the boundaries implied by that term. Well, if one begins to read the article one quickly sees that the author belongs to that school of thought—increasingly visible these last few years in discussions of Tibet—that doesn’t stop at the idea of Tibet having become a part of China during the Mongol period, but veers into the realm of thinking in which Tibet is held to have been part of China well before the Mongols appeared on the scene. This notion is derived from the writings of the historical geographer Tan Qixiang, and has most recently been interpreted to support the proposition that China must be understood retroactively to have included Tibet as an integral part of its territory “since human activity began.” Yang Jianxin doesn’t articulate anything as silly as that, but nevertheless sees no need to stop at the Yuan, pushing Tibet’s incorporation into China to some time in the post-Tang, pre-Yuan era of conquest dynasties when, according to the article, the fate of the Tibetans became bound up with the fate of the motherland, Tibet became an inseparable part of China, and the Tibetans became a Chinese nationality:

9 世纪末, 唐朝也开始出现分崩离析的迹象. 至 10 世纪初, 整个中国进入所谓 “五代十国” 以及以后的宋、辽、金、西夏等许多民族政权割据状态, 在几百年中, 西藏与祖国其他地区遭受着同样的命运… 从西藏和藏族历史发展的进程看, 在元代之前, 西藏和藏族已经嵌入了当时的疆域和民族政治、社会、文化生活之中, 聚居于西藏及青、甘、川、滇的藏族已经成为中国历史上的民族, 西藏的历史就已经成为中国历史的一部分, 西藏地区也成为中国历史疆域不可分割的一部分.

So, given the departure from previous Chinese orthodoxy and the placement of Tibet’s incorporation into China in the pre-Mongol era, might not some Sautmanesque-label be appropriate to alert readers as to the author’s general position? No. Only those whom Sautman wants to specify as bad influences seem to get labels. Someone who believes in the odd notion that Tibet was somehow made part of China during some unspecified point in the broad era of the Song, Liao, Jin or Xixia dynasties (even though Tibet is not included in the administrative geographies of these states) receives no labels from Sautman.

Generally Sautman’s secondary sources seem to be selected not as part of an approach wherein one sifts through and digests relevant materials with the aim of exploring the issue at hand, but rather as fodder for arguing a predetermined conclusion. It’s a bit more than just the selective reading of Mark Elliott mentioned above. For an evaluation of the place of the Manchu Emperor in Tibet he turns to Prasanjit Duara:

The historian of late imperial China Prasenjit Duara has written that “the Qing emperor was not simply a Chinese emperor, not simply the Son of Heaven. He was many things. He was the Bodhisattva Manjusri when he went to worship the Buddha; he was the Ruler of Rulers when he went to the Potala Palace in Lhasa…”

Prasanjit Duara is also many things, but a specialist in Qing-Tibetan relations is not one of them (and certainly not something he claims to be, in spite of being pressed into service as such by Sautman). Indeed, even Sautman is constrained to admit in a note that no Qing emperor ever visited the Potala. But the Qing emperor as “Ruler of Rulers” in Tibet? What Tibetan term is this supposed to represent? Certainly not gong-ma. Not that one would expect Sautman to see this; even less to wonder if Duara would be the best source for the subject at hand. (Sautman comments, regarding the emperors’ non-visits to the Potala, that, well, their representatives did visit! Close enough, one guesses.) Anyone familiar with Sino-Tibetan relations during the Qing would know that the Qing emperor was Mañjuśrī not just when “he went to visit the Buddha,” but whenever he entered Tibetan perceptions. It should be noted too that on the same page from which the above quote comes Duara also refers to the Qianlong emperor meeting the Dalai Lama as well as the Panchen Lama. No meeting with any Dalai Lama occurred… but the emperor did meet representatives of the Dalai Lama!

To give Duara his due, his piece is not concerned with Tibet for the most part. Indeed, it is part of a volume conceived as a textbook for beginning area studies researchers. Similarly, for several quoted lines on the Qing succession to the “mandate of heaven” that had been held by the Ming emperors Sautman turns not to any of the voluminous scholarly works on the Ming-Qing transition, but rather to an online site for educators teaching Asia.

With such citations the impression that sources were sought out only to support the conclusions that Sautman had already adopted gives way to the feeling that this was done via something akin to a high-intensity Google search for the right kind of comment, a task that might even have been outsourced in part to research assistants. In any event, the mass of footnotes becomes primarily a distracting data blitz (even for the small portion of Sautman’s “All That Glitters is Not Gold” with which I’m dealing); for who can go off hunting down every odd citation? What one does not have, however, is an objective sifting of relevant literature.

And so we come to one of the more amusing assertions of Sautman, sourced with a footnote directing the reader to the official web site of the British monarchy. (The basic information is so well known that one wonders why a citation is needed at all—and if needed, could not a better one have been found?) Sautman here informs all who might Han-chauvinistically question the legitimacy of Mongols and Manchus as Chinese rulers of China that: “Contending that the Yuan and Qing dynasts were not Chinese rulers is no more persuasive than arguing that King George I (r. 1714-1727) was not a British monarch because he was German and seen that way by the British public, spoke English poorly, and lived 54 years in Germany before ascending the British throne.” (We’ll set aside Princess Diana’s remark to her solicitor [in the midst of divorce proceedings] that her problem was having married into a German family.)

Reflect on this: on the level of national identity Sautman now equates the widespread tradition of intermarriage between European royal houses with the Mongol and Manchu military conquests of China.Thus, the bloody conquest of China, the imposition of non-Chinese officials in important positions throughout the bureaucracy, the stratification of a hierarchy with Mongols and Manchus at the top… all these elements that went into creating clearly perceived identity boundaries are supposed to be equated with the marital politics of the ruling houses of Europe. Let’s put it another way: Sautman invites readers to usefully analogize the Mongol penetration and conquest of China to the Hanoverian penetration and conquest of… the granddaughter of James I. The idea of scholarship aside, it is hard to take this seriously as a polemic.

Finally, as if all this were not enough, Sautman leaves us with his prescription for peace on the Tibetan Plateau. At the end of “All that Glitters is Not Gold” we read:

If it is acknowledged that China has had a reasonable claim to Tibet as legitimately part of its territory and that ethnic groups and parts of states do not have a right to independence, then attempts at secession had no legal effect and Tibet was a pseudostate. The way then becomes clear for the Dalai Lama to accept the pre-condition for negotiations, that he state that Tibet is an alienable part of China, something he can do even without explicitly acknowledging that Tibet was not independent in the decades before 1951. Provided that the Chinese government then makes good on its pledge to enter into negotiations with him and does so not just about the Dalai Lama’s future, but about matters he has said are most important to him, i.e. religion and culture in Tibet, the threshold for resolving the Tibet Question will have been attained.

One wonders where Sautman has been during the years in which the Dalai Lama has been acknowledging that Tibet is legitimately a part of China. Not only has he said that he yearns to be a Chinese citizen, “to return to Tibet as a member of China’s Tibetan minority,” the prime minister of his exile administration has asserted that the Tibet Question is an internal Chinese matter and Western countries have nothing to do with it. In effect, the “threshold” that Sautman is focused on with laser-like analytical abilities was crossed long ago. Perhaps that’s why the later piece, “Tibet’s Putative Statehood and International Law” simply places the burden of accepting China’s claim on the shoulders of what he broadly refers to as Tibetan exiles: “If Tibetan exiles recognize that China has a legitimate claim to Tibet, the threshold for resolving the Tibet Question will have been crossed. Presumably, negotiations that would include expanding the scope of autonomy for Tibet and protecting its culture could begin.”

The Dalai Lama’s acceptance of Tibet as a part of the People’s Republic of China is fairly well known within Chinese intellectual circles debating the Tibet issue. Has that information never popped up on the screen as Sautman (or Team Sautman?) scoured the internet for citations with which to buttress his thesis? China is simply uninterested in having the Dalai Lama back. No matter what his stated position he will inevitably become the focus of Tibetan aspirations. In 1959 he neither sought nor led a revolt against China. But he was swept up into it and became the face of a revolt he never wanted. This is all well known, but Sautman prefers to look away from the Dalai Lama’s eagerness to accommodate China’s claim to Tibet and instead blame “Tibetan exiles” for… well, for what exactly? For their political stance on the question of Tibet’s status? Sautman obviously thinks that “Tibetan exiles” should abandon advocacy, something they have a right to undertake by any interpretation of a number of international covenants on human rights, (starting with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Then, Sautman “presumes,” China will negotiate about letting them have a greater role in “protecting [Tibet’s] culture.” In other words, Tibetans are asked to give up a basic right, advocacy and the expression of their opinions, and then China will discuss curbing culturally repressive measures that it should not be implementing to begin with. The rhetorical tact Sautman takes, by positing the cessation of advocacy as a prerequisite for discussions about cultural protection, easily insinuates to readers who don’t pause very long to consider what they’ve just read that the former is the cause of the latter. Or, to put it crudely, repression is caused by opposition to repression.

And what sort of protection does he think Tibet’s culture needs? As he puts it elsewhere, “state practices in Tibet do not amount to cultural genocide or ethnocide.  No intentional destruction of Tibetan culture has been shown.” (BTW, he supports these comments and others like them with reference to remarks by the “pro-Tibet-independence Tibetologist Elliot Sperling” about the cultural activity that does take place on the Tibetan Plateau, selectively omitting said Tibetologist’s assertion that Chinese measures aimed at repressing literary and artistic freedom must be opposed, and that repression can indeed be harsh when the government perceives a potential for engendering sentiments it considers separatist or simply hostile to its interests. More to the point are the attacks on cultural figures that have been more and more in evidence since 2008.)

I’ve largely looked only at Sautman’s section on Tibet’s historical status and here alone one winds up with a real farrago of selective and often specious citations, wrapped up inside a meant-to-impress 400+-footnote package. It’s certainly enough to impress the easily impressed—those who don’t understand the necessity for primary sources on such a question or the need to examine the view from below (and not just the view from the metropole). It will surely seem impressive to those who don’t understand the necessity of reading and digesting the basic literature on a question, as opposed to simply citing just enough of whatever writings one can find to support an argument. And it will certainly strike a resonant chord with anyone who imagines that being conquered by the Mongols is somewhat akin to having one’s monarch marry into another royal family. A most impressive piece of work, “All That Glitters is Not Gold.”

Indeed.

You can guess I wasn’t feeling too cheerful when I started out writing about the state of our quasi or (more hopefully) embryonic democracy. But after I posted the first part of the essay and received some lively feedback from readers, I must admit that things began to look a little more hopeful. In Part One I dissected our present political system and pronounced it not exactly a democracy, in spite of official claims. In part two I made the case that only a party-based system could make our exile political system a real democracy, and concluded that we needed a strong national party, committed to Rangzen and democracy, to win “the Kalon-Tripa and parliamentary elections and, with the blessings of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, legitimately take over the government-in-exile.”

But of course the underlying problem has not only been how to go about creating a national political party, but also have it accepted officially by Dharamshala. From what I understand the present Exile Charter does not have any provisions for the legal formation and registration of political parties. To get a new ruling inserted into the Charter is going to be next to impossible, or at least take a very long time to accomplish. But then, is such a new law really necessary?

For instance there is absolutely no mention of political parties in the American Constitution, but the party system came into being in the US and established itself as a vital part of American polity. I am not a constitutional scholar but I think that the freedom of assembly, or freedom of association, as it is sometimes referred to, provides the legal basis for people to come together and form political parties. Freedom of assembly, as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, is interpreted to mean both the freedom to assemble and the freedom to join an association. The next logical progression is, of course, starting your own association or political party, which is just an extension of the right to free assembly. Since the freedom of association is recognized as a human right, a political freedom and a civil liberty, I am sure the exile government recognizes and guarantees it to all those within its authority. Hence there should be no legal problem for Tibetan political parties.

Presently we have the National Democratic Party of Tibet (NDPT) in Dharamshala, which fields candidates for the Parliamentary elections. I understand that the Party once requested permission to register with the electoral commission, but was told that the commission had no provisions for doing that, but that the NDPT could go ahead and put up their candidates anyway. The NDPT was established by the Tibetan Youth Congress. The Central Executive Committee of the TYC invited me and other former Central Executive members to a meeting in 1993 (or 94), where a plan was discussed to create a political party that would reinvigorate the Tibetan political environment. My friend Lhasang Tsering and I participated in the founding conference of the party in September 1994. But official pressure was put on the conference not to include Tibetan independence in its primary goals, and a majority of the delegates went along with this. So Lhasang la and I withdrew our membership from the party.

But the point I wanted to make here is that no official registration seems to be required to form a political party and field candidates in the national elections. If we want to be absolutely sure about the legitimacy of introducing a political party in Tibetan politics, then we have, in fact, the blessings of His Holiness himself, who urged the TYC in their Annual Working Committee Meeting in August 1990 to take the initiative and form a political party. Does this mean that we have resolved the issue of whether a political party advocating Tibetan independence can participate in Tibetan electoral politics, and whether this overlong essay can finally end at this convenient juncture?

I’m afraid we’re not quite there yet. One fundamental problem that sticks out is the logistical one of setting up a genuinely democratic and participatory political organization in an exile society physically dispersed all over the Indian subcontinent, and these days, the world. Of course, I never saw myself launching any political party from my solitary retreat in the Appalachian mountains, but when I said I was going to write a Part III to the “Waiting for Mangtso” essay, I did hope to be able to offer the readers some practical solution to this question. I want to apologize for it taking this long, but I spent quite a bit of time thinking and working (with a few other friends) on a partial solution, but one that would have the virtue of being practical and immediately implementable. Let me lay it all out here, from its inception.

Last summer when I was in India, I (besides writing Part I of “Waiting for Mangtso”) gave a PowerPoint presentation, Independent Tibet -The Facts, at a number of schools and Institutions in Dharamshala, Delhi and Bangalore. I also traveled to Bylakuppe where I was the guest of Shingza Rimpoche, the dynamic young rangzen activist from Golok. He arranged for me to speak to the monks of Sera monastery, the Bylakuppe public and the children of the SOS School.

I don’t think I can adequately describe the incredible enthusiasm of the monks, lay-people, college-students, schoolchildren and new-arrivals who attended these talks. The near unanimous fervour and eagerness of everyone to discuss the issue of Tibetan independence, caught me completely by surprise. It might also have caused a little concern to some in Beijing. A denunciation of my talk and myself (the “radical-separatist”) appeared on bbs.tibet.cn on 29.7.09.

Many in my audience spoke of their desire to contribute to the cause and expressed frustration at not finding a way to do so. Some spoke of the need for an organization of progressive and patriotic Tibetans who believed in rangzen. In fact some of them asked me about the Rangzen Alliance (which the late Taktser Rimpoche, myself and some others started in 2000) and what it was doing now.

With the Alliance’s few members scattered around the world, it is in no position to start a political organization or undertake any major rangzen project. Yet I think that because of the Alliance’s unwavering (and initially unpopular) stand on rangzen, it has a measure of credibility in the Tibetan world and could serve to bring those who believe in rangzen together, at least for a national discussion.

But how do we go about creating this national discussion or dialogue? Most Tibetans live their lives in what can only be described (I am not speaking metaphorically here) as a vast concentration camp – admittedly, with varying degrees of confinement and privileges. The rest of us in exile are scattered to the four winds. Even those of us fortunate enough to live in the free world are tied down by jobs, families and responsibilities, and not able to communicate, far less interact with, other Tibetans on a regular basis.

Having brainstormed the problem we decided that the Internet and related communications technology offered a solution that though seemingly inappropriate to our not-so-advanced society, could at least be undertaken as a first step. This solution also held out the only real long-term possibilities for overcoming the barriers to communicating with Tibet and for moving an older generation-in-exile into the modern world.

The Internet has become the most powerful global conduit of knowledge and information, and at the same time an unprecedented social and cultural leveler. The enormous potential of this technology for opening up closed societies and spreading freedom and democracy is evident in China’s massive efforts to censor and police the Internet. The Tibetan struggle does not appear to lend itself to wonderful solutions, no matter how spiritual or high-minded, as the latest “talks with China” have demonstrated, yet a kind of nonviolent silver bullet does appear to exist for us in “The Arsenal of Freedom” (to paraphrase President Roosevelt) in the form of Internet technology. And we have already been using it, if we think back to March 2008 and the role that the cell phone and YouTube played in that revolutionary uprising throughout Tibet. As I speak, young people all over Tibet are keeping our language, culture, identity and collective defiance alive through blogs and writings on the Internet.

As a first step the Rangzen Alliance will put up a discussion forum, which will soon be online, but have restricted access. To make these discussions as open and democratic as possible discussants will be able to introduce their own topics, and have others comment on them. This discussion forum will be linked to the Rangzen Alliance’s public website rangzen.net, which is being completely redesigned and will carry many new features.

The Alliance had earlier convened open symposiums and forums in New York City and elsewhere. Although we generally had great turnouts, the discussions often degenerated into rangzen vs. middle way squabbles, or expressions of concern about the TGIE’s or the Dalai Lama’s reaction to such gatherings, or the repetition of the bizarre claim that since all Tibetans had rangzen in their hearts, advocating it or arguing on its behalf was not only pointless but harmful to Tibetan unity. Hence this new discussion forum will only involve Tibetans and friends who are committed to the cause of Tibetan independence and who are unafraid to express their beliefs.

Such a discussion forum will allow rangzen advocates and activists to participate in a community of like-minded compatriots with whom they can, not only share opinions, concerns and hopes, but also have their own special ideas and plans discussed seriously by interested and involved people. Depending on what the discussants might eventually work out or resolve: a new rangzen campaign, an international conference or a national political party, could then possibly be created. The bottom line being that all these events would come about through democratic discussion among Rangzen activists and supporters world over, and not be decided by a leader figure or a clique.

The only requirement to join is a declaration of commitment to the three goals of the Rangzen Alliance:

• The restoration of Tibetan independence.
• The return of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Tibet as the sovereign head-of-state of an independent nation.
• The establishment of a fully democratic system of government in exile Tibetan society and in free Tibet – based on the rule of law and the primacy of individual freedom.

An online registration form is available on rangzen.net (click here). A PDF version (in English) can be downloaded (click here).

Although the discussion forum is restricted to registered members, the new public website offers many ways for even non-members to interact and express their opinion. Comments and ratings of posts are open to all, as well as dedicated submission forms for individual contributions as film, book and music reviews, essays, event promotion, video sharing, etc. A number of well-known political writers on Tibetan freedom are contributing to a large blog section and offering their unique reflections on our political affairs.

This Internet experiment will need the contribution of volunteers to succeed. We are looking for rangzen-committed writers, bloggers, editors, discussion-moderators (including Tibetan and Chinese languages) and volunteers to help in other ways. We have a fantastic activist/ web-developer (a veteran of the ‘89 Lhasa demonstration) putting the finishing touches to the website, while three other members are setting up the organizational stuff.

(Photo: © Tenzin Lekshay, 2008)

西藏问题，一直是一个争议的话题。不仅海峡两岸的中国政府与西藏流亡政府对此问题持截然不同的观点，海内外的中国人，对此看法也相当不同。这种种不同，主要源於人们对西藏历史与现实的了解程度和使用的“价值尺度”。因此，讨论西藏问题，不仅有助於了解西藏的真正历史和现实，更促使我们重新思考人的自由意志和国土统一；人民选择权利和国家形式；以及民族自决权等重要的价值概念和冲突。对这些价值采取什麽样的取舍，直接影响中国人走向自由和民主的进程。

一、西藏历史的真实：

海峡两岸的中国政府都声称，西藏是中国领土不可分割的一部份。而西藏人民的精神领袖达赖喇嘛和西藏流亡政府认为，历史并不是这样，西藏是一个独立的国家。

中华人民共和国认为，自1950年中国人民解放军进入西藏，西藏就从农奴制“解放”了，西藏这些年获得巨大进步和繁荣。而西藏流亡政府认为，藏人这些年在被奴役，被剥夺了基本人权。

这两种截然相反的看法，哪一种更接近真实呢？

1、西藏与中国关系的历史轮廓：

让我们从历史书籍上看看西藏与中国唐、宋、元、明、清五个朝代的关系。

西元前127年，汉朝初建时，西藏的第一个国王聂赤赞普就登基。随後是几百年的藏内各部落争霸内战。

在中国唐代期间，西藏变得强大。西元七世纪，西藏吐蕃王松赞干布兼并了各部落为统一的国家，并扩展疆土。唐朝曾将文成公主献给松赞干布为妃，谋求两国和好。西藏军队还曾一度攻占了中国当时的首都长安（现西安）。

在中国宋朝末年，西藏也和宋朝一样，被强大的蒙古成吉思汗的铁骑兼并。蒙古人在中原建立了元朝。但在西藏，元世祖忽必烈尊藏人大喇嘛八思巴为整个蒙帝国的最高上师喇嘛，相当於国师，并让他主掌西藏政教权力，蒙古人没有直接统治西藏。

蒙古帝国衰败後，西藏与元朝後的中国明朝几乎没有什麽联系。

中国清朝时，与西藏的关系基本友好。清朝军队曾四次应达赖喇嘛的吁请进藏驱退外部侵略和平息内部叛乱，随後即撤出。清朝末期，西藏曾遭到邻国尼泊尔和英国的侵略。1909年，清朝光绪皇帝和慈禧太后相继去世後，清军攻进拉萨，占领了西藏。两年後，辛亥革命爆发，驻藏清军分裂成“保皇”和“共和”两派并内讧。藏人乘机起义，击败清军後，十三世达赖喇嘛宣布西藏为一个独立的国家。

1950年初，中国人民解放军进攻西藏。藏人在大军压境下，派出代表团到北京求和，被迫与北京政权签订了“17条协议”。主要内容是，北京允诺保持西藏一切不变，藏人允许解放军和平进藏。但进藏不久，中共实行社会主义，藏人日益不满。1959年藏民起义，中共称之为“叛乱”，用军队镇压。十四世达赖喇嘛和近十万藏民逃到印度，建立了西藏流亡政府。

2、两岸中国政府将西藏视为中国领土的历史根据和历史缺陷

现在海峡两岸的中国政府声称西藏自古就是中国领土，主要根据有五个∶一是中国唐朝时藏王娶了文成公主。文成公主後来在西藏有很大的权势。二是中国元朝时，西藏也被并入蒙古帝国，属元管辖。三是清朝时，多次清军入藏做保护人。四是五世达赖喇嘛的称号是满清皇帝册封的。五是当年蒋介石的中央国民政府曾派“蒙藏委员会”委员长吴忠信去拉萨主持了十四世达赖喇嘛“做床”仪式（即当时五岁的达赖喇嘛被正式确立为西藏最高政教领袖的登基典礼）。

从历史资料和常识角度，这五个“根据”都是不能自圆其说的。

第一，唐朝的文成公主嫁给藏王松赞干布，是唐朝以婚姻方式谋求两国和好。今人以距今1,300多年前的唐朝献妃来做为西藏自古与中国有关，是中国领土，是非常荒唐的理由。

第二，蒙古成吉思汗的骑兵侵入中原建立了元朝。因它是在中国汉人居住地区建立的政权，中国人将元朝做为中国历史上的一个朝代。但以西藏也被成吉思汗的铁骑侵占，成为蒙古帝国的一部份，来证明西藏是元朝、即中国的一部份，是说不通的。如果这种道理能够成立，现在成吉思汗的子孙蒙古人也要起来声称，因为他们的祖先曾征服了西藏和中原，还有俄罗斯的大部份领土，他们对这些领土就有主权。那麽现在的中国就应归属於蒙古共和国。按照这种逻辑，现在的越南、朝鲜都应是中国的领土，因当年都被中国人征服过。这种逻辑显然不通。

第三，清军多次入藏帮助藏人平乱和击退外侵，并不能成为清朝对西藏就拥有主权的理由。如果这种道理成立的话，几年前美军帮助科威特击败伊拉克的侵略，是否就拥有科威特的主权？今天美国等联军进入海地帮助被军人推翻的海地民选总统阿瑞斯蒂恢复职权，是不是美国从此就对海地拥有了主权？

第四，说西藏五世达赖喇嘛的称号是清世祖册封，来证明西藏隶属於清朝，也是不符合历史事实的。中共建政後研究西藏历史的权威是牙含章，他编著了有关西藏至今十四个达赖喇嘛历史的《达赖喇嘛传》，在此书序言中，这位历史学家写到∶“为了斗争的需要，组织上要我写一本关於西藏历史的书，既用於驳斥反对派散布的谰言，也用於对广大西藏人民进行反帝爱国主义教育。”[1]历史学家应忠於历史真实，但他写书是为了政治需要。但即使在他的书中，也记载著，达赖喇嘛的称号并不是满清皇帝赐封给五世达赖喇嘛的，而是蒙古王俺答汗在大约中国明朝时期赠送给西藏宗教领袖索南嘉措的尊号。[2]“达赖”是蒙语，大海的意思；“喇嘛”是藏语，上师的意思。从此有了“达赖喇嘛”的称号。藏人追认前两位佛教领袖为一世和二世达赖喇嘛，将索南嘉措视为第三世达赖喇嘛，这一称号从此按顺序延续使用。[3]

满清皇帝是曾给五世达赖喇嘛册封过24个字的尊号，但同时达赖喇嘛也给满清皇帝册封了一大堆尊贵的称呼。[4]这种相互册封是当时双方表示友好的一种方式，不存在隶属关系。

第五，从辛亥革命至1950年，这近40年间，西藏是完全独立的。这期间虽发生十三世达赖喇嘛去世，十四世达赖继任等权力转移，但藏人始终没有答应蒋介石的国民政府提出的西藏应是中国领土、隶属汉人统治的要求。由北京的中国藏学研究中心和中国第二历史档案馆合编的《十三世达赖喇嘛圆寂致祭和十四世达赖喇嘛转世坐床档案选编》（以下简称“选编”）一书，收集了当时的国民政府就此问题的公函、电报等478件[5]。我认真阅读了所有这些文件，发现藏人在这期间始终没有同意将西藏归属於中国统治。

两岸中国政府强调说，当年国民政府派专使吴忠信去了拉萨，代表中央政府“察看确定”了灵童，并“主持”了十四世达赖喇嘛“坐床”仪式。以此证明西藏的从属地位。但从“选编”一书中吴忠信从拉萨与蒋介石的来往电报可以看出，藏人只是为给国民政府面子，让吴见了灵童，并参予了坐床仪式。吴忠信并没有决定十四世达赖喇嘛可否确立的权力。牙含章在《达赖喇嘛传》中对此也写道∶“所谓‘查看’，不过争回国民党政府的一点面子，实际上并无否决之权。”[6]在“坐床” 仪式上，发生了争执，因吴忠信被安排在并不重要的座位。最後藏人勉强同意给他相当清朝驻藏大臣的座位。牙含章对此写道∶“所谓‘座位’问题，亦不过是给国民党政府争回一点面子，说明吴忠信的身份至少与驻藏人大臣是相等的。”[7]吴并没有“主持”坐床登基典礼。

当时的国民党报纸曾刊载了一张达赖喇嘛与吴忠信在一起的照片，做为吴主持达赖喇嘛登基典礼的证据，但现任中共“全国人大”副委员长的阿沛·阿旺晋美，在《西藏日报》发表的讲话指出，那张照片是登基典礼结束几天後，吴忠信去拜见达赖喇嘛时所拍的。[8]我在研读“选编”中的文件时，发现其中有两封电报可以佐证这一点∶例如第439件公函为当时国民政府中央宣传部副部长董显光拍给在拉萨的吴忠信的电报，电文是说，美国美联社想得到达赖喇嘛登基典礼的新闻照片发表，为省时间，让吴将照片直接寄印度一家报纸转美联社。[9]吴忠信在回电（第441件公函）中说，因为登基典礼在早晨进行，“不便拍照”。意思是说，他没有登基典礼场面的照片。他在电文中说，他会把其他场面拍的照片寄美联社。[10]别的场面会拍照片，恰恰是国民政府最重视的、由特使吴忠信“主持”的登基典礼，“特使团”近百人却没拍一张吴忠信主持仪式场面的照片，所谓由吴忠信主持的登基典礼之说是很难令人相信的。

3、西藏作为宗教国家的特殊地位

海峡两岸的中国政府认为西藏不是一个主权国家，主要根据是西藏与其他国家没有正式外交关系；西藏多次得到中国满清皇帝派军进藏平乱和击退外侵。

这种状况的产生缘於西藏特殊的宗教国家性质。

西藏与中国发生密切关系，主要是在满清王朝时期。两者的关系是“施者”和“被施者”的关系。满清皇帝做为施者，用军事力量和每年供奉大量财富使“被施者” 达赖喇嘛不仅掌管西藏的政教权力，并成为整个清帝国国教的最高精神领袖。而达赖喇嘛远至蒙古、新疆以及朝鲜、缅甸的宗教影响力，则帮助了满清王朝的稳定。双方处於一种世俗和宗教互益的合作状态。

打一个比喻，双方的关系很像是一个村子和村边山上的和尚庙。这个村的村长做为世俗领袖，掌管著这个村子的权力。很多村民信仰佛教，包括村长也信佛，共同尊奉和尚庙的长者喇嘛为精神领袖。村长并无掌管和尚庙宇的权力。但当有强盗侵入和尚庙，或庙内小和尚造反，长者喇嘛向村长求救时，村长会派乡兵入庙驱敌，帮助恢复秩序後，乡兵即撤离。平时还要做为“施者”向和尚庙提供食物。村长对庙宇长者喇嘛的尊敬和友好关系，使村上的佛教徒更加拥护村长，增加村政权的稳定。庙宇并不需要自备军力，因为佛教主张不杀生，有危急情况吁请村长派兵保护。庙宇也不需宣布独立，因为它从来都不属於这个村管辖。喇嘛与村长的关系是互助互益。

这种情况也有点像意大利和梵蒂冈的关系。梵蒂冈虽然座落在意大利，但不是意大利的一个行省，不归意大利政府管辖。但当有人对这一罗马教皇居住圣地进行攻击破坏时，根据教皇的吁请，意大利的军队会去帮助。但绝不会帮助後就一直占领。

这种关系的破裂，一般多出於村长这边的原因。例如庙宇遭祸求救，他置之不理，或他自己动了霸占庙宇之心。庙宇的存在是靠精神力量，没有军力。如果世俗的村落不看重宗教精神，用武力讲话，庙宇一边自然是弱者。如果村长什麽教也不信，不仅霸占庙宇，还要对喇嘛和尚进行社会改造，那这个和尚庙就只有遭殃了。

西藏的这种特殊的宗教国度性质，和与满清王朝的施者与被施者的关系，导致了它没有成为一个与世界各国有著正式外交关系的典型的独立国家。而这一点是造成中国人认为西藏是中国领土的错觉之一。

4、西藏不是中华帝国行省的两个证据

从五世达赖喇嘛受满清皇帝顺治的邀请，1652年到北京访问的礼节上也可以看出，西藏并不从属於满清王朝统治。据牙含章的《达赖喇嘛传》记载，达赖到达京城之前，满清皇帝曾召集满汉大臣，讨论欢迎达赖的礼节。满臣认为，达赖为国师，皇帝应出城亲迎，这样会使信佛教的外蒙归顺。汉臣认为，“皇上是天下国家之主”，亲自出迎，有失身份。最後顺治帝采折衷方法，以“打猎”名义，出城四十里，与达赖“路遇”。[11]在中国封建王朝历史上，不要说没有过皇帝亲自出城迎接自己统治下的人，在清王朝晚期，面对强大的英国派来的使臣，皇帝还坚持要他行跪拜磕头的仪式。对达赖的特殊礼节，可以看出西藏并不是满清王朝的下属。

另一个明显的例证是，如果西藏从属於满清王朝，它就应该像属下行省或其他附属国一样向朝廷“进贡”。但历史上并无这样的记载，反而是满清王朝一直向西藏提供大量贡品。因为满清视佛教为国教，尊达赖喇嘛为最高精神领袖。

5、西藏事实独立的主要根据

近代西藏只与尼泊尔等国一度有外交关系。做为主权国家，西藏除了在正式外交关系上条件不充足外，做为独立国家的其他条件都是具备的。例如在这八个方面∶

第一，西藏国家元首即达赖喇嘛有自己的产生方式。西藏有自己的政府机构和政府内阁。第二，西藏有自己的首都，一直在拉萨。第三，西藏有自己制订的法律。第四，自行税收，印制并发行货币，独立财政。第五，虽然规模不是很大，但一直有自己的军队。第六，更重要的是它有自己的文化，自己的风俗习惯，和不同於中国汉语的藏语言文字。第七，有以海拔高度为历史界线的自然地域。第八，有一直独立的历史。

二、西藏现实的状况

1、尊重西藏历史

对於西藏的真实历史，海峡两岸的中国人了解得不多。因为两岸政权都主张西藏是中国领土，任何关於西藏独立历史的书籍都难以出版。再加上中国人向来有“大一统”的国家情结，想到西藏，第一个反应是不能独立。中国人的西藏历史知识，基本都是中国官方灌输的知识。

1992年10月，中华人民共和国发表了“西藏问题人权白皮书”，该文引述并围绕邓小平的这一指示写成∶“根本问题是，西藏是中国的一部份，对与不对，要以这个标准来判断。”[12]

这种不管“对”与“不对”“西藏都是中国的一部份”是多麽蛮横的逻辑。遗憾的是，邓小平的这种思维代表了相当多的中国人的想法，即提到西藏，就是不能独立。不管历史事实是怎样，不探究现实状况如何，也不想了解西方藏学学者的研究，更不要说认真倾听藏人的呼声了。

2、正视西藏现实

尊重历史，应该是人们思考西藏问题的基本出发点。而比这更重要的是要正视西藏在中共统治下的现实和西藏多数人民的意愿。

如果对西藏人民生存现状做一评估，衡量的主要依据应是∶在中共45年的统治下，在政治上，藏人是被解放了，“当家作主”获得自由了，还是被剥夺了基本的政治权利；在经济上，藏人拥有私有财产的权利是被保护，富有了，还是这种权利被剥夺，生活贫穷；在宗教上，信仰选择被尊重了，还是宗教自由被践踏；在人文和生态环境上，西藏的文化和自然环境被保护了，还是被破坏；在种族关系上，藏人做为少数民族被尊重了，还是一直被歧视。

只要人们稍加了解，就会发现，事实是相当令人痛苦与愤怒的。

在政治上，藏人的选择权利完全被剥夺。西藏像整个中国大陆一样，从无人民投票选举，各级政府毫无民意基础。在西藏，最高权力者为中共西藏自治区党委第一书记。从1959年所谓“平乱”至今的七任“党委书记”——张国华、曾雍雅、任荣、阴法唐、伍精华、胡锦涛、陈奎元，除伍精华是彝族外，其馀都是汉人。

西藏像整个中国一样，没有新闻自由和言论自由。任何反抗都被中国军队镇压。据现在传到西方的中共西藏军区文件披露，仅在1959年“平乱”中，就有 87,000名藏民被“消灭”。[13]据曾任中共“全国人大”副委员长的班禅喇嘛的统计，当时全藏10-15％的藏民被关进监狱，其中40％死於狱中。[14]据国际大赦组织的资料，仅从1987至1992年间，拉萨就发生150多次藏人上街游行遭到镇压事件。[15]尤其是在1989年春天，即 “天安门民主运动”发生前两个月，中共在拉萨对藏人进行了大规模镇压并宣布戒严。当时在拉萨的《北京青年报》记者唐达献根据现场目击和其他渠道获得的中共官方文件，在海外发表了镇压内幕。据他的统计，当时有400多藏人被屠杀，上千人受伤，3,000多藏民被逮捕。[16]其他资料来源说，因此被株连的四万多藏民後来被取消城市户口，赶出拉萨。

达赖喇嘛在美国耶鲁大学演讲时说，在中共统治的40多年间，有120万藏人死於饥饿和迫害。[17]西藏流亡政府对这一数字有详细的分类统计，其中死於狱中17万人；被枪决近16万人；死於战场43万人；死於饥饿34万人；被逼自杀和批斗至死共10万人。整个死亡人数相当於西藏三区——“西藏自治区”和前藏、东藏居住的全部藏人的六分之一，即每六个藏人就有一人因异常原因丧生。[18]这种死亡比例在人类近代历史上是罕见的。[19]

在经济上，藏人拥有私有财产的权利完全被剥夺。中共强迫藏人进入社会主义的运动，使藏人的生活更加贫穷。1980年，中共中央总书记胡耀邦到西藏视察。面对藏人生活的极端贫苦，胡耀邦震怒地在中共西藏自治区党委会议上说∶“中央援助西藏的专门拨款都仍到雅鲁藏布江里去了？！”随後中共西藏自治区党委书记任荣被免职，阴法唐继任。胡耀邦对西藏的指示是，苦干几年，将西藏人民的生活水平恢复到20年前的1959年水平。後来阴法唐在《红旗》杂志上撰文说∶“胡耀邦同志视察西藏时，根据当时西藏的状况指出，西藏的实际情况是贫穷和落後。”[20]

近年来，随著整个中国的经济改革，西藏人民的生活水平较胡耀邦视察时已有较大改善。但据了解西藏实情的人士说，现在在西藏发财的主要是中国人。因为所有经济活动都要靠“关系”，没有公平竞争。而只有那些汉人才与北京和内地有各种关系和门路。据媒体报道说，在拉萨市最繁荣的“八角街”上，汉人经营的店铺多於藏人的。

在宗教上，藏人遭受的迫害更严重。据西藏流亡政府的统计，至1979年时，西藏境内的6,259座僧侣庙宇被破坏到只剩下8座。原有的59万僧侣，有11 万被迫害致死，25万被强迫还俗。在1988年於北京召开的中国藏学研究中心成立大会上，班禅喇嘛对此沈痛地说∶“凡西藏人居住区百分之百的寺庙遭到破坏，幸存的七、八座，没一个是完好无损的。”

现在中共对宗教迫害不像当年那样残酷，但藏人仍没有宗教自由。西藏的所有寺庙和僧侣都必须听命於中共统战部和宗教事务管理委员会。“出家僧侣规定”上这样写著∶“年满18岁以上，热爱国家，热爱共产党，征得父母同意。┅┅入寺後，要学习马克思主义，认清唯心和唯物是两种对立的世界观。”

而僧侣们对这种剥夺宗教自由的做法稍有不满，就遭到惩罚。尤其对主张西藏独立的藏人，更是残酷镇压。据曾在监狱中亲身经历过虐待的藏民描述，中国军警不仅使用电棍、枪托、铁棍和拳打脚踢，还使用烟头烧，放狗咬，和向尼姑阴道捅警棍等残忍方式逼供。据一位原在西藏曾为公安人员的汉人流亡者指出，“在西藏，警方的酷刑种类有33种之多。”[21]

在人文和自然环境上，西方研究西藏问题的学者一致指出，西藏文化和自然资源正遭到严重破坏。中共政权用重新划分西藏版图的方式，将西藏原有的东藏和前藏的大部份土地划入四川、云南、甘肃和青海等省份，并向这些地区大量移入汉人。根据中国几次全国人口普查的统计结果推算，现在居住在西藏三区的汉人已达700 万，总数已超过了600万藏人。

即使对西藏情况不了解的人，只要在中国共产党统治下生活过，就会设身处地地想象到，中共在西藏的专制会怎样黑暗。藏人在被中共专制奴役的同时还忍受著汉人的种族歧视。中国著名异议人士魏京生撰文回忆说，他的父母从没有接触过藏人，但当听说他的女朋友是藏族人时，坚决反对这门亲事，并要断绝父子关系。他父亲反对的理由是∶藏人不是人，是半个畜生。[22]这种结论来自多年受共产党教育的结果。

三、中国人反对西藏人民行使自己权利所反映出的四个价值问题

相当多的中国人既不尊重历史，更无视西藏人民这四十多年的苦难，就是一味反对西藏人民的独立诉求，坚持“大一统”的中国是高於一切的。海峡两岸中国政权反对西藏独立，自然是出於统治者自身利益，而海峡两岸的知识分子则完全不应无视西藏人民选择独立的权利。

1、统一的概念重要，还是人的自由价值重要？

有人反对西藏独立的理由是，如果让西藏独立，新疆、内蒙等地都会跟随要独立，大中国就会解体，这个责任谁来负？

但是我们思考问题的出发点是“人”，还是“国”。是“统一”的价值重要，还是人的自由重要。哪一个是终极价值？换一句话说，是“解体”可怕，还是个人被奴役可怕。我们可以假设这样两幅图画∶列宁复活，用武力统一了原属於“大苏联帝国”的包括俄罗斯在内的15个国家，恢复了大苏联，实行共产主义统治。全体苏联人被奴役，但国家统一了。另一幅图画是，苏联解体，分成现在的15个国家，大苏联没有了，但人民获得了自由。面对这样两种图画，两种生存方式，人们要选择哪一个？苏联人选择了即使付出“大苏联”解体的代价，也要人的自由。中国人为什麽就一定要选择宁可不自由，也要“大中国”呢？

边界、国家这些概念，从来就不具有终极价值。1975年欧洲国家签订的“赫尔辛基协定”有这样的条款∶所有欧洲国家间的边界变动，如果是和平方式进行，都是可允许的。赫尔辛基协定的主体精神是，边界并不是永恒的，人的自由意愿高於国家、边界等价值。道理并不复杂，因为边界，以及国家形式、社会制度等，都是人创造的，其出发点和最终归宿都是为了人的自由与尊严。当它违背大多数人民的意志，或与人的需要不相协调时，人们就要将它加以改变，而不是扭曲人的自由去适应它。

有人说，如果这种道理成立的话，那麽广东、四川、上海等中国的29个省市自治区都要独立怎麽办？问题是，这种假设的基础是不存在的。一个地方的人民要求独立，一定有一些特殊条件，例如不同的种族，不同的文化，曾有过独立的历史，以及大多数人民的意愿等等。不可能无缘无故地、毫无理由地就是要求独立。例如原苏联分成现在的15个国家後，俄罗斯的土地面积和人口数量都远超过其他原苏联分出的14个国家，但至今人们没有听说俄罗斯人民还要求再分成几块。其中重要的原因就是俄罗斯是一个民族，同一的文化，近代历史上也没有分成若干国家的历史。而且更重要的是，大多数俄罗斯人民没有这个愿望。

这正如中国东北三省在日本人统治时曾正式建立过“满洲国”，但今天并没有东北人要求“独立”成为一个国家。那种说如果让西藏独立，连广州、青岛、哈尔滨都会独立的假设，正如某些人面对中国大陆难民来美国，就疾呼如果不把他们送回去，中国12亿人都逃来美国怎麽办一样，都是用一种根本不可能发生的事先假设，来剥夺一部份处於弱者地位的人应有的权利。

中国人这种视“国家”重於个人自由与尊严的传统是相当久远的。整个一部五千年的中国文化的历史，就是强调君王、国家、社会等群体价值大於个人自由的历史。中国知识分子的老祖宗孔子、孟子以及他们的传人，精心构筑的中国文化，核心是个人服从群体。

近代中国图新变革的著名知识分子，像康有为、梁启超、陈独秀、章太炎、梁漱溟等，强调的都是图强变法，使国家强大。很少论述个人的自由和权利。即使像严复这样翻译了穆勒的《自由论》，有意向国人介绍与传播英国自由主义思潮的知识分子，仍是把自由主义作为富国强兵的手段，而不是将自由做为目的。而中共统治这近半个世纪，这种国家价值大於个人，更是被强调到极端地步。中国人深受这种国家强大、祖国利益至上的文化侵蚀。从近年来中国大陆人民争取民主自由的运动，都可以看到这种国家利益至上的民族情绪。例如无论是1976年的“四五”天安门运动，还是“八九民运”，天安门广场的主旋律都是“爱国”。天安门学生领袖向政府的主要诉求是要当局承认这是一场爱国运动。个人主义和自由主义的呼声是相当微弱的。在今天中国经济发展势头旺盛的情况下，一些中国知识分子提出“新权威主义”的主张，这种“主义”的本质，仍然是视国家利益大於个体权利，社会秩序高於个人自由的传统中国文化思维。

构成讽刺和让人深思的是，这种“国家强大最重要”的思维在中国蔓延了五千年，但这个国家始终强大不起来。根本原因是中国人，尤其是中国一批又一批迂腐的知识分子，把价值观念给颠倒了∶强调国家强大，结果是剥夺了个人自由和权利。国家富强并不应是终极目标。相反，保护个人自由和尊严才是国家存在的价值和意义。国家强大只应该是一个“结果”，人只有在自由的状态下，才有想象力和创造力，才能创造出更多的精神和物质财富，最後结出国家强大的“果”。中国人五千年来本末倒置，结果是国没强大，人的自由也被剥夺。

看重人的自由，不仅是解决西藏问题的根本出路，也是中国人能否变成现代人，中国能否成为一个真正自由民主国家的关键。

2、由中国十二亿人决定，还是尊重多数藏人的选择？

有人说，西藏是否独立，不能由藏人自己选择，应该取决於中国大多数人民，即十多亿汉人是不是同意。有人把它含蓄地表达为，要由汉人和藏人共同决定。这种 “大多数汉人决定论”，实际上等於剥夺了藏人的选择权利。道理并不复杂，汉人有十亿多，藏人只有六百万。假设汉人人口总数不再增长，藏人以世界上人口增长速度最快的每年3％的速度增长，也要1,500年後人数与汉人相等。这种由多数汉人决定的观点，实际上等於永远取消了藏人有自己作主的机会。

在西藏问题上，尊重“多数人”的决定，主要是尊重多数藏族人民的意愿。正像“大中国”和“统一”不是终极目标一样，独立也不是一个最重要的价值。最重要的是尊重大多数西藏人民的自由选择权利，无论他们要选择独立还是选择与中国统一。

1993年美国托管地波多黎各“公民投票”决定该岛是否成为美国第51个州，是相当体现尊重人民选择权利的事例。该岛是否成为美国领土的一部份，并没有取决於美国50州人民的意愿，而是由岛上的所有居民自由投票决定。如果实行由美国多数人民决定的原则，那麽就没有波多黎各人民的选择馀地，因为岛上的居民只有300万人，而美国本土人口有两亿五千万。

“公民投票自决”的结果，波多黎各多数人民选择保留现状，即不愿意成为美国的一个州。美国政府与人民对这种结果并没干涉，完全尊重当地人民的意愿。按照美国的法律，如果波多黎各多数人民选择了要与美国统一，想成为美国的第51个州，反而并不能自动地成为现实。这一议案要经过美国国会讨论是否批准。美国国会是全国最高立法机构，代表著民意。由它审核，就是由美国多数人民审核。也就是说，当波多黎各选择独立时，由他们自己的多数人民单方面决定。当波多黎各人民选择要与美国统一时，这时需要征得美国人民的同意。

这种事情很像婚姻和家族关系。在美国，如果一方提出离婚，法院即受理，并且可以离成，不需要两方都同意。而当一方提出要复婚时，却必须得到另一方的同意才能“统一”。也就是说，离婚，单方提出就可以；而结婚才需要两方都同意，不能一方坚持要“结”就可以结成。家族关系也是这样，假如在一个有几个兄弟共同生活的大家庭中，如果有一个兄弟要搬出去“独立”生活，这个权利应该属於他本人。但当这个搬出去的兄弟有一天要回来和大家庭“统一”生活在一起时，却要经过多数兄弟的同意。

这些事例和比喻的背後，都体现著这样的观念，即充分尊重人的选择权利，将人的自由意愿视为最高的价值。人类的历史越来越证明著，只要是好的东西，或好的生存方式，是不需要强迫别人接受的。在一个允许人民自由选择的条件下，人们一定最终选择好的。这种选择“好的”之所以能够实现，是允许人们有选择“坏的”的权利。

3、西藏独立会对中国安全构成威胁吗？

有些比较现实的中国人强调，如果西藏独立，会使中国的国家安全受到威胁。意思是说，中国和印度有过边境战争，现在双方还隔著喜马拉雅山屯兵对视，一旦西藏独立，印度军队和势力就会进入西藏，没有山脉的自然屏障，中国腹地的安全会受到直接的军事威胁。

这种设想实际上是漠视了西藏人民追求和平与独立自主的传统和意愿。西藏在近代历史上受过其他国家和清王朝的多次入侵，现在又被中共专制统治。凭什麽说藏人摆脱了中国人的统治，独立自主後，就一定会甘愿或允许印度军队入侵或外人统治呢？西藏流亡政府以及十多万藏人难民在印度至今已经流亡了35年，即使居住在印度的国土内他们也没有被印度人统治，西藏流亡政府和它领导的藏人社区一直是独立的。

1987年达赖喇嘛在美国国会演讲时提出解决西藏问题的“五点和平计划”，[23]其中包括将藏区建成一个非军事区，成为自然环境保护区和旅游区。如果西藏成为一个非军事区，无论对中国或印度的安全都是有好处的，因为任何一方要攻击对方，都必须先进入西藏，这不仅会受到藏人的抵抗，也会引起国际社会的谴责。而不会像现在这样，中印军队如果冲突，一触即发，中间没有缓冲地带。而一个非军事区的西藏，一个由主张非暴力的诺贝尔和平奖得主达赖喇嘛领导的西藏，会对哪个国家的安全构成威胁呢？

4、离开中国的援助，西藏独立後能够存活吗？

很多中国人谈起西藏，特别强调中国政府不断重复的一个观点，即西藏原来是农奴制度，贫穷落後。这些年经过内地提供的大量人力物力援助，才使藏人生活改善。北京发表的“西藏人权白皮书”，也引用了大量官方数字来说明这一点。以此证明，“没有共产党，就没有新西藏”。

首先，“西藏人权白皮书”的数字的可信是值得怀疑的。中国大陆至今没有言论自由和新闻自由。当一种数字既不受到新闻舆论的监督，又不允许不同意见的反驳挑战，它的真实性会有多大呢？退一步讲，即使这些数字都是可信的，那麽一个国家或地区经过四十五年这样漫长的时间段的发展，怎麽可能没有一些进步和生活改善呢？谁能证明由西藏人自己管理自己，其经济发展就一定不比现状好呢？

第二，没有人否定西藏原来实行农奴制的落後。但可不可以用军事占领方式对一个异族社会强行进行改造？

中国人谈到农奴制，往往会想到中共当年拍摄的揭露西藏农奴主残忍的电影《农奴》，影片主人公强巴的苦难形象成为旧西藏的象徵。但旧西藏的黑暗实际上是被中共垄断的媒体夸大了的。正如中共夸大旧社会中国的苦难一样，目的是要人们满意当前的生活，不管它多麽贫穷；同时证明共产党现今统治的合理性和合法性。中国人由於长期生活在这种单一的宣传之中，久之，西藏的图像就变成了仅仅是电影《农奴》，藏人都是强巴，而不去追想中共军事占领後对西藏强行社会改造的残酷。

第三，就象“没有共产党，有没有新中国”的问题一样，没有共产党，有没有新西藏？中国大陆45年的惨痛现实已告诉人们，共产党的统治，给中国人带来了多麽深重的苦难。对於西藏也如此，共产党近半个世纪都没有搞好，为什麽还要坚持“党的领导”？而且那种没有中国人的帮助，藏人就无法生存下去的观点，实际上是对藏族人民的智慧、创造力和人类共同性的贬低，本质上是种族歧视。在印度的藏人不仅建立了自己的流亡政府，还以全体流亡藏人自由投票的方式产生了保障人民言论和新闻自由以及私有财产的新宪法。美国哥伦比亚大学研究西藏的学者罗勃特·萨尔曼教授（Robert Thurman）评价说∶“达赖喇嘛在印度重建了一个可观的西藏社会，保留了西藏的文化。”[24]藏人在印度寄人篱下的情况下都能建立一个独立、富有而民主的社会，为什麽他们在西藏真正当家作主之後这种能力就会消失呢？有人说，西藏没有工业，没有中国人的帮助，这样的地区很难发展。但蒙古人民共和国的居民也是游牧民族，人家不是也能生活，并且随著苏联帝国的垮台，蒙古简　F共产主义，人民活得越来越富裕和自由吗！关键是要相信，不管哪一个民族，哪一种肤色，只要人民有自由，就能创造自己的未来。中国人不要总是按著共产党的思路，总想给别人当“大救星”。

四、人的自由是最高的价值

解决西藏问题的根本原则是尊重人的选择权利，把人的自由视为最高的价值。国家、边界和社会制度等，都应该是为了保障人的自由和权利而设置，当它违背了这一初衷时，就要改变它。对这一点，近代西方文明奠基者之一的英国思想家洛克（John Locke）三百年前就已精辟阐述。洛克认为，在国家形式和国家法律出现之前，有一种“自然法”，这就是人生下来天赋的自由、平等和拥有私有财产的权利。国家和社会法律的制订都是为了保护人的“自然法”，即人的自由不被他者侵犯。当国家法律和任何社会制度违背了人的“自然法”精神时，就要改变它。面对专制制度，人民有革命的权利。洛克的这种人民主权、自由至上的理论在法国思想家卢梭笔下体现为《社会契约论》，即政府形式只是人民与国家的一种“契约”，即人民受权政府管理国家事物，多数人民的意愿是政府合法性的基础。後来杰佛逊起草的美国《独立宣言》，和美国宪法之父麦迪逊的论述，都是继续这种将人的自由、尊严、生命视为最高价值的人文精神。

从这种人文精神出发，我们就要尊重西藏人民的自由意志。那就是西藏人民有权利选择自己的领袖，自己的社会制度，自己的文化，自己的国家形态和生存方式。这个选择权利不属於中国人，只属於西藏人民。中国人民反对中共暴政，是因为这种政权剥夺了人的自由。如果中国人在向共产主义抗争的同时，还坚持对西藏的统治权，即剥夺藏人的选择自由，这是对自由的亵渎。

中国人一向强调民族主义。今天面对西藏问题，中国人真的应该强调一次民族主义了，那就是面对一个十多亿人的大汉民族对一个弱小藏族的长期欺凌和压迫，作为中国人，在西藏人民面前要感到羞愧！尤其中国知识分子，更要为自己在强权施暴面前的沉默，甚至符合中共的宣传而感到羞耻！近代中国曾被外强欺负凌辱，现在却欺辱别的弱小民族。这将成为中国人，尤其是汉民族历史上永远耻辱的一页。作为中国人，让我们在未来一定会有的审判面前忏悔吧┅┅

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注释∶
1、牙含章∶《达赖喇嘛传》序言，人民出版社出版，1984年，北京。
2、同1，第21页。
3、同1，第21页。
4、同1，第35页。
5、中国藏学研究中心、中国历史第二档案馆合编∶《十三世达赖喇嘛圆寂致祭和十四世达赖喇嘛转世坐床档案选编》，中国藏学出版社出版，1990年，北京。
6、同1，第329页。
7、同1，第330页。
8、《西藏日报》，1989年8月31日。
9、同5，见第439件公函。
10、同5，见第441件公函。
11、同1，第34页。
12、“西藏的主权归属与人权状况”，1992年9月21日，中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室，见香港《大公报》，1992年9月24日，第8版。
13、见艾夫唐（John F.Avedon）的《雪域境外流亡记》中文版，台湾慧炬出版社1991年版，第134页∶一九六二年西藏游击队在新疆去拉萨的运输线上伏击了中共军队，击毙了中共西藏西部军分区司令员和参谋人员，并缴获了西藏军区政治部编写的《西藏状况教育基本教材》一书，该书称，“公历1959年3月到10月间，消灭了西藏叛乱分子87,000人”。
14、关於班禅喇嘛的统计数字，见萨泽兰（Daniel Southerland）的“毛时代的大众死亡”专题报道，《华盛顿邮报》，1994年7月17日和18日。
15、见《西藏的真相》中文版，西藏流亡政府外交和新闻部编，达兰萨拉1993年版，第20页。
16、唐达献∶《刺刀直指拉萨——1989年西藏拉萨事件纪实》，载美国《民主中国》杂志，1990年8月，总第3期，第33页
17、达赖喇嘛於1991年10月9日在美国耶鲁大学的演讲，载日本《民主中国》月刊，1993年9月号。
18、同15，第19页。
19、据中共国务院发表的“西藏的主权归属与人权状况”提供的数字∶1990年全国第4次人口普查结果，藏人共有459万。据中共国务院国际问题研究会会长宦乡在北京评论》1988年2月发表的研究数字∶“西藏民族六百万人口，其中西藏自治区居住两百万，其馀四百万居住在其他省份。”据西藏流亡政府的资料 ∶西藏总人口为六百万，其中包括被划入青海、云南、四川等省份的原东藏、後藏地区的藏人。
20、见阴法唐的文章，《红旗》杂志，1983年第8期。
21、同15，第21页。
22、见魏京生在狱中给邓小平的信，纽约《北京之春》月刊，1994年2月号，第59页。
23、达赖喇嘛∶“有关解决西藏问题的五点和平计划”，日本《民主中国》月刊，1994年7月号，第33页。
24、Claudia Dreifus∶“访达赖喇嘛”，《纽约时报》杂志，1993年11月28日，第52页。

——原载纽约《中国之春》月刊1994年11月号；台北《自由时报》1997年3月29日至4月1日连载