The Preamble

The following interviews have been published in July 2005, in “Diplomatie”, a French magazine devoted to international and diplomatic issues. They have not been published yet in English media. Doing it now is very interesting to assess the situation during these last four years, in the light of the 2008 unrest in Tibet and the ongoing changes within Tibetan movement.

Three political figures were interviewed about two main and highly connected issues: the “dialogue process” between Chinese and Tibetans; and the opportunity to recognise the Tibetan Government in Exile as the legitimate representative of the Tibetan people, as suggested by the European Parliament resolution of 6 July 2000.

The three political figures interviewed were Thomas Mann, Member of the European Parliament and President of Tibet Intergroup ; Samdhong Rinpoche, Prime Minister of the Tibetan Governement in Exile; and Lhasang Tsering, Tibetan writer and former President of the Tibetan Youth Congress.

The European resolution of 6 July 2000 invited “the governments of the Member States to give serious consideration to the possibility of recognising the Tibetan Government in Exile as the legitimate representative of the Tibetan people if, within three years, the Beijing authorities and the Tibetan Government in Exile have not signed an agreement on a new Statute for Tibet, through negotiations organised under the aegis of the Secretary-General of the United Nations”. But this resolution remained in standby till now.

After the three years deadline, on 8 July 2003, the Tibet Intergroup held a meeting to assess the “Sino-Tibetan dialogue”. According to TIN report (15 July 2003), “the option of a new resolution by the European Parliament was maintained. However, it was also decided that in consideration of the two delegations’ visits and the positive contacts established with Chinese officials, no unnecessary pressure should be exerted.”

When these interviews were published in Diplomatie Magazine, in July 2005, two years had passed since Tibet Intergroup’s meeting and three years more since the adoption of the European resolution. Thus what happened?

On this issue, Samdhong Rinpoche answered: “The European Parliament resolution was helpful. Regarding none implementation of this resolution, I cannot answer on behalf of European Parliament. One should ask this question to EP”. For the MEP Thomas Mann, things seemed to have been momentarily in standby for technical reasons: “The possibility for a renewal of the resolution through the EP is high. The actual task is to convince the newly elected Members of the EP of the high relevance of recognition of the Tibetan Government in Exile”. But till now, in 2009, no result. And no sign of any real attempt in this direction.

In his answer, Lhasang Tsering was more direct, as well known free speaker. According to him, “the so-called ‘dialogue diplomacy’ was an important part of China’s strategy to play for time. (…) It was a clever ploy by the Chinese to offset the very important resolution of the European Parliament on Tibet”. The view of Lhasang Tsering is not unique, it reflects the sentiment of a large number of Tibetans and their supporters.

For example, Vijay Kranti, an Indian journalist close to Tibetan community, quoted several Tibetan voices in his article “Rangzen first, the rest can follow” (in Border-Affairs, October 2002): ” ‘This visit and dialogue have only helped China by sabotaging the first ever chances of winning international recognition to Dalai Lama’s exile government’, says an angry senior officer of the Central Tibetan Administration”. For many, it was like “‘helping Beijing to wriggle out of EP ultimatum”, Vijay Kranti added.

Today, events give reasons to Lhasang Tsering. The Chinese crackdown of the “Tibetan Spring” in 2008 was the most concrete answer to dialogue from Beijing side. During their last visits in China, in July and November 2008, Special Envoys of the Dalai Lama expressed their disillusionment about talks. The Dalai Lama himself acknowledged the failure of all attempts to dialogue with Beijing as he “lost faith in Chinese leadership”. During the Special Meeting held in November 2008, many questioned the consistence of the present Tibetan policy. As mentioned in its post Special Meeting statement, the National Democratic Party of Tibet “discussed in the meeting to appeal effectively to recognise the exile-government by EU, UNO and other independent countries”.

Previously, in May 2007, Jamyang Norbu wrote an article titled “Reflections on a political solution”. In it, he thought about strategies to resolve Tibetan issue: “A step might be to seek governmental recognition of the TGIE. This may appear to be a difficult even impossible task but have we really tried? There are precedents for recognizing exile governments. (…) There might not be, for some time at least, a big power willing to offer such recognition, but it is at least a perceptible goal to which our supporters and friends in their respective countries could at least work towards. (…) Getting even one small country -size doesn’t matter in these things- to recognize Dharamshala as the legitimate government of Tibet is extremely important.”

Now, in the light of all these elements, the reader should be able to objectively decrypt the following interviews. Even after four years, they remain valid. They even may show the way to go ahead.

MV

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1. WHAT ABOUT EUROPEAN RESOLUTION OF 6 JULY 2000?

Interview of Thomas Mann*

*Thomas Mann is Member of the European Parliament and President of the EP Tibet Intergroup.

Q: On 6 July 2000, the European Parliament passed a resolution inviting Member States to recognise the Tibetan Government in Exile as the legitimate representative of the Tibetan people if there was no negotiation within three years. What were your reflection and your strategy?

T.M: By the resolution the EP, as the “voice of human rights in the EU” embarks the strategy to put pressure on the Commission, the Council and the Member States to establish the recognition of the Tibetan Government in Exile as a core demand of the permanent dialogue between the EU and China.

Q: Don’t you think this recognition request was in contradiction with the official policy of the Tibetan Government in Exile?

T.M: The recognition of the Tibetan Government in Exile would be an important sign of support for the peaceful policy of the Dalai Lama. Therefore, I cannot perceive a contradiction to the official line. 

Q: On the other hand, could such recognition be an opportunity for the Tibetan Government to review its strategy and clarify its positions?

T.M: The Tibetan Government in Exile has always been a strong supporter of the peaceful policy of the Dalai Lama, which stands out through clearness, straightness and reliability. As a recognized player in international relations the government would be able to spread these ideals more effectively in foreign affairs. 

Q: According to the conditions and the objectives stated in the resolution, why had this one not be implemented?

T.M: The resolution is based on a broad majority in the European Parliament. We have steadily increased the pressure on the Commission, the Council and the Member States. This results in the Chinese invitation for talks with the Tibetans. The possibility for a renewal of the resolution through the EP is high. The actual task is to convince the newly elected Members of the EP – one third of the plenary – as well as the newly composed EU-Commission of the high relevance of recognition of the Tibetan Government in Exile. 

Q: The visits of the Dalai Lama’s Envoys in China have been qualified as “positive signs” manifested by Beijing towards “substantive negotiations”. However, these visits had produced no result, except divergences of views on fundamental issues. By supporting yourself these “positive signs”, don’t you contribute to a Chinese strategy of communication which counter Tibetan interests?

T.M: Both visits have been an important sign, but not more than a first step, which has to be followed by further more. The EP has motivated the EU-Commission to push for more substantial negotiations. The EP and other sympathisers of Tibet will increase the volume of their protests, if public relation shows will go on – these shows have to be unmasked! Therefore, substantial progress is also in the interest of the Chinese government. 

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2. HOPEFUL POLICY 

Interview of Samdhong Rinpoche*

*Samdhong Rinpoche is the Prime Minister of the Tibetan Government in exile.

Q: What about your relations today with China about Tibet’s future and in view of eventual negotiations?

S.R: We believe that the Chinese authorities receiving the three visits of His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s envoys to China and Tibetan areas is a positive indication that China is serious in setting the issue of Tibet peacefully and through a process of negotiations. Our main issue is that the six million Tibetan people are granted enough freedom to protect and promote Tibet’s distinct cultural identity. For that we are seeking genuine national regional autonomy within the framework of People’s Republic of China.

Q: In October 2002, you asked Tibet’s supporters not to disturb Chinese officials’ visits until June 2003, in view to create a conducive atmosphere for dialogue with China. Did it work? Why did you set this deadline rather than another one?

S.R: Yes, we did indeed request the Tibet Support Groups and the Tibetan NGOs not to be provocative during demonstrations. I believe that our request has produced results in terms of creating a conducive atmosphere for negotiations because our contacts with Chinese leadership are strengthening and the envoys of His Holiness could visit for the second and third time due to improved environment. Thereafter we have again urged the Tibet Support Groups not to be aggressive and provocative to the PRC until the process of dialogue and negotiation reached to a logical conclusion.

Q: You have called “positive” some signs made by China. How do you understand some Beijing statements which contradict you on this matter?

S.R: Regardless of the rhetoric coming out from the China it is our believe that the Chinese leadership is serious in setting the issue of Tibet peacefully. You cannot expect a visible change in the public statement of PRC till substantive negotiation reached to a definitive stage.

Q: In July 2000, a resolution of the European Parliament planned to ask Member States to recognise your government as the legitimate representative of the Tibetan people, if there were no negotiations within three years. Is that a coincidence? Did this resolution help or disturb you in your diplomatic effort? Why had it not be applied?

S.R: Any concern expressed by the international community or resolution passed on the issue of Tibet by any parliament around the world is helpful for the cause of Tibet. This sends a message to China that the international community is concerned about the current conditions in Tibet and will help encourage the Chinese leadership to settle the issue peacefully. And similarly, the European Parliament resolution was helpful. Regarding none implementation of this resolution, I cannot answer on behalf of European Parliament. One should ask this question to EP. The fact is that we are still in the process of dialogue. Negotiation is not achieved as yet.

Q: Which statute are you looking for in view of eventual negotiations if your government is not recognised? Why do you maintain this one if you give up independence?

S.R: The issue of Tibet is yet to be settled. That is why we continue to maintain the Central Tibetan Administration to look after the welfare of the Tibetan exiles in India and elsewhere in the world. Once the issue of Tibet is settled to the satisfaction of the Tibetan people and His Holiness the Dalai Lama returns to Tibet in freedom, the Central Tibetan Administration will be dissolved and the governance of Tibet will be left in the hands of the Tibetan people in Tibet.

Q: In the case of failure of your present policy, which alternative do you consider?

S.R: We are pursuing the process of negotiation with PRC leadership through Middle Path Approach having full faith that it will definitely achieve our desire goals. So therefore the question of considering an alternative does not arise at this moment.

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3. TALKS ABOUT TALKS

Interview of Lhasang Tsering*

*Lhasang Tsering is a Tibetan writer and former President of the Tibetan Youth Congress

Q: How do you understand the “renewed dialogue” with China and the “positive signs” from this one since 2002? What is your point of view about the three delegations that visited China and Tibet?

L.T: The first thing we must understand about the so-called “dialogue diplomacy” between Beijing and Dharamshala is that we only have “talks about talks” but no meaningful dialogue. This is because China has essentially no need to talk to the Tibetans. In that case one may ask why then are the Chinese inviting and receiving “Envoys of the Dalai-Lama”? The simple truth here is that this is an important part of China’s strategy to play for time.

As for the talk about a “renewed dialogue” due to the visit to Beijing of the Special Envoys of the Dalai-Lama in 2002; in my view this was a cleaver ploy by the Chinese to offset the very important resolution of the European Parliament on Tibet which stated that member countries of the EU would seriously consider recognizing the Tibetan Government in Exile if, within three years, China does not enter into meaningful negotiations with the Dalai-Lama to resolve the future status of Tibet.

From the very beginning I felt that the Tibetan delegations visiting China and Tibet was a mistake. The stark reality facing the Tibetan people today is that China’s population transfer policy has set a time limit. The fact is that time is running out for Tibet; China is playing for time and the delegations visiting China and talking about “positive signs” is playing into Chinese hands.

Q: What strategy do you advocate to help negotiations opening? Are these ones necessary and according to which objectives? In your view, is there an alternative based on another objectives and another strategy?

L.T: I cannot understand the idea of “a strategy to achieve negotiations”. As I see it, negotiation is only a means to achieve an end and not an end in itself. Which is to say that negotiations can only be a part of a wider strategy and merely holding negotiations; without a clear goal, can at best only be a waste of time.

I also believe that meaningful negotiations can only take place when there is a shared need on both sides to come to a negotiated settlement. Regarding China’s occupation of Tibet, I cannot see any reason why China should surrender even a small part of its total control over Tibet and for that reason I cannot see why China should hold any meaningful negotiations with Tibetan refugees. What is going on now is not negotiations – it is only talking about talks. And this is happening simply because China is killing not just two – but three birds with one stone.

Firstly, China has effectively neutralized the Tibetan struggle by keeping the Tibetan leadership hoping and waiting; which, in turn has thrown the Tibetan people into confusion. By “talking about talks” and periodically inviting the “Special Envoys of His Holiness the Dalai-Lama” to Beijing; China has also effectively kept at bay the possibility of any international involvement on the issue of Tibet. The result of keeping the Tibetan leadership hoping and waiting and, therefore, ruling out any international involvement on the issue of Tibet is that China has gained the time that it needs to send in more and more and more Chinese settlers into Tibet. The railway will reach Lhasa in 2007 – some say even earlier. Soon there will be so many Chinese in Tibet it will become meaningless to talk about a Tibet for Tibetans.

I believe it is not possible to work out a unified strategy to overcome any problem without first having a clear understanding and acceptance of the nature of the problem.

As such, I believe it bears repeating that; before we can come up with any meaningful strategy; it is a pre-condition that the Tibetan people – and most of all the Tibetan leadership – must first understand and accept the fact that China will never voluntarily and willingly relinquish their control over Tibet. We must formulate and implement a plan of action that will hurt China enough – if not to throw them out of Tibet then, at least to force them to come to the negotiating table.

Q: Does the Tibetan Government in Exile have the will and the means to review its current policy? Is that to be hoped?

L.T: I am not in a position to say whether or not the Tibetan Government in Exile has the will to review its current policy. But it certainly has the means to do so since it enjoys the faith of the overwhelming majority of the Tibetan people and I can think of no other factor holding back the Tibetan Government from taking its own decisions. More to the point; in my view it is not a question of will – I believe the Tibetan Government has the duty to respond to the right and the desire of the Tibetan people for freedom and independence.

Perhaps I should add here that the desire of the people inside Tibet should be more than clear to the Tibetan Government in Exile in view of the fact that all the protests and demonstrations inside Tibet; in which many, many Tibetans have been killed and many more have been imprisoned; have all been for freedom and not autonomy.

However, as things stand now, I can see no signs that the Tibetan Government in Exile is considering any departure from the Middle Way Policy; and soon it will be too late.

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Interviews conducted by Mathieu Vernerey for Diplomatie Magazine, July 2005. 

These interviews were originally published in French on Diplomatie Magazine and Alternative Tibetaine (Lhasang Tsering) and in English on Phayul.

In his TCV’s speech (25 October), the Dalai Lama said: “The Tibetan people should take collective initiative and take an interest based on the kind of long-term strategies that we should employ to resolve our struggle”. Before concluding: “When all is said and done, it is for the Tibetan people themselves to decide about their collective future”. Commenting the Dalai Lama’s remarks, his spokesperson Tenzin Taklha told AFP (27 October): “He has lost hope in trying to reach a solution with the present Chinese leadership which is simply not willing to address the issues. (…) His Holiness feels that other options have to be considered, and this will be done at the meeting in November”. The Dalai Lama even decided not to attend the meeting as he clearly doesn’t want to influence the discussions: “If I say, ‘I think this is better or that is better,’ then people may not express freely. (..) Now it’s up to the people”.

So, as the Dalai Lama often says: “The issue of Tibet is not the issue of the Dalai Lama alone. It is the issue of 6 million Tibetans”. This is not only addressed to Chinese leadership or foreign observers. It also concerns Tibetans themselves, particularly those who always speak on behalf of the Dalai Lama without listening him. Anyway, all this indicates that any review of the “Middle Way policy” should be considered very carefully. But more fundamentally, and quite paradoxically, it may reveal also that Middle Way is not the problem and that it could even become the solution.

New Middle Way

People should not make confusion between Middle Way approach and autonomy. In one hand, Middle Way approach is a moral aspiration and its main objective is to achieve a mutually-beneficial solution. On the other hand, autonomy is a political proposal, which furthermore was conceptualised in a particular historical context. In 1979, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping said that “except independence, all other issues can be resolved through negotiations”. So the Dalai Lama based his Middle Way approach on the proposal of autonomy. But the fact is that China doesn’t want to negotiate neither autonomy nor independence. However, Middle Way policy was and remains a successful way to popularize the Tibetan issue around the world and to achieve an international political support: that is its concrete and irrefutable result. 

So autonomy is just a proposal and it should not be fatally identified to Middle Way, as there are not direct or immutable links between them. Fundamentally, there is no contradiction between Rangzen (independence) and Middle Way approach. Even Rangzen could become a new political proposal in this framework. Thus Rangzen should not be considered just as confrontation with China. It could be viewed in a new way, as partnership with China. Of course, the nationalist and idelogical view of Chinese over Tibet remain a big problem. But strategic considerations on a partnership could become a more pragmatic argument than just giving up independence with no strategic arrangements.

For example, China needs energies for its economic development. So Rangzen Tibetan leaders could think about the better way to rationally exploit Tibetan natural resources and about what kinds of cooperation could be possible with China: in a mutually-beneficial way. Idem for many other domains like environment, defense, diplomacy, even arts, etc.: always in a mutually-beneficial way. But more important: at this moment, Tibet remains unstable and represents a threat for China’s stability, and Beijing is unable to control the situation. An independent Tibet could become, not a threat, but the promise of stability for China, as Tibet would be a new and reliable neighbour country able to guarantee its proper social stability.

Of course, all this might not convince Chinese leadership, for some time at least. But this is not the point. There are other steps before. First, it would be the best way to keep the Dalai Lama in the course, because “Rangzen partnership” proposal would not be in contradiction with his Middle Way approach. It would be also the best way to keep Tibetan unity, now on the basis of Rangzen. Even if the Chinese leadership would remain skeptical, it could show to Chinese common people that Rangzen activists are not a kind of phantasmed terrorists or fanatics, and so create a more favorable opinion within Chinese society. But above all, it would show to foreign political leaders that Rangzen leaders are serious, responsible and credible interlocutors, able to be concerned in regional stability in Asia and even in China stability. So Rangzen is possible and a combination Rangzen-Middle Way is possible as well. Tibet and China, both as independent and sovereign countries, could become good neighbours, in a mutually-beneficial way. 

Rangzen political project

We know the Five-Points Peace Plan (1987) of the Dalai Lama, as well as his Guidelines for future Tibet (1992). But what about Rangzen activists’ vision of a future Tibet? What is their “Peace Plan” and what are their “Guidelines”? Rangzen activists seem to wait for a policy review of the Tibetan Government in Exile (TGiE). At last, this will be discussed at the forthcoming Special Meeting. But we need to know also what is the political project and the alternative programme of Rangzen.

For example, what kinds of relationship do they imagine between an independent Tibet and some neighbouring countries like China, India, Mongolia, Republics of Central Asia, and even other territories presently under Chinese rule (South Mongolia and East Turkestan)? Some few other more provocative and apparently naive questions: what kinds of relations with NATO, Shanghai Group, APT, USA, Russia, European Union, etc.? And more concretely, what about political constitution, social and economic issues, diplomacy, defense, religion, etc.?

Of course, it may be too early to answer to these questions, but not to ask them. Because Rangzen has to become a credible political project to which foreign leaders could give their support and cooperation. In one word: what is the interest for other countries to support an independent Tibet? Not just by default or by comparison with China. But in a more positive way: what can an independent Tibet offer to the world? Then another important and key issue would be how to acheive independence – this question is also valid for those supporting autonomy.

So we need to know more about Rangzen political project, programme and strategies. Jamyang Norbu wrote “Rangzen Charter” in 1999 and created the Rangzen Alliance. This was a good and necessary first step. But now, which other steps have been realised by Rangzen activists since Jamyang Norbu’s first proposal draft? We have to be aware of a very important point. Today, we collectively – the Dalai Lama first – acknowledge the failure of the present Tibetan policy – mostly because of the Chinese attitude. But without any concrete and ready yet alternative programme, what would be the chances of a Rangzen policy? And what would be the consequences of a premature failure of Rangzen?

The challenge of Rangzen

Rangzen activists can’t be satisfied any more with just criticising the Tibetan Government in Exile, without making alternative propositions and applying them. Yes, the policy and the action of the TGiE are not perfect and now obviously come to an impasse. But they were till now the “only solution”, in default of “another concrete solution”. TGiE’s initiatives are like a life raft, drifting but floating. And there is no use in sinking it, as it is also the legitimate continuation in exile of the Tibetan sovereignty and the symbol of the Tibetan struggle.

In fact, the TGiE is first and foremost the hostage of a situation presently unfavourable to it – precarious condition of refugee, fragile tolerance of the Indian host, pressure of foreign governments, threats of China against Tibetans inside Tibet, etc. Secondly, considering the pronounced legitimism of the present Tibetan leadership, changes will not come if the Dalai Lama doesn’t take the initiative. Fortunately, the Dalai Lama himself has recently called a Special Meeting to discuss new strategies. But what lacks to each other to step forward is the horizon of a concrete alternative: this should be the job of Rangzen activists. But the construction of this alternative programme – which doesn’t exist at the moment – will take a necessary time of maturation, during which Rangzen activists will have to stand and to act when the TGiE will not be able to do it. They could also take advantage of this situation.

But above all, to bring political alternation and achieve a real political change in exile, Rangzen activists will have to ensure their proper political – and not only moral or historic – legitimacy, which can be started with their parliamentary representation. And so for several reasons:

Political party representation

In spite of successive reforms since its creation in 1960, the Tibetan Parliament in Exile (TPiE) persists on a strictly regional and religious system of representation. Identification is not based on political ideals, objectives or programmes, but only on traditional provinces or religious sects. Politically, the Tibetan deputy is either an individual, or the representative of his region or his religious sect, but he is never the member of a group sharing and supporting common objectives. This doesn’t mean that divergence of views or conflict of interest don’t exist – especially about the question of independence or autonomy – but they don’t find any opportune way of expression, meaning here political way.

This is why when some Tibetan MPs resolved in September 2004 to contest a previous resolution adopted with the majority support – about the possibility to review the Middle Way policy – they did it under the cover of their regional groups. Two regional associations (Domed and Utsang) resolved to resign from the assembly if the resolution was not withdrawn. This in political terms has no signification and incorrectly presumes the individual stand of the other deputies of these regions.

The Tibetan Parliament functions with no political party system. Although the Tibetan Charter in Exile doesn’t proscribe this kind of representation, it simply doesn’t deal with political party – what Tibetans often basically answer as a natural fact, without questioning this constitutional blank. At best, they refer to the Guidelines for Future Tibet by the Dalai Lama, who advocates multiparty system. But this perspective is immediately restricted to a future “free” Tibet – a distant future as unfathomable as uncertain. And so it postpones the responsibilities of today to tomorrow. Moreover, this vision could function only in an independent and sovereign Tibet – free to decide its proper way of governance – but it would be contradicted by the Chinese constitutional framework to which it doesn’t refer by the way. But more significant is the top down democratic initiatives and progression, only due to the goodwill of the Dalai Lama who still confronts the many resistance: a new initiative which the Tibetans seem to find hard to take themselves, or at least just to anticipate and implement.

So, in exile, the successive reforms of the constitution brought the right to vote, the separation of powers, the election of Parliament Members and Prime Minister through direct suffrage. But having democratic institutions is not sufficient to establish a democracy if there remains a lack of any party expression relative to political ideals or objectives, to begin with the underlying – but non formalised – opposition between Rangzen and autonomy. Democracy would be an empty word if it could not allow political discussions and if it would be impossible to know who represents who or who represents what. And there is no question here of region or religious sect, but only of political ideals, programmes or objectives carried by parties sharing a common stand.

More fundamentally the question is about the mode of parliamentary representation and about the process of decision. The role and the vocation of a political party are to participate in governance and to the decision-making process – including the role of opposition. Thus to invest all the areas of decision, especially in the parliament where the policy of the exile government is voted. But till now the Tibetan Parliament in Exile and the Tibetan Charter don’t include this kind of political representation – although political parties are not proscribed and could function within the present structure. To be clear, this is not a question of presumed democratic model, but a question of political legibility and efficiency.

For the moment, it appears that Rangzen and political party system create a kind of unrest and even of taboo among Tibetan parliament and community. Both issues stigmatize a feeling of direct conflict or confrontation with the Dalai Lama and his Middle Way approach: an incorrect prejudice harmful not only to Rangzen but to the whole Tibetan struggle. Fundamentally democracy is based on difference of views, and opposition is a fundamental principle. Democracy is the only solution to leave the present political stalemate in exile, and the Dalai Lama himself did his best to bring democracy to the Tibetan community in exile. As Tenzin Tsundue says in “Mangtso: Our Democratic Vision” (2004): “Although we received our democracy as a blessing (from the Dalai Lama), we must endeavour to make it work. And we have been most unwilling to do just that; take up democratic responsibilities”.

Presently, the thought process within the Tibetan parliament and community seem unprepared or not ready for political party representation. However one step at least could be realised. During the last legislative elections in March 2006, new deputies were elected and most of them, as well as former ones, are very close to Rangzen. So if political party representation may be premature for the moment, one stage exists: a parliamentary group. Then it remains with all these deputies close to Rangzen to gather – even on the sidelines of the parliament – and to form a Rangzen parliamentary group. Because ensuring the political representation of Rangzen is primordial, and representing Rangzen at the Tibetan Parliament – the ultimate decision-making body and the symbol of the Tibetan democracy – is an absolute necessity.

Rangzen parliamentary group

Except for the fact that a parliamentary group would be opportune to ensure the political representation of Rangzen – in default of a system of political party representation – it also presents some strategic advantages:

For the moment, Rangzen activists put pressure on their government in exile to change their present policy. But clearly, it would be too dangerous for the Tibetan parliament or government to become suddenly pro-independent, and it would be also premature in absence of a clear alternative strategy. However, without lowering the Rangzen cause and its highly moral signification, pragmatism and strategy are useful. Middle Way approach is not so bad for Rangzen cause. It is even the best protection for Rangzen to grow and to unify and structure its movement. As Middle Way approach is in the interest of China, it is also in the immediate and present interest of foreign nations. These will not harm a Tibetan leadership which acts presently in their own interest, and the evidence is that they desperately support “dialogue with China” and consequently Middle Way policy through its present formulation – with no political results of course. But that is not the question.

During the time of maturation of the Rangzen movement and of its political representation, Middle Way approach should remain the government policy, even on the basis of autonomy, until political alternation and Rangzen alternative strategy are ready. This time would be also useful for Rangzen activists to gain political and international support.

It doesn’t mean that Rangzen activists should stop requesting their government to change their policy. Of course they should continue, but by keeping in mind the risks of a brutal change of policy. Even it remains extremely important, as Jamyang Norbu wrote in “Looking Back from Nangpa-la” (2007), to “take the Dalai Lama back”. He is the keystone of the Tibetan struggle, but he is at the same time the problem and the solution – the “Dilemma” that Rangzen activists as often but respectfully speak of. The fact remains that, in absence of an alternative strategy, the present position of the Dalai Lama is the “only solution”. He has no more latitude of maneuvering. And the job of Rangzen activists is to build the bridge over the precipice to “take him back”.

However, in the present circumstances, “unity” may be a “trap”. Of course Tibetan people are all united in their aspiration to end the Tibetan suffering and to live in freedom. This is a common and indisputable goal. But “freedom” does not have the same political signification. The Tibetan opinion is not uniform and, if a consensus seems to exist on the basis of the Middle Way policy, it is in a delicate way. As Tenzing Sonam writes in “Until the Last Tibetan” (2007): “We (can) no longer pretend that this contradiction between our loyalty to the Dalai Lama and our instinctive belief in Tibet’s independence (does) not exist”. Except this “morass of conflicting goals and loyalties besetting the Tibet movement”, it has also many political consequences, not only by creating confusion, but also by giving opportunities to foreign governments or Chinese leadership to neutralise the Tibetan struggle. Then political unity with different and even opposite political goals is impossible and also counterproductive. As the French Rangzen activist, Francois Corona, often says: “We rather need a clever political plurality than a sham unity as claimed by some”. The hope of unification of the whole Tibetan movement – including the parliament and the government – on the basis of Rangzen would be delicate for the moment and more certainly premature. The differentiation of two sides acting for their respective objectives is momentarily preferable, as well as the Middle Way approach as present policy of the Tibetan government to prevent any kind of retaliatory measures from foreign governments. In this framework, a Rangzen parliamentary group would be the best way to bring political alternation – and even convergence – and achieve a change of policy with less risks. It is of course necessary to review the policy of TGiE, as well as to restore the complete unity of Tibetan struggle on the basis of truth and justice: Rangzen. But we have to do so step by step.

First steps for a progressive policy review

So, in the present situation, reviewing the present Tibetan policy remains more than ever essential. At least, it requires some “minor” but substantive changes. For example, the TGiE could keep autonomy as a political proposal, but without giving up independence until the Chinese leadership agrees to negociate the status of Tibet. Secondly, the TGiE should stop with just looking for bilateral and informal talks with China. Now, time has come to work for a formal process of negotiations, with the support of a third country part ready to host and sponsor such meetings. The Tibetan side needs also to get a status for itself in the framework of this negotiation process. For this, one can get lessons from the Palestinian issue. Yasser Arafat was recognised as a “valid negotiator” and PLO became the “Palestinian authority”. As well, the Dalai Lama could be recognised as “valid negociator” and the TGiE, in default of an official recognition as government in exile, could become something like “Tibetan authority”.

But time has come also to seek an international recognition of the Tibetan Government in Exile. Till now, because of the informal talk process with China, the TGiE refused any such recognition. Now, Tibetan leadership should not only accept it but manage to seek and to achieve it. There are opportunities for this. For example, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in July 2000. By this resolution, EP called on governments of the Member States “to give serious consideration to the possibility of recognising the Tibetan Government in Exile as the legitimate representative of the Tibetan people if, within three years, the Beijing authorities and the Tibetan Government in Exile have not, through negotiations under the aegis of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, signed an agreement on a new status for Tibet”. Till now the so-called “renewed dialogue” with Beijing since 2002 and the present Tibetan policy have only helped China to wriggle out of EP ultimatum. But if the three years deadline has now passed for a long time, at the grassroots, EP engagements remain as well as the obligation to implement this resolution that is still and more than ever justified by the lack of any China-Tibet agreement.

In the medium term, the major review of the Tibetan policy should be to rethink the Middle Way approach on the basis of Rangzen, as suggested in the first chapter. But it supposes that Rangzen activists have first worked and advanced on this alternative proposal, and that they are ready to ensure political alternation. Because it is not the present Tibetan leadership that will bring a pro-independent policy. This is the duty of Rangzen elected people to implement themselves their programme: they can’t wait for someone else to do their proper job. This is why the political and parliamentary representation of Rangzen is so important. Thus a major review of the Tibetan policy will depend on the maturity of the Rangzen movement to initiate and to implement such change.

Special Meeting agenda

All this could and should be discussed during the Special Meeting. “Minor” changes, as suggested above, could be easily decided without any traumatic “revolution”. Then, technically, the formation of a Rangzen parliamentary group could be planned as soon as possible – since there are several Tibetan deputies close to Rangzen. Furthermore, a Rangzen political party could emerge – why not a revitalised NDPT (National Democratic Party of Tibet) – and campaign in view of the next Tibetan legislative elections, in 2011. Discussions on a major review of the Middle Way policy could be immediately opened with including a possible combination with Rangzen. But any decisions on this crucial question may be premature at the moment. Because a such “revolution” needs to be further discussed and to be accepted by all parties. Its supposes also a solid Rangzen support movement ready to bring political alternance, which doesn’t exist at the moment and has to emerge.

Of course, as always, Chinese may repeat their accusation about a “hidden agenda”. But this is not new and it started at the very time when the Dalai Lama introduced his Five-Peace Plan. And there is no more “hidden agenda” today. Tibetan people are just looking for possible solutions in a situation unfavourable to them. They should not care too much about any Chinese accusations as these will always exist in any circumstances.

During the discussions, unity should not become an obsession or even an obstacle to explore new strategies. As mentionned before, unity of the Tibetan people already exists as a common aspiration to freedom and the Dalai Lama is the indisputable symbol and protector of it. No one should be afraid about democracy and pluralism that allow and formalize differences of views. As far as the national unity is preserved, the differentiation of strategies may be in the interest of the whole struggle, especially when opposite objectives – like independence and autonomy, each as legitimate as the other – cannot be mingled against nature without creating confusion, frustration and division. An artificial and forced consensus would be counterproductive at a moment when Tibetans have to make choices. As well, one should take care not to make any abusive equation “Middle Way = autonomy” that unjustly implies an opposition or an incompatibility between Rangzen and Middle Way approach.

To finish, it remains to say that Rangzen is not the threat of division and of conflict within the Tibetan community and their supporters. Rangzen is the promise of reconciliation and a door to exit out of present political crisis. Rangzen is also a very inspiring promise: to become sooner or later a reality. Democratisation in exile, diplomatic policy, activist strategies, international support and Rangzen are highly connected and very close to each other. And today, the time is to connect these. Yes, Rangzen is possible, but without getting ahead of schedule: step by step.

MV

This article was originally published on Phayul.

However, the presence of monks among the movement’s leaders has prompted questions about the real nature of the uprising, often described as a “Buddhist revolt”. Despite the brutality of police counter-measures, the unusual violence of many demonstrators has also blurred the image of a reputedly non-violent struggle. Rioters have targeted some Chinese and Hui Muslim civilians, suggesting the revolt may have ethnic or religious motives.

Symbolically the demonstrations started on 10March, the anniversary of the 1959 uprising in Lhasa against Chinese intervention. The repression of this popular movement precipitated the flight of the Dalai Lama and his government to India.

The Buddhist religion is an integral part of Tibet’s identity but hostility to China now dominates nationalist sentiment. Though the majority of the population seems resigned, hatred of China is finding more virulent outlets. Beijing may accuse the Dalai Lama of being the main troublemaker, but a new generation is emerging over which the nation’s spiritual leader has less influence.

As China has strengthened its hold on the country, with a steadily increasing influx of settlers, Tibetans have been gradually sidelined. Development has not delivered its promised benefits and economic investment, largely colonialist in its aims, has failed to appease discontent exacerbated by persistent nationalism.

The violence that disfigured the “Chinese Lhasa” is not typical of the independence movement as a whole. Protests have brought together secular and religious elements, the latter brandishing portraits of the Dalai Lama as well as the Tibetan flag. Seen by his supporters as an exiled head of state, the spiritual guide has lost none of his authority, enjoying widespread recognition in and outside Tibet, even if some militants are advocating more direct action. He is still the cement of national unity. In their way even the Chinese authorities acknowledge his importance. As the Tibet Communist Party leader, Zhang Qingli, put it: “We are in the midst of a life-and-death struggle with the Dalai clique.”

The attitude of Tibetans living abroad to the Dalai Lama and the issue of independence is more complex. Independence has been a taboo ever since their leader officially abandoned the idea and confirmed his policy of openness and dialogue with Beijing. In October 2002 he explicitly appealed to militants to refrain from any form of anti-Chinese demonstration in public all over the world, in order to create a propitious atmosphere for dialogue. The call for restraint left many militants confused and discouraged.

Until the outbreak of the recent unrest, China seemed to have achieved its ends, no longer the target of public criticism and credited with new respectability on account of its “goodwill”. Meanwhile, in the political arena, it arrogantly dismissed demands for autonomy. The Tibetan independence movement has played on this behaviour, though it seems in some doubt as to what to do next.

Among those in exile there is no unified movement pulling together the various organisations advocating independence. None of them has managed to set out new proposals, replacing or complementing the line adopted by the government in exile. Most pro-independence campaigning inside Tibet is the work of isolated individuals or spontaneous, unpredictable gatherings without any clearly formulated strategy or goal.

The media build-up to the Olympic Games in Beijing offered a unique opportunity to denounce Chinese hegemony to the world. In India the five main pro-independence organisations joined forces to organise a march back into Tibet, setting out on 10March. The Indian authorities promptly banned the operation, triggering the departure of another wave of marchers. Demonstrations started in Lhasa at the same time, gathering strength and spreading to other towns in Tibet and other provinces once occupied by Tibetans, which has not happened before. But though the movement has achieved a certain popular and militant synergy, it lacks political direction and visibility, raising the larger question of how Tibetans are represented and what means are available for them to express demands.

Most Tibetans still living in their home country see the government in exile as a legitimate entity, because it is consistent with the principle of the Dalai Lama’s sovereignty and rule. But they are wary of the government, blamed for not finding a solution to their present predicament and giving up the goal of independence. This disaffection spares the Dalai Lama himself.

However a distinction needs to be made between the government’s diplomatic efforts and the work of the Tibetan parliament in exile as a representative body. The parliament is supposed to represent the Tibetan people in its entirety, at home and abroad, if only symbolically due to the impossibility of organising a vote in Tibet. Its only real electorate is the exiled community in India and Nepal, organised according to the three regions that traditionally formed Tibet. The five Buddhist schools also have their representatives, as do expatriates living in Europe and North America. The complex overlapping of constituencies does not make it any easier to determine quite what the parliament stands for.

The root problem is the Tibetans’ inability to institute proper political debate. The parliament operates without parties. The draft constitution does not condemn this. It simply does not refer to it, despite reforms on the separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers, voting rights, and the election of MPs and the prime minister by universal suffrage. But setting up democratic institutions is not enough to achieve democracy, particularly without parties to defend contrasting political ideals or goals. It is immediately obvious that there is no way of voicing the underlying split between advocates of independence, and those in favour of autonomy. At the last general election, in exile, in March 2006, some MPs backed independence, but they have made no attempt since to put their commitment into practice. Of course it is difficult to oppose openly the views of the Dalai Lama.

There is little chance of political parties being formed in the near future, even if an increasing number of MPs now support independence, with talk of a pressure group on the sidelines of the parliament. The present situation – the precarious condition of refugees, the limited tolerance India can afford as their host, pressure from foreign governments not to upset the status quo, and Chinese reprisals targeting Tibetans at home – leaves the pro-independence section very little room for manoeuvre.

So the country may be on the brink of an uprising but it lacks the political direction and voice without which the Lhasa spring will never bear fruit. 

MV

(Le Monde diplomatique, avril 2008)

In “Rangzen Charter” (1999), Jamyang Norbu spoke about the “first step” of a pro-independence movement: “Before any effective discussion on strategy or organisation for the Freedom Struggle can take place it is absolutely necessary that those individuals and organisations that cherish liberty and Rangzen openly and unequivocally declare their dedication to freedom and Tibetan independence”. Today, and not without difficulty, this “first step” is now accomplished.

Several events have been held in 2006 and 2007: Declaration of Independence of the Nations of High Asia (Washington, September 2006), International Conference of the Dhokham Chushi Gangdruk (New York, December 2006), International Forum for a Free Tibet (Turin, May 2007), International Union of Socialist Youth Asia-Pacific Committee Meeting (Ulaan Baatar, June 2007) and the Conference for an Independent Tibet (New Delhi, June 2007). All these events are many “first steps” in the dynamic, emerging movement in favour of Rangzen.

But after the “first step”, the most important is the one that follows, and perhaps the one to be decisive: the unification and the structuring of Rangzen movement. There are several great Rangzen figures – like Jamyang Norbu, Lhasang Tsering, Tenzin Tsundue, etc. – and several Tibetan NGOs supporting Rangzen – like Tibetan Youth Congress, Dhokham Chushi Gangdruk, Students for a Free Tibet etc. – but there is no unified and structured movement: which is probably the most important and the only absolute precondition to any alternative strategy or campaign.

Rangzen activists can’t be satisfied any more with just criticising the Tibetan Government in Exile (TGiE), without making alternative propositions and applying them. Yes, the policy and the action of the TGiE are not perfect and seem to be condemned to fail, but they are for the moment the “only solution”, in default of “another concrete solution”. TGiE’s initiatives are like a life raft, drifting but floating. And there is no use in sinking it, as it is also the legitimate continuation in exile of the Tibetan sovereignty and the symbol of the Tibetan struggle.

In fact, the TGiE is first and foremost the hostage of a situation presently unfavourable to it – precarious condition of refugee, fragile tolerance of the Indian host, pressure of foreign governments, threats of China against Tibetans inside Tibet, etc. Secondly, considering the pronounced legitimism of the present Tibetan leadership, changes will not come if the Dalai Lama doesn’t take the initiative. And what lacks to each other to step forward is the horizon of a concrete alternative. This should be the job of Rangzen activists. But the construction of this alternative programme – which doesn’t exist at the moment – will take a necessary time of maturation, during which Rangzen activists will have to stand and to act when the TGiE will not be able to do it. They could also take advantage of this situation.

But above all, to bring political alternance and achieve a real political change in exile, Rangzen activists will have to ensure their proper political – and not only moral or historic – legitimacy, which can be started with their parliamentary representation. And so for several reasons:

Political party representation

In spite of successive reforms since its creation in 1960, the Tibetan Parliament in Exile (TPiE) persists on a strictly regional and religious system of representation. Identification is not based on political ideals, objectives or programmes, but only on traditional provinces or religious sects. Politically, the Tibetan deputy is either an individual, or the representative of his region or his religious sect, but he is never the member of a group sharing and supporting common objectives. This doesn’t mean that divergence of views or conflict of interest don’t exist – especially about the question of independence or autonomy – but they don’t find any opportune way of expression, meaning here political way.

This is why when some Tibetan MPs resolved in September 2004 to contest a previous resolution adopted with the majority support – about the possibility to review the Middle Way policy – they did it under the cover of their regional groups. Two regional associations (Domed and Utsang) resolved to resign from the assembly if the resolution was not withdrawn. This in political terms has no signification and incorrectly presumes the individual stand of the other deputies of these regions.

The Tibetan Parliament functions with no political party system. Although the Tibetan Charter in Exile doesn’t proscribe this kind of representation, it simply doesn’t deal with political party – what Tibetans often basically answer as a natural fact, without questioning this constitutional blank. At best, they refer to the Guidelines for Future Tibet by the Dalai Lama, who advocates multiparty system. But this perspective is immediately restricted to a future “free” Tibet – a distant future as unfathomable as uncertain. And so it postpones the responsibilities of today to tomorrow. Moreover, this vision could function only in an independent and sovereign Tibet – free to decide its proper way of governance – but it would be contradicted by the Chinese constitutional framework to which it doesn’t refer by the way. So, quite paradoxically, this vision found in Middle Way policy is tacitly or unintentionally an advocacy for Rangzen. But more significant is the top down democratic initiatives and progression, only due to the goodwill of the Dalai Lama who still confronts the many resistance: a new initiative which the Tibetans seem to find hard to take themselves, or at least just to anticipate and implement.

So, in exile, the successive reforms of the constitution brought the right to vote, the separation of powers, the election of Parliament Members and Prime Minister through direct suffrage. But having democratic institutions, as perfect as they are, is not sufficient to establish a democracy if there remains a lack of any party expression relative to political ideals or objectives, to begin with the underlying – but non formalised – opposition between Rangzen and Autonomy. Democracy would be an empty word if it could not allow political discussions and if it would be impossible to know who represents who or who represents what. And there is no question here of region or religious sect, but only of political ideals, programmes or objectives carried by parties sharing a common stand.

More fundamentally the question is about the mode of parliamentary representation and about the process of decision. The role and the vocation of a political party are to participate in governance and to the decision-making process – including the role of opposition. Thus to invest all the areas of decision, especially in the parliament where the policy of the exile government is voted. But till now the Tibetan Parliament in Exile and the Tibetan Charter don’t include this kind of political representation. This is not a question of presumed democratic model, but a question of political legibility and efficiency.

In the second issue of Alternative Tibetaine, we interview three influential Tibetan deputies of the present Tibetan Parliament in Exile: Karma Yeshi, Karma Choephel (co-chairman) and Penpa Tsering (co-chairman). According to Karma Choephel, even the National Democratic Party of Tibet (NDPT), the unique “party” in exile, is not a real political party: “NDPT is supposed to be a preparation for the future” in accordance to the vision of the Dalai Lama who “envisages a dual or multiparty parliamentary system of democracy for future Tibet”.

Even Karma Yeshi, who “(has his) share of contribution in the formation of NDPT and strongly (supports) its manifesto and political stand”, acknowledges that he is not himself, literally speaking, deputy of NDPT. He adds that “the main issue is formation of one or two more political parties and getting them endorsed by the parliament as well as Tibetan election commission”. However, according to Penpa Tsering, “it may be possible for political parties to function within the present structure”, before adding: “but I did not see any move from any quarters to effect such change”.

Penpa Tsering also specifies that “political parties need definite political ideology and programs and leadership. Either we are lacking in one or all, or we are satisfied with the way it is and focus on the (presumed) common goals”. And Penpa Tsering wonders “why people who feel very strongly about political parties do not form one on their own or collectively with other people?”. This is the real question.

For the moment, it appears that Rangzen and political party system creates a kind of unrest and even of taboo among Tibetan parliament and community. Both issues stigmatize a feeling of direct conflict or confrontation with the Dalai Lama and his Middle Way approach: an incorrect prejudice harmful not only to Rangzen but to the whole Tibetan struggle. Fundamentally democracy is based on difference of views, and opposition is a fundamental principle. Democracy is the only solution to leave the present political stalemate in exile, and the Dalai Lama himself did his best to bring democracy to the Tibetan community in exile. As Tenzin Tsundue says in “Mangtso: Our Democratic Vision” (2004): “Although we received our democracy as a blessing (from the Dalai Lama), we must endeavour to make it work. And we have been most unwilling to do just that; take up democratic responsibilities”.

For the moment, the thought process within the Tibetan parliament and community seem unprepared or not ready for political party representation. However one step at least could be realised. As Karma Choephel says in his interview: “At present it can be said that within the Tibetan parliament there is a majority support for the Middle Way policy. But I sense that the longer the present stalemate, of getting no concrete response from the Chinese side remains, more members tend to waver in their position. (…) So I feel that in future also if the stalemate remains, support for Rangzen will grow in the house”. This analysis is confirmed by the fact that, during the last legislative elections in March 2006, new deputies were elected and most of them, as well as former ones, are very close to Rangzen. So if political party representation may be premature for the moment, one stage exists: a parliamentary group. Then it remains with all these deputies close to Rangzen to gather and to form a Rangzen parliamentary group. Because ensuring the political representation of Rangzen is primordial, and representing Rangzen at the Tibetan Parliament – the ultimate decision-making body and the symbol of the Tibetan democracy – is an absolute necessity.

Rangzen parliamentary group

Except for the fact that a parliamentary group would be opportune to ensure the political representation of Rangzen – in default of a system of political party representation – it also presents some strategic advantages:

In his article “Political Transcription of Rangzen” published in the second issue of Alternative Tibetaine, Francois Corona, a French Rangzen activist, speaks about the method of the “parliamentary group” which he names the “method of the legislative smokescreen”. In many countries exist some Tibet parliamentary groups. This is the method of foreign governments to not engage on the Tibetan issue and to let their legislative representation respond to the citizens and electors expectations. By doing so, it is also a way for the governments to preserve the governing political parties from the electoral consequences of their compromise with China and to not hurt China as well. So we need to use the same arms as our political “adversaries” or presumed “partners”. This model presents many teachings and could be applied to the Tibetan movement by reversing the situation. There are several levels of analysis:

For the moment, Rangzen activists put pressure on their government in exile to change their present policy. But clearly, it would be too dangerous for the Tibetan parliament or government to become suddenly pro-independent, and it would be also premature in absence of a clear alternative strategy. However, without lowering the Rangzen cause and its highly moral signification, pragmatism and strategy are useful. Middle Way approach is not so bad for Rangzen cause. It is even the best protection for Rangzen to grow and to unify and structure its movement. As Middle Way approach is in the interest of China, it is also in the immediate and present interest of foreign nations. These will not harm a Tibetan leadership who act presently in their own interest, and the evidence is that they desperately support “dialogue with China” and consequently Middle Way policy – with no political results of course. But that is not the question.

During the time of maturation of the Rangzen movement and of its political representation, Middle Way approach should remain the government policy until political alternance and Rangzen alternative strategy are ready. This time would be also useful for Rangzen activists to gain political and international support.

To be clear again, it doesn’t mean that Rangzen activists should stop requesting their government to change their policy. But TGiE is as obstinate as frightened by the foretold failure of its proper policy and by its duty to maintain the Tibetan unity. So of course Rangzen activists should continue to put pressure on their government, but by keeping in mind the objective difficulties of this and the risks of a brutal change of policy. Even it remains extremely important, as Jamyang Norbu wrote in “Looking Back from Nangpa-la” (2007), to “take the Dalai Lama back”. He is the keystone of the Tibetan struggle, but he is at the same time the problem and the solution – the “Dilemma” that Rangzen activists as often but respectfully speak of. The fact remains that, in absence of an alternative strategy, the present position of the Dalai Lama is the “only solution”. He has no more latitude of manoeuvring. And the job of Rangzen activists is to build the bridge over the precipice to “take him back”.

However, in the present circumstances, “unity” may be a “trap”. Of course Tibetan people are all united in their aspiration to end the Tibetan suffering and to live in freedom. This is a common and indisputable goal. But “freedom” does not have the same political signification. The Tibetan opinion is not uniform and, if a consensus seems to exist on the basis of the Middle Way policy, it is in a delicate way. As Tenzing Sonam writes in “Until the Last Tibetan” (2007): “We (can) no longer pretend that this contradiction between our loyalty to the Dalai Lama and our instinctive belief in Tibet’s independence (does) not exist”. Except this “morass of conflicting goals and loyalties besetting the Tibet movement”, it has also many political consequences, not only by creating confusion, but also by giving opportunities to foreign governments or Chinese leadership to neutralise the Tibetan struggle. Then political unity with different and even opposite political goals is impossible and also counterproductive. As Francois Corona writes: “We rather need a clever political plurality than a sham unity as claimed by some”. The hope of unification of the whole Tibetan movement – including the parliament and the government – on the basis of Rangzen would be delicate for the moment and more certainly premature. The differentiation of two sides acting for their respective objectives is momentarily preferable, as well as the Middle Way approach as present policy of the Tibetan government to prevent any kind of retaliatory measures from foreign governments. In this framework, a Rangzen parliamentary group would be the best way to bring political alternance – and even convergence – and achieve a change of policy with less risks. It is of course necessary to review the policy of TGiE, as well as to restore the complete unity of Tibetan struggle on the basis of truth and justice: Rangzen. But we have to do so step by step.

Rough draft of a political solution

In a new article published in the second issue of Alternative Tibetaine, Jamyang Norbu draws some starting points for discussions on a political solution to Tibet issue. “One of the first steps that might be undertaken is to seek various local administrative bodies, state legislatures, even national parliaments to proclaim Tibet an ‘occupied country’. Such initiatives have been successfully undertaken before but always as one-off initiatives and never as a part of concerted campaign with a specific over-all goal. (…) A logical next step might be to seek governmental recognition of the TGiE. This may appear to be a difficult even impossible task but have we really tried?”

The suggestion of Jamyang Norbu is very consistent because it echoes to a previous resolution adopted by the European Parliament in July 2000. By this resolution, EP called on governments of the Member States “to give serious consideration to the possibility of recognising the Tibetan Government in Exile as the legitimate representative of the Tibetan people if, within three years, the Beijing authorities and the Tibetan Government in Exile have not, through negotiations under the aegis of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, signed an agreement on a new statute for Tibet”. Till now the so-called “renewed dialogue” with Beijing since 2002 and the present Tibetan policy have only helped China to wriggle out of EP ultimatum. But at the time of the deadline, in July 2003, EP should have evaluated their objectives and reformulated openly their recommendations in the framework of a new resolution. In the circumstances, attest the lack of any agreement between Beijing and Dharamsala and consequently call on Members States to recognise the Tibetan Government in Exile. Now the July 2000 EP resolution has not resulted in any kind of new process, therefore its content has neither been confirmed nor withdrawn. Theoretically, EP tacitly recognises the Tibetan Government, but by their constant silence and ulterior resolutions, they behave as if this resolution has never existed. If the three years deadline has now passed for a long time, at the grassroots, EP engagements remain as well as the obligation to implement this resolution that is still and more than ever justified by the lack of any China-Tibet agreement.

But to seek this international recognition, the first and absolute precondition is that the TGiE itself doesn’t refuse any such recognition, and not only accept it but manage to seek and to achieve it. By default of this precondition, another condition could be sufficient: a Rangzen parliamentary group giving the necessary political legitimacy to initiate and undertake a such campaign, supported by an unified and structured international Rangzen movement. In fact, this Rangzen parliamentary group and this international Rangzen movement are useful and absolutely necessary to any further strategies or campaigns.

All this could and should be discussed by Tibetan Rangzen activists during their next meeting, in December, in Dharamsala. As many of them – Sonam Topgyal, Jamyang Norbu, Lhasang Tsering, Karma Yeshi, Tenzin Tsundue, Sonam Wangdu etc. – met last June, they decided to organise a next meeting or conference at the end of this year to discuss further strategies. Technically, the formation of Rangzen parliamentary group could be planned as soon as possible – since there are several Tibetan deputies close to Rangzen. This initiative could then be made official during the next session of the Tibetan parliament, in March 2008. Furthermore, a Rangzen political party could emerge – a revitalised NDPT or a new “real” party – and campaign in view of the next Tibetan legislative elections, in 2010. For the first time, the formation of a Rangzen parliamentary group could also be the best political answer to China in view of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. However, Rangzen activists should not focus too much on Beijing Olympics, as fundamentally Rangzen cause has no link with Chinese affairs. Of course Beijing Olympics are a great opportunity to highlight Tibetan issue and to confront China, but it is not a goal in itself. It should not become a pretext to postpone again what is more important than everything: the unification and the structuring of the Rangzen movement and the advent of its political representation. Long term strategies have more consistence than immediate and just reactive actions.

To finish, it remains to say that Rangzen is not the threat of division and of conflict within the Tibetan community and their supporters. Rangzen is the promise of reconciliation and a door to exit out of present political crisis. Rangzen is also a very inspiring promise: to become sooner or later a reality. Democratisation in exile, diplomatic policy, activist strategies, international support and Rangzen are highly connected and very close to each other. And today, the time is to connect these. Yes, Rangzen is possible, but without getting ahead of schedule: step by step.

MV

This editorial was originally published in English on Phayul and Alternative Tibetaine.

Following interviews have been realised and published by Alternative Tibetaine (Tibetan Alternative, n °2, 2007), a French-language review completely devoted to the Tibetan issue. These interviews deal with democratic process in exile, its progression and its limits: electoral system, political representation, multi party system, etc. In one word: the mode of parliamentary representation and the process of decision. Three Tibetan deputies of the present Tibetan Parliament in Exile have been interviewed: Karma Yeshi, Karma Choephel (co-chairman) and Penpa Tsering (co-chairman). Interviews conducted by Mathieu Vernerey, editor of Alternative Tibetaine.

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1. PROMOTING MULTIPARTY SYSTEM

Interview of Karma Yeshi*

*Karma Yeshi: Tibetan deputy (U-Tsang), former vice-President of Tibetan Youth Congress (1995-2001), co-founder of the National Democratic Party of Tibet (1994)

Q: In March 2004, the Tibetan Parliament in Exile (TPiE) passed a resolution to review the exile administration’s policy of Middle Way Approach if no positive response from China came by March 2005. Would it not be opportune now to reformulate and to implement a such resolution?

K.Y: The main content of that very resolution is to empower parliamentarians to review ongoing process of dialogue. That resolution is not anti middle way policy. It is rather a sign of urgency in resolving our issue. Time is running out for us. We are already minority in our own country -Tibet. Our culture, language, identity and the very existence of Tibet is in great threat. That resolution could be used as a pressure from TPiE to the People’s Republic of China. Our dialogue team could make best use out of it.

Whether there are more young parliamentarians in TPiE or not, resolution to Tibet issue is our main target. We need to resolve our problem as soon as we could. We have no time. As stated above, tabling such resolution is need of the time. Looking at the attitude and sincerity of Chinese leadership, we can no longer trust them any more.

Q: This resolution was withdrawn in September 2004 in a context of great tension. Two regional associations threatened to resign from the Assembly if the resolution was not withdrawn. Aren’t the regional corporatism and the traditional rifts an obstacle in the democratic process, especially to the detriment of ideas, discussion and capacity of decision?

K.Y: A group of parliamentarians tabled a resolution in September, 2004. The content of this resolution is just to withdraw a middle way approach review resolution passed in previous session in March 2004. In fact this is a sign of democracy. You can lobby your parliamentarian colleagues and bring amendments to the policy now and then.

The second resolution of September 2004 was tabled by our colleagues in bit hurry without giving proper respect to the previous resolution. Those who are against first resolution could have waited till March, 2005 and let TPiE have open debate or discussion on the process of review. It would have at least given a platform for more discussions on middle way policy.

You cannot just generalize and say that second resolution was a sign of regional politics within TPiE. Apart from three overseas TPiE members, rest is elected through this door of provincial/regional and religious sects. If you smell any regional politics, we must change the very system of our election. Whether there are any regional politics or not; if this very system of election is not changed, others will just look at it with same eyes.

This TPiE represents both Tibetans in and outside Tibet. We are seeking freedom for Tibet consisting of all three provinces. From this angle, it has some meaning in present election system.

Q: During the last elections, you were elected with the support of the list ‘Youth for better MPs’. This initiative, which came from a group of young electors, proposed a list of nominees and a political draft over the traditional rifts. Shouldn’t such an initiative come from the nominees themselves and become the beginning of a real political party, indeed an opening on multiparty system?

K.Y: I won the last election not only because of this initiative by ‘Youth for better MPs’ alone. There are so many other groups who took active participation in every election. Initiatives of proposing nomination lists have been there in our society long time back. It is not just a new or first one.

His Holiness the Dalai Lama in his future political vision of Tibet, he clearly stated that future Tibet will be ruled by political party system. Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) gave birth to first ever political party called National Democratic Party of Tibet (NDPT) in 1994. This is a big initiative undertaken by TYC.

If we are looking for future democratic Tibet, every TPiE members must support this lone party to grow up to its fullest capacity. Those who do not agree with the political manifesto of NDPT must take initiative to give birth to another party and let Tibetan democracy grow for ever.

The present system of our parliament is party less. All members have to take both roles of ruling as well as opposition. Can a member effectively take both roles? I think it’s a big question mark.

I am always in support of political party system. But, not more than three parties. Through this political party system, we can keep constant check and balance on our parliamentarians too.

Q: Are you ready to form a political party or a parliamentary group to make Rangzen represented at TPiE?

K.Y: I have my share of contribution in the formation of NDPT. I strongly support its manifesto and political stand. NDPT stands for Rangzen. I do not necessarily have to form a party. Those who do not agree with the political ideology of NDPT can form another party. In fact it is important to bring support to political party system and bring changes in our election system too.

Q: So are you yourself a deputy of the NDPT and are there other deputies from this party in the new elected Assembly? Can we imagine that, in next elections, the NDPT will present a common list of nominees?

K.Y: I have been nominated by many groups – like NDPT, Youth for Better MPs, and some others too. When these different groups nominate somebody for parliamentarian candidates, it is just a group of lists for the public to think over it. You can not generalize that he or she is a deputy of that group or this group just because he or she is nominated by group A or B.

There are many elected deputies, who are nominated by NDPT as well as others too – like me. In which category you would like to put them in? Putting them in this category or that category is difficult.

NDPT will definitely present a common list of nominee for next election as before. Others will also present their nomination lists too. All these nominations are just lists of nominees by different NGOs or groups for people to think over it. 

The main issue is formation of one or two more political parties and getting them endorsed by the parliament as well as Tibetan election commission.

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2. RANGZEN GROWING

Interview of Karma Choephel*

*Karma Choephel: Tibetan deputy (U-Tsang), co-chairman of the Tibetan Parliament in Exile, former President and vice-President of the Tibetan Youth Congress (1985-1989), former President and co-founder of the National Democratic Party of Tibet (1994, 2004-2006)

Q: When you were elected as the Chairman of the Tibetan Parliament in Exile (TPiE), you resigned from the Presidential post of the National Democratic Party of Tibet (NDPT). But are you still member of the NDPT?

K.C: Yes, I am still an ordinary member of the NDPT.

Q: As a deputy at the TPiE, are you or do you consider yourself as a deputy of the NDPT?

K.C: No, mainly because the present Tibetan election system is not based on political party lines. Those members of the NDPT who belong to the U-Tsang or Central Tibetan province might have voted for me. Basically therefore, I am a deputy of this province.

Q: Till now, the TPiE has no political party system. However the NDPT exists and presents itself as a political party. Consequently why isn’t it represented at the TPiE, and, if it is not represented within this Assembly, in what consists its role as a political party?

K.C: NDPT was started by Tibetan Youth Congress initially on the expressed advice of His Holiness the Dalai Lama mainly to act as a forum and an initiator of further democratic exercises as a preparation for the future Tibetan polity. I believe that in the vision of His Holiness, he also envisages a dual or multiparty parliamentary system of democracy for future Tibet and he felt that the beginning must be made in exile. So I do not hope for any full fledged role for the party while in exile as long as the present election system is in place. NDPT is supposed to be a preparation for the future.

Q: NTPD stands for Rangzen. Yourself, how do you conceive the parliamentary action for Rangzen within the TPiE?

K.C: At present it can be said that within the Tibetan parliament there is a majority support for the Middle Way policy. But I have a sense that the longer the present stalemate of getting no concrete response from the Chinese side remains more members tend to waver in their position. So I have seen that from the 11th House till now more and more members have changed their position. Therefore, my proposed resolution to review the Middle Way policy got the majority support. That it got changed in the next session is another story which had more to do with the political exigency rather than individual support. So I feel that in future also if the stalemate remains support for Rangzen will grow in the house.

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3. PRACTICES AND CONSTITUTION

Interview of Penpa Tsering*

*Penpa Tsering: Tibetan deputy (Dho-Me), co-chairman of the Tibetan Parliament in Exile, Director of the Tibetan Parliamentary and Political Reaserch Center (TPPRC).

Q: Till now the Tibetan Parliament in Exile (TPiE) has no political party system. Why?

P.T: The Tibetan Charter (Constitution) does not deal on the issue of Political Party. Presently we function as a party-less democracy, for some it has remained a theoretical intellectual concept but in our case it is a reality, partly because of the nature of our existence as an exiled government and partly because of the political expediency to retain the identity of traditional Tibet. 

People’s Republic of China persists that only Tibet Autonomous Region is Tibet. But for the Tibetans, the whole of Tibet including Kham and Amdo is Tibet. The equal representation of Provinces in the Parliament in Exile irrespective of the number of Tibetans from each province in exile is based on this political imperative than unequal rights. Given the fact that about 75% (appox.) of the Tibetans are from Central Tibet (U-Tsang) and the rest from Kham and Amdo, naturally gives rise to belief that equal suffrage or one man one vote would tilt the representation to one province, which in turn would be a powerful tool in the hands of China to divide the Tibetans inside Tibet.

Of course this must be one of the most debated issues in the exiled community over the last 35 years but no one has been able to come up with a solution that could satisfy all. And there are proponents of different theories on this concept. It seems very unlikely for the situation to change in Exile but once we get back to Tibet, the reasons I have mentioned above holds no water and the polity then would be guided by the “Guidelines for Future Tibet” by His Holiness. 

But then again one cannot rule out possibilities of political parties within the present structure of representation. So far no other party has emerged other than the Democratic Party of Tibet. May be the time has not come or people do not see the need for one to make it more complex.

Q: However would it not be useful to harmonize the Tibetan system of election and then to let or encourage the suffrage be expressed according to the political objectives and programs carried by political parties?

P.T: One thing that needs to be kept in mind is that the government in Exile has no hand in forming or closing political parties. The democratic party of Tibet was formed and it still exists. Why it is not successful is a different story. Sometimes I wonder as to why people who feel very strongly about political parties do not form one on their own or collectively with other people. On the other hand political parties need definite political ideology and programs and leadership. Either we are lacking in one or all, or we are satisfied with the way it is and focus on the (presumed) common goals.

There have been lots of discussions on universal suffrage and constituencies. Presently, the idea is that once we are elected from any province or religious tradition or constituencies such as Europe and North America, we represent all the six million Tibetans. When we talk about geographical constituencies, the chapter that deals with the structure of parliament has to be amended, which seems to be an impossible task at the moment. On the other hand, even if we manage to create geographical constituencies, the political implication on the overall movement of Tibet has to be considered, which in my view is more important than the uniqueness of our electoral system.

With regard to Universal Suffrage of one man one vote. Presently, monks, nuns and Ngag-pas get to vote 12 people, lay people in India, Bhutan and Nepal get to vote 10 people and Europe two and North America one. Except for murmurs within the community, there have not been persistent efforts to harmonize the system.

Like I said, it may be possible for political parties to function within the present structure, but I did not see any move from any quarters to effect such change.

Q: So do you confirm that NDPT or any new party can be represented through the TPiE and have its proper deputies?

P.T: I am sure it is possible. If a strong political party comes into being and campaigns vigorously based on their political ideology, within the religious, provincial and geographical constituencies, they certainly can. Same goes for the post of Kalon Tripa (equivalent to Prime Minister).

Q: When you succeed Mr. Karma Choephel to the post of Chairman of the TPiE, what arrangements will you make to encourage and establish a real political party system?

P.T: My mandate is to run the parliament in the best possible way without bias, to improve the image of the parliament and make the parliament more effective in its functioning. On political party system, I personally do not advocate for one at the moment and when I take over, I do not think the ground realities will change to initiate such moves.

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itw: MV

These interviews were originally published on Phayul and Alternative Tibetaine (Karma Yeshi ; Karma Choephel ; Penpa Tsering).