The Tibetan Resistance and the Role of the CIA 
Freud’s favourite image of the mind was as an archaeological site, ﬁlled, layer by layer, with the buried strata of the past (but one where these layers could rise into consciousness at any time). However the Tibetan national mind, or at least that part of our collective memory which deals with our recent and violent history could perhaps be best compared to an iceberg. A small part of it ﬂoats in our view, mostly during the annual Tenth of March commemorations, while the far greater mass moves silently unseen beneath the surface of our hypocrisy and indifference. Yet history abhors such disregard, and the past may yet one day surface to upset the cherished ﬁction of our ofﬁcial non-violent history and ideology.
In marked contrast to developments in other areas of Tibetan studies, very little attention has been paid to modern Tibetan history, and within that, even less to the violent and cataclysmic period in the 1950s and 1960s when the Tibetan people, especially the tribesmen from Eastern and North-Eastern Tibet, took up arms against Chinese domination. What few published accounts of the Tibetan Resistance movement exist are on the whole vague about ﬁgures, place-names and details of the people involved.
Such books as Tibet in Revolt by George Patterson, From the Land of Lost Content by Noel Barber, The Cavaliers of Kham by Michel Peissel and The Secret War in Tibet by Lowell Thomas Jr. are good reads, supportive of the Tibetan cause and probably the best that could be done at the time with the limited information available, but they are on the whole rather nebulous works. In a couple of them the authors make no mention of the real leaders and participants in the uprising, while glorifying as heroes and resistance leaders, people who were not only nothing of the sort, but often well-known collaborators.
There has also been a singular lack of inquiry into the Resistance movement on the part of the exile Tibetan government. The government has always had an uneasy relationship with the Resistance. The wide extent and popularity of the Resistance highlighted the failure of the government’s policy of co-operation with the Chinese occupation forces. Traditional prejudices between Khampas and the Lhasa government also played their part. Early in the 1960s the exile Tibetan government did attempt to gather statements from as many refugees as it could and collected a number of accounts from people involved in the Resistance. These accounts were never very extensive or detailed, and only a few of them were ever published. A number of these records seem to have been lost or misplaced, but an attempt is being made to put them back together as far as possible.
The Resistance itself did not go in for documenting its activities in any systematic or extensive way, and was suspicious of other people’s attempts to do so. With the establishment of connections with the CIA there was an almost obsessive insistence on secrecy that was carried to a degree where it did more harm than good. No real attempt was made to publicise the activities of the Resistance to the world. Even within Tibetan exile society, little attempt was made to inform the public of its activities. Secrecy was also maintained so as not to embarrass the governments of India or Nepal where the Resistance maintained bases and agencies.
After the closure of the last guerrilla bases in Mustang in 1974, the Four Rivers, Six Ranges organisation in India, mainly composed of former Resistance members, made attempts to gather and record detailed histories of every guerrilla group or dmag-sgar that had belonged to the Resistance movement. This project has apparently suffered considerable setbacks and it does not seem that it will be possible for these records to be published in the near future. A posthumous biography of the leader of the resistance, Gompo Tashi Andrugtsang, was published in India in 1973, but it was sketchy and badly translated. 
Lhamo Tsering, a leader of the Mustang guerrilla force and the assistant to Gyalo Thondup, one of the Dalai Lama’s elder brothers (who was a kind of overall leader of the Resistance for some years), has also written his memoirs. The book has not been published at the time of writing, but it promises to shed light on many aspects of Resistance history, probably focusing on Resistance activities in the 1960s and 1970s when he was involved in a position of responsibility.
Another person closely linked to anti-Chinese activities in Lhasa, especially in the mid and late 1950s, is the controversial Alo Chonze. He was one of the leaders of an underground Lhasa-based nationalist organisation, the Mimang (the “People”). He is publishing, in instalments, a semi-historical, semi-autobiographical account of the Tibetan Uprising and of the politics of exile. Two volumes have been released of which the ﬁrst provides interesting information on the Lithang Uprising (1956) and the formation of the underground Mimang organisation in Lhasa. 
My contribution to the subject has been a play Yuru (1981) about the uprising in Lithang and the tragic death of the resistance leader Yuru Pon. I also wrote Horseman in the Snow (1979) about the life and struggle of a Khampa warrior, Aten Dogyaltsang, and an account of the resistance in Nyarong and surrounding areas. The book was subsequently reissued as Warriors of Tibet in 1986.
Although many Resistance leaders and ﬁghters have died, a number are still alive in Nepal, India and Switzerland. Many of them, these days, seem willing to be interviewed and to talk freely about their past. In a recent French television documentary on the Tibetan Resistance,  Khampas spoke openly about their activities, their old CIA connections and even their connections with the Indian intelligence and military.
Washington still regards American support for the Tibetan Resistance as a sensitive issue, and the appropriate records remain classiﬁed. A few obscure newspaper articles  and some references in certain books on the CIA  are all that is available to the public on one of the few long-term and successful operations conducted by the American secret service. According to Fletcher Prouty, a colonel in the US Air Force who managed secret air missions for General Erskine’s Ofﬁce of Special Operations, Tibet is “buried in the lore of the CIA as one of those successes that are not talked about”. 
Such lack of information on the Tibetan Uprising has enabled the Tibetan leadership to successfully rewrite history, playing down the role of the armed revolt and fostering the ﬁction that popular resistance was non-violent. Though unhesitatingly subscribed to by many friends of Tibet, this story is patently untrue. There was never a non-violent campaign against the Chinese. Even the few public demonstrations before the uprising of March 1959 were not a display of the public’s commitment to non-violence; quite the reverse. They were a signal to the Chinese that the Tibetans were prepared to act violently to protect their leader and their religion.
This non-violent interpretation of modern Tibetan history has accorded only a minor role to the Resistance movement. It has even given rise to two very misleading assumptions, both of which we shall examine: ﬁrst, that the overall scale of the uprisings against the Chinese had not been signiﬁcant; and secondly, that the uprisings had been fomented by the CIA.
Magnitude of the Tibetan Uprising
From anecdotal evidence provided by surviving Resistance ﬁghters, refugees and recent escapees from Tibet, it would seem that during the uprisings the scale of the ﬁghting and the consequent deaths and dislocation in Eastern Tibet were enormous, and comparable in magnitude to the events in Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion. Yet the consequences of the Tibetan uprisings have not been as great for China as that of the Afghan conﬂict for the Soviet Union, especially since ofﬁcial propaganda ensured that the Chinese people remained largely ignorant of it. Still the Tibetan Uprising has remained the one persistent running sore that has tainted China’s otherwise successful efforts at keeping up appearances before the eyes of the world. Roderick MacFarquhar considered that the Tibetan Resistance produced “the gravest episode of internal disorder (in the People’s Republic of China) prior to the Cultural Revolution” 
Even if we were to discount the anecdotal evidence, the scale of demographic dislocation in Eastern and North-Eastern Tibet, where most of the ﬁghting took place, provides sufﬁcient evidence to substantiate the claim of many refugees as to the massive extent of the ﬁghting and casualties in these areas. One of the standard corroboration of this provided by the refugees is the claim that, subsequent to the crushing of the uprisings, all or most of the ploughing in the villages and districts were being done by women (unthinkable in the past) as there were no men left in the area.
Chinese ﬁgures taken from their 1982 census , ﬁfteen to twenty years after the revolt had been crushed, indicate a much larger ratio of women to men in Eastern and North-Eastern Tibet. Such disparate sex-ratio ﬁgures do not appear in other parts of Tibet or even China, although vast numbers of people died in these places too, for other reasons, such as the 1960–63 famine (probably the worst in human history), which affected both sexes equally. We must also bear in mind that the majority of the Tibetan people lived in Eastern and North-Eastern Tibet, where much of the ﬁghting had taken place.
No substantive effort has been made by any person or organisation, not even in the exile Tibetan government, to ﬁnd out the number of people killed in the uprisings in Eastern Tibet, or in the rest of Tibet and Lhasa. In fact the only published ﬁgure we have for Tibetans killed in the Lhasa Uprising and its aftermath is from ofﬁcial Chinese sources. A booklet marked “secret” and published in Lhasa on 1 October 1960 by the political department of the Tibetan Military District, says of the aftermath of the Lhasa Uprising: “From last March up to now we have already wiped out (xiaomie) over 87,000 of the enemy.” 
Earliest Resistance to the Chinese
Prevalent at one time among journalists and academics sympathetic to China was the idea that the Tibetan revolt was essentially a conspiracy of the Tibetan church, the aristocracy and the CIA, and that even the Dalai Lama’s ﬂight to India was engineered by the CIA.  Vestiges of such notions still prevail today.
Popular resistance in Eastern and North-Eastern Tibet began long before any American involvement in Tibet. In fact there is evidence to prove that sporadic resistance to Communist Chinese advances occurred in these areas even as early as 1949. We need not go into accounts here of earlier clashes between Tibetans and Communist forces, especially in 1934–35 during the Long March,  as these clashes were not related to the actual invasion and occupation of Tibet in later years.
In interviews with tribesmen from Gyalthang in South-Eastern Tibet, now part of Yunnan province, I learned that they had resisted the Red Army when it ﬁrst advanced into their territory in 1949. Their claims are, to some extent, conﬁrmed by the accounts of Peter Goullart,  a White Russian employee of the Kuomintang government, who served in the late 1940s as an agricultural expert in the Nakhi (Naxi) town of Lijiang in Yunnan province. Goullart states that in 1949, after the fall of Kunming, the provincial capital, and the Red Army push towards the west, Khampas from Gyalthang, which bordered Nakhi territory, came to Lijiang and, helped by local Nakhis, managed to inﬂict an initial defeat on an advance guard of the Red Army. Later, the Communists used more subtle tactics and inﬁltrated agents among the younger Nakhis, which led to their demoralisation and the fall of Lijiang to the Communists. Goullart also mentions that the Gyalthangwas were a more warlike and formidable people than the Nakhis.
Gyalthang’s resistance probably explain why it was one of the ﬁrst places in Eastern Tibet where “democratic reforms” were carried out from as early as 1953. Gompo Tashi Andrugtsang mentions the event in his autobiography: “In the area of Gyalthang Anthena Kham, the following year  the local population was divided into ﬁve strata and a terror campaign of selective arrest launched by the Chinese. People belonging to the ﬁrst three strata were either publicly humiliated or condemned to the ﬁring squad.” 
Another area of early resistance to the Red Army came from somewhere geographically very distant to Gyalthang, namely Hormukha and Nangra in Amdo, or North-Eastern Tibet. Here, the ﬁght against the Communist had been going on for a considerable time with Ma Bufang, the Kuomintang governor (in reality a semi-independent Muslim warlord) of Qinghai province, who led his Hui cavalry allied (sometimes) with Amdowa and Mongol tribesmen.  But when Communist victory seemed imminent in 1949, Ma Bufang ﬂed with his wives and treasure on two dc–10s. The Red Army reached Nangra and Hormukha in September 1949, according to an eyewitness, Rinzin,  who later also participated in the ﬁghting.
In December of the same year, the two chiefs of Nangra, Pon Wangchen and Pon Choje, led their men in the battle against the Chinese. There were a number of encounters, in one of which the son of Pon Wangchen was killed. Rinzin claims that the initial contingent of Chinese troops with whom they fought consisted of around six thousand men, who were later reinforced by an additional ten thousand troops from Rebkong after the outbreak of ﬁghting.
The people of Hormukha joined in the ﬁghting in February 1950, but by then it was too late to affect the outcome of the conﬂict as the Chinese had many more troops in the area. All the major Amdowa forces were destroyed. In one disastrous encounter Pon Choje was nearly captured but managed to escape by faking death. Nearly all the tribesmen were forced to leave their homes and take to the mountains from where they began hit-and-run guerrilla operations against Chinese supply lines and patrols. These operations proved more successful than the pitched battles they had been conducting till then. The Amdowas of Nangra claimed that, because of their determined resistance, the Chinese referred to Nangra as “Little Taiwan”.
In 1952 a truce was arranged by some Lamas of Dechen Monastery. Pon Wangchen was taken to Xining and then to Beijing, where he is said to have met Mao Zedong. There was a brief period of peace between 1952 and 1953, but once again the Chinese began denunciations, struggles, arrests and executions, and renewed ﬁghting broke out all over the territory. The Chinese had by now built up an overwhelming superiority in numbers and in quality of arms, and there was no doubt as to the ﬁnal outcome of the conﬂict. Many thousands of Amdowas were killed in the ﬁghting, executed or sent to labour camps. Many also committed suicide. Some escaped to Lhasa. In the words of Rinzin, “only a few blind men, cripples, fools and some children were left”. 
Such resistance against invading Chinese forces in the late 1940s and early 1950s was not a common phenomenon in Eastern and North-Eastern Tibet at the time. Nor did the Tibetan government forces receive much help from local Khampas when Communist troops attacked in October 1959. A considerable degree of the Tibetan government’s prestige and authority had waned in Eastern Tibet since 1918 when, under Kalon Jampa Tendar, Governor General of Eastern Tibet, Tibetan power and inﬂuence in that entire area had been at its pinnacle. 
Before the Chinese invasion of 1950, the Tibetan government had attempted to rouse the people of the frontier regions to resist the Red Army, but without much success. Taktser Rinpoche, one of the Dalai Lama’s elder brothers and abbot of Kumbum Monastery in Amdo, told me that his monastery had received a letter from Lhalu zhabs-pad (minister), the governor of Eastern Tibet and Commander of the Tibetan army there, a year before the invasion, instructing the monks of Taktser to resist Chinese forces. But Lhalu’s efforts to rouse Amdowa and Khampa loyalty were not very successful, except in a few cases, as at the monastery at Chamdo. 
Isolated though they were, the outbreaks of ﬁghting in Gyalthang, Nangra and Hormukha and certain other areas were of sufﬁcient scale and ferocity to be indicative of the coming course of events in Eastern Tibet. Soon Chinese policies in Eastern Tibet began to create a new wave of hostility against the occupation forces that became particularly violent around the winter of 1955–56, one of the most immediate causes being the implementation by the Chinese of a set of programmes labelled “Democratic Reforms”. The Chinese called this uprising the “Kangding Rebellion”  after the Chinese name for the Tibetan frontier town of Dartsedo, which was the Chinese headquarters for the whole of Eastern Tibet. The revolt spread like wildﬁre all over Eastern Tibet, and soon tribal chiefs from diverse areas tried to organise a joint effort to defeat the Chinese.
Yuru Pon, the paramount chieftain of the Lithang nomads, sent messengers all over Eastern Tibet calling for attacks on Chinese positions on the eighteenth day of the ﬁrst Tibetan month of 1956. Monasteries and tribes in Nyarong, Kanze, Bathang, Drango, Linkashi and other areas responded to this call to action. Yuru Pon later died in the bombed ruins of the Great Monastery of Lithang in the aftermath of a fake surrender where he killed two senior Chinese ofﬁcers with a concealed pistol. 
Dorje Yudon (Dorgee Eudon), the younger wife of the chief-tain of Nyarong, Gyari Nima, stated in an interview  that the Gyaritsang family received a letter from the Lithang chieftain asking them to revolt on the eighteenth day of the ﬁrst moon of 1956. He also wrote that he would send them another message conﬁrming the date of the revolt as soon as he received answers from all the chiefs in Eastern Tibet.
Since Gyari Nima had been summoned by the Chinese authorities to Dartsedo for a meeting, Dorje Yudon took up the leadership of the Gyaritsang clan and other tribes of Nyarong. When she organised meetings in various parts of Nyarong to persuade people to join her revolt, the Chinese authorities realised what she was up to and attempted to have her assassinated at her home by two Nyarongwa collaborators, aided by two Chinese soldiers.
The attempt failed, as did other attempts to arrest Dorje’s uncle and other leaders of the revolt in Nyarong. She was therefore forced to call the revolt four days earlier than the date agreed upon with Yuru Pon. The Nyarongwas were initially successful in destroying various small Chinese garrisons in the region and also in killing and capturing many collaborators. Surviving Chinese troops fell back on the Chinese administrative centre for Nyarong which was located at Drugmo Dzong, the Fortress of the Female Dragon. The surviving Chinese soldiers barricaded themselves behind the massive walls of the ancient fort and prepared to hold out. The Nyarongwas tried to storm the place a number of times but were unsuccessful.
The Chinese sent relief forces from Kanze which the Nyarongwas tried to intercept and ambush. Initially Dorje Yudon’s forces were successful but, after a month, larger Chinese forces from Drango and Tawu managed to break the siege of the Fortress of the Female Dragon. Dorje Yudon recalls that twenty-three tribal chieftains in Kham ﬁrst responded to Yuru Pon’s call to revolt, and that they called their loose-knit alliance Tensung dhanglang magar or “the Volunteer Army to Defend Buddhism”.
The Character of the Revolt
Though there were obvious limits to which military action could be co-ordinated among the various tribes of Eastern Tibet, the general uprising in 1956 did succeed in clearing the Chinese out of nearly all of Eastern Tibet for a brief period. The Red Army soon returned in greater strength and numbers, but that sad conclusion need not concern us here. Yet it is worth noting that, despite long-standing tribal animosities and differences, a fairly successful attempt was made to unite the efforts of Eastern Tibetans in ﬁghting the Chinese. When one considers that this attempt at co-ordination had to cover many hundreds of miles of mountain wilderness, without even basic communication equipment, roads or motorised transport, it is remarkable that such a widespread rebellion should have successfully taken place, more or less around the date agreed upon.
The name that the Khampas gave to their Resistance movement, “the Volunteer Army to Defend Buddhism”, reﬂects what may be called the ideological nature of the uprising, and thus the support it gained all over Eastern Tibet and later in Central Tibet. Dawa Norbu, in an article on the Tibetan Revolt, considered that the Khampa Uprising was in defence of Tibetan Buddhist values, and of the political and sacred institutions founded upon such values. “As long as the Chinese did not tamper with the objectively functioning social system and the value systems still considered sacred by members of that society, as happened in Outer Tibet, there was no revolt, although the unprecedented Chinese presence in the country caused great resentment and anxiety. But the moment the Chinese tried to alter the functioning and sacred social system in Inner Tibet which they considered de jure China proper, the revolt began.” 
This traditional ideology on which the revolt was based gave it sufﬁcient popular appeal to transcend the borders of Eastern Tibet and to ignite passions and violence even in Central Tibet, where the Chinese had caused no disruption in the social system, and where the aristocracy and clergy were being actively courted by the Chinese authorities. Hence many Tibetans have considered the Uprising a national one , in the sense that the sentiment of the majority of the Tibetan people were involved.
Yet the leaders and members of the resistance movement, mainly composed of Khampas and Amdowas, were too often unable to transcend narrow tribal loyalties, for the movement to take on a fully national and dynamic character. The traditional Lhasa-Khampa divide, though bridged on a number of occasions during the revolt, was also never reconciled satisfactorily. The other name of the resistance movement, Chushi Gangdrug, “Four Rivers, Six Ranges” — an ancient term for Eastern Tibet — might be seen as underlining the narrower and divided character of the movement.
With the savage suppression of the Uprising in Eastern Tibet and the large-scale movement of refugees to Lhasa, the focus of the Resistance shifted to Central Tibet, where, under the leadership of the Lithangwa merchant-chief, Gompo Tashi Andrugtsang, the earlier very loose-knit confederacy of guerrilla bands was re-organised, and a single Resistance army formally created on 16 June 1958, in the district of Lhokha, south of Lhasa. Weapons were purchased secretly from India.
Dawa Norbu points out that “the vast majority of the twenty-three Khampa leaders of the Tibet Revolt were merchants who had made their fortunes since the ‘Liberation’, as China kept pouring silver coins called dao-yuan into Tibet to pay the Tibetan ruling class and the road workers. But instead of making more money or running away to India safely with their silver fortunes, Khampas spent the Chinese money on the purchase of arms and ammunitions for the revolt.” 
The Resistance also received information from sympathetic ministers and ofﬁcials of the Tibetan government on the location and content of secret government arsenals. From these they removed substantial quantities of arms and ammunition , which enabled the guerrillas to cut off the three strategic highways south of Lhasa and near paralyse Chinese army operations in that area.
Limits of American Involvement
It is from these tumultuous and far-ranging events that the Tibetan Resistance movement takes its origins. It was only after these events and other successes, reports of which reached the ears of the American government in due course , that the United States actually sent assistance to the Resistance forces in Tibet, although this aid only began to reach the hands of the ﬁghters in 1958. By all accounts, during the crucial period of the Resistance in Eastern Tibet and during its greatest successes, no American arms or assistance of any kind were received by any Resistance group.
Accounts of the CIA engineering the Dalai Lama’s escape  seem to be mostly the result of creative journalistic imagination. The only agents the CIA had in Lhasa who attempted to make some kind of connection with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government were two Lithangwas, Athar and Lotse, who had been parachuted near Samye some time before the outbreak of the revolt in Lhasa. Lotse died a few years ago but Athar is still alive, in New Delhi. He told me that he and his partner secretly managed to see Phala, the Dalai Lama’s Lord Chamberlain (mgron-nyer chen-mo), who with Surkhang zhabs-pad, was the leader of the nationalist faction in the Tibetan government, and sympathetic to the Resistance.
Athar gave Phala a message from the American government asking for an ofﬁcial letter from the Tibetan government requesting American military aid. Phala told Athar that it was too late and that it would be impossible to trust the entire Cabinet or the Assembly with such a sensitive and potentially compromising message. Phala conﬁrmed this story of his meeting with Athar in a conversation I had with him some years ago before his death. Phala planned and organised the Dalai Lama’s escape using Athar and Lotse with their radio transmitter to keep the Americans informed of developments in the escape plan, and later during the actual escape itself.
The true extent and implications of the Tibetan Resistance have never been studied systematically.  From the little understanding I have managed to gain through conversations and interviews with people who were involved, I have come to realise that the amount and the quality of information on these events are frustratingly inadequate. The far greater mass of historical knowledge and memory ﬂoats undiscovered beneath the surface of our indifference and neglect.
It is my hope that the present ridiculous attitude of Tibetan ofﬁcials, Western dharma practitioners and New Age type supporters who regard the Resistance movement as an embarrassment — either because it somehow detracts from the preferred peace-loving image of Tibet as a Shangri-La, or because the Resistance committed the ultimate sin (for lefties at least) of accepting money and arms from the CIA — will change and a more realistic and inquiring attitude take its place.
Tibetan Review, 1994
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1. This essay started off as an “extempore” presentation at the conference “Fourty Years On: Tibet 1950–90”, held at the School for Oriental and African Studies, London on April 1990, and was subsequently published in Resistance and Reform in Tibet, edited by Robert Barnett and Shirin Akiner, Hurst & Co., London, 1994.
2. Gompo Tashi Andrugtsang. Four Rivers, Six Ranges: A True Account of Khampa Resistance to Chinese in Tibet, Dharamshala: Information Ofﬁce of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 1973.
3. Alo Chonze (Alo Chos-mdzed), Bod kyi gnas-lugs bden-’dzin sgo-phye ba’i lden-mig zhes bya-ba (The key that opens the door of truth to the Tibetan situation), self-published.
4. Marie de Louville and Michel de Castelverd, “Tibet. L’armée des ombres”, broadcast in the series Resistance by the TV channel Antenne 2, Paris, 2 September 1991.
5. Jeff Long, “Going after Wangdu: The Search for a Tibetan Guerrilla Leads to Colorado’s Secret CIA Camp”, Rocky Mountain Magazine, July – Aug. 1981.
6. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, New York: Dell, 1980.
7. Fletcher L. Prouty, “Colorado to Koko Nor: The Amazing True Story of the CIA’s Secret War Against Red China”, Denver Post, 6 February 1972.
8. Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
9. The Population Atlas of China, Oxford University Press, 1987.
10. Xizang xingshi wenwu jiaoyu di jiben jiaocai, Lhasa: Political Department of the Tibetan Military District, 1960.
11. Chris Mullin, “The CIA – Tibetan Conspiracy”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 September 1975.
12. Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, New York, 1938.
13. Peter Goullart, Forgotten Kingdom, London: Readers Union, 1957.
14. Andrugtsang, op. cit.
15. Leonard Clark, The Marching Wind, London: Hutchinson, 1957.
16. Tibet Under Chinese Communist Rule, Dharamshala: Information Ofﬁce of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 1976.
18. Eric Teichman, Travels of a Consular Ofﬁcer in Eastern Tibet, Cambridge, 1922
19. Robert Ford, Wind Between the Worlds, New York: David McKay, 1957.
20. Anna Louise Strong, When Serfs Stood up in Tibet, Beijing, 1960.
21. Alo Chonze, op. cit.
22. Holly Elwood, “Dorgee Yudon: The Leaders of the Rebels”, unpublished interview, 21 May 1989.
23. Dawa Norbu, “The 1959 Tibetan Rebellion: An Interpretation”, China Quarterly, no. 77, March 1979, pp.74 – 93.
24. Phuntsok Wangyal, “The Revolt of 1959”, Tibetan Review, July – August 1974.
25. Dawa Norbu, op. cit.
26. Andrugtsang, op. cit.
27. US Department of State, Ofﬁce of Intelligence Research, Division of Research for Far East, Intelligence Report no. 7341, “Unrest in Tibet”, 1 November 1956.
28. Mullin, op. cit.
29. The situation has improved with the publication of four volumes of Lhamo Tsering’s Resistance series by Amnye Machen Institute, though eight volumes remain to be published. The release of White Crane’s documentary on the CIA in Tibet, Shadow Circus, has made a considerable change in the Tibetan public and supporter’s appreciation of this important period of Tibetan history. Even two former CIA personnel connected to the Resistance have come out with their own books: Roger McCarthy’s Tears of the Lotus, and Ken Knaus’ Orphans of the Cold War. The latest book on the subject is Conboy and Morrison’s The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet.Unquiet Memories,